

A  
Just, Genuine, and Impartial  
**H I S T O R Y**  
Of the MEMORABLE  
**S E A - F I G H T,**  
I N T H E  
*Mediterranean :*

Between the  
Combined Fleets of FRANCE  
and SPAIN,

And the  
Royal Fleet of ENGLAND,

Under the  
Command of the two ADMIRALS  
*Mathews and Lestock:*

Together with  
The Proceedings that have been had, since  
their Return Home, in Relation to the solemn  
and publick Enquiry that has been made into  
their Conduct on that Occasion.

Faithfully collected, as well from printed Pieces,  
as original Papers and Letters, and methodi-  
cally digested into one regular Narrative.

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By an Impartial HAND.

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L O N D O N :  
Printed for the AUTHOR, and Sold by R. WALKER.  
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THE HISTORY

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# THE P R E F A C E.



*THE English Navy has, for many Ages, been the Bulwark of the Nation, the Guardian Angel of its Friends, and the Dread and Terror of its Enemies. In former Times, wherever the Royal Fleet appeared, it brought with it Life, Succour, and Deliverance to its Allies, but inevitable Ruin and Destruction to those who presum'd to oppose its Power. The very Name of a British Admiral, in those Days, had the Weight of an Army, and in whatever Part of the World his Broad Pendant was display'd, Homage and Respect were paid to the glorious Signal. Whoever read the History of those brave Commanders Drake, Raleigh, Blake, and many others of our marine Heroes, without Astonishment at their Surprizing Atchievements? They carried the Delight and Terror of the*

British Name to the utmost Parts of the Globe, and brought to their own Country, Wealth and Glory, both from Friends and Foes. Our Officers in general, had then, the strictest Regard to their own Honour, as well as to that of the Nation; they never suffer'd private Piques and Quarrels to mingle with their Duty; in Time of Action, every Contention was laid aside, except that of advancing the Glory of the British Flag. The high Post of Admiral, in those Times, was never fill'd, but with a Person, who arrived at it through a long Series of faithful Services, by the Dint of his own Merits, distinguished Abilities, long Experience, and approved Conduct; and therefore he had always the greatest Regard and Deference paid him by his Officers; and as to the common Sailors, such was their Veneration, I might almost say, Adoration, of him, that they knew no other Monarch, and scarce any other God, besides. Our Commanders were then animated with true Glory, and the Love of their Country, and our Sailors never flinch'd, when the Honour of Old England was the Point in Dispute.

Such was the Humour of our Ancestors! too rough and unpolite for the Imitation of their more delicate and mannerly Descendants. Merit and old Services grow rusty by lying by; whereas a servile Complaisance, a rich Dress, a handsome Present judiciously plac'd, and a constant Attendance at the Levees of the Great, shall command greater Favours, than many

## *The* PREFACE.

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*Years of hard and faithful Service. I wish our own Times could not afford many Instances of this Sort: However, tho' the martial Spirit of the English, seemed a good while to have been lost, and buried in a Dunghil of Corruption, yet it looks as if the Time of its Resurrection was at Hand; the Spirit of Enquiry has possessed our Senators, and the People in general seem determin'd, without any Regard to Names, to bestow their Favour or their Censure, on the Object that has the best Title to it.*

*The late inglorious Action in the Mediterranean, claims our strictest Attention; since by that, I may say, fatal Miscarriage, we lost the only Opportunity that we shall, probably, ever have, of ruining the combin'd Fleets of France and Spain, and thereby disconcerting their Projects upon Italy. By what Means, and in what Manner, this happened, has been the Subject of a Parliamentary Enquiry; but what is transacted within the Walls of that august Assembly, must not transpire to the Publick, except it be by some Conveyance of their own. However, as there was nothing brought under Examination there, but what was before well known to all the Officers in the Fleet, and to every Body else, who were in, or Spectators of the Battle, we are as capable of giving as true and exact Account of the whole Affair, from Eye witnesses, as if we had heard the Examination of every Person that gave his Testimony before the Committee of the honourable House of Commons. Our Materials for  
this*



*this Work have been collected from the most authentick Papers that have been published, as well as private Intelligences, and original Letters. In writing this Account, the strictest Regard has been had to Truth, and the utmost Impartiality observed in speaking of Persons and Things; nothing is exaggerated above, nothing lessen'd below its just Measures; we neither applaud nor censure, judge nor condemn, and only relate Things in the Manner they occur'd, and leave the candid, unbiass'd Reader to make his own Reflections upon the Whole.*







A

Just, Genuine and Impartial

# HISTORY

Of the MEMORABLE

## SEA-FIGHT,

IN THE

### *Mediterranean, &c.*



THE Miscarriage of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean* is become a general Topic in Conversation. We have all along flatter'd ourselves, especially as so much Care had been taken to supply and reinforce that Fleet, till at last there were not more Ships left at Home, than were absolutely necessary, to disappoint and defeat any Designs that might possibly be attempted by the *Brest* and *Rockfort* Squadrons; that so great a Force, supported at such an immense Expence, so great a Length of Time, with the Aid and Assistance of our good and powerful Ally, the King of *Sardinia*, would disconcert all the Projects

jects of our Enemies in that Quarter of the World, and infallibly frustrate the ambitious Views of *Spain*, in settling Don *Philip* in *Lombardy*; and if the combined Fleets of *France* and *Spain* came out to Sea, so great was our Dependence on the Strength of our Fleet, that we seemed to be perfectly sure that their Destruction must inevitably ensue. Then all Murmuring among the People, under Pretence that the public Treasury was exhausted in maintaining useless Fleets, would have ceased, when our *Mediterranean* Fleet had the Glory to finish a War, whereby our Commerce has so much languished, and our Strength diminished, and brought about an advantageous and honourable Peace, where this Commerce flourished again under the Protection of our wise Laws, and Plenty became universal. But alas! how great is our Disappointment, when we find this Opportunity lost, and the severe Necessity we are under of continuing these great Expences! Whether this Misfortune has proceeded from want of Experience in a great Command (agreeable to the late Duke of *Argyle's* Observation) or a Capacity to execute so great a Design, Strength of Judgment, or from whatever other Cause it has proceeded; yet the Nation, thus injured, has an undoubted Right to make an Enquiry and cry aloud for Justice: To punish with the utmost Rigour is Brutality and not Justice: But here, where the Interest of the Publick is so greatly concerned, a too extensive Good-nature, which has not Force to punish so much Evil, would not be a Virtue, but a Weakness, which might produce the worst of Consequences.

In order to do Justice to the Character of both these Admirals, *Mathews* and *Lestock* (under whose Conduct the *British* Fleet suffered so much Loss and Dishonour) and to give the Reader an

Idea

Idea of their respective Qualifications, as Sea-Officers, it will be necessary to introduce some Pieces that have been published on the Occasion, which will set in a pretty good Light the Conduct of each of them, and lead us on gradually to the great Point in View, that memorable Fight in the *Mediterranean*, in which, by the Misconduct of one or both these Commanders, or the Misunderstanding that was betwixt them, our Naval Glory suffered such an Eclipse, and the common Cause such a Prejudice, as must be for ever lamented by every true honest hearted *Briton*.

The first Piece, from which I shall make some Extracts for my Purpose, is an historical Account of the Proceedings of the Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, from the Year 1741 down to the Engagement before *Toulon*. It is written by a Friend of Mr. *Lestock*, and vindicates and extols the Conduct of that Gentleman, not without reflecting, with a great deal of Acrimony, on the Behaviour of Mr. *Mathews*. But, that I may keep an even Hand between both, I shall subjoin Extracts from Pieces, which have appeared likewise in Behalf of Mr. *Mathews*; and thus by setting one against the other, we shall be the better able to find out the Truth, and fix the Blame where it ought to be. Come we now to the Matter in Hand.

The Suspension of a Vice-Admiral of the White-Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet, and sending him home in the *Salisbury*, with Merchant Ships under her Convoy, at so critical a Conjunction, when his Experience and Knowledge might be necessary, are extraordinary Instances of the Power and unbounded Authority of an Admiral abroad; and what makes it more surprizing, this Vice-Admiral was thought to be so consummate and experienced a Commander by his Majesty, that the other Admiral had Leave lately to come Home for the Re-

covery of his Health, and a Commission was sent out appointing him Commander in Chief in the *Mediterranean*; as appears from the following Letter.

*Admiralty Office, Decem. 10, 1743.*

SIR,

MY Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty having thought proper to appoint you Commander in Chief of his Majesty's Ships in the *Mediterranean*, in the Absence of Admiral *Matthews*, I am commanded by their Lordships to acquaint you, that a Commission appointing you to that Post, together with an Order for your obeying his Majesty's Orders, signified to you by the Secretaries of State; and Powers to administer the Oaths, and assemble Court Martials, are sent to Admiral *Matthews*, who will deliver them to you, on his resigning the Command of the Fleet to you.

I am, Sir, Your's, &c.

THO. CORBETT.

P. S. Admiral *Matthews* has also a Commission, appointing you Vice-Admiral of the White Squadron, which he is directed to deliver to you.

*To Vice-Admiral LESTOCK, &c.*

Many Persons are alarmed, and cannot possibly judge or surmise any Cause for this Proceeding against the Vice-Admiral; numberless and various are the Reasons given by others; some attribute it to Treason or Cowardice; others are silly enough to affirm it to be for holding a *Correspondence* with the Enemy, or being in Concert with the disaffected Persons, who were to favour the Invasion in Behalf of the Pretender; nothing less flagrant say they,



they, considering all Circumstances, can justify such a new and unprecedented Stretch of Command in a Brother Admiral. It has been observed by the Sea Officers, that had any Part of the Vice-Admiral's Conduct displeased in the late Fight with the *Spaniards*, the Admiral who commanded was too good an Officer to have suffered him to have continued his Authority after that, and in Sight of the Enemy, when a more general Action was expected every Moment: Likewise it has been said, that he did not obey immediately the Signal to give over chasing the Enemy the second Day after the Battle, when they escaped with their lame Ships; for the *Winchelsea*, a Frigate of 20 Guns, was sent after him, whose Captain told the Vice-Admiral, that it was the Admiral's Directions to give over Chace, and to come into the Fleet, and keep near to him. In short, all that we are able to gather from so many different Accounts, is the Certainty that these Gentlemen never lived in any Friendship or Harmony; whenever they met they were Opposites, as is manifest from the following Letters.

*Neptune, Hieres Road, Nov. 9, 1742.*

S I R,

Captain *Lovett* has told me your good Intentions towards him, in removing him into a Fourth Rate; at the same Time, you think of removing Captain *Lingen* from the *Elizabeth* to be my Captain. The *Elizabeth*, I think, is as good a Seventy Gun Ship as any the King has; and as Capt. *Lingen* was put into her from the *Cambridge* by his Friend and Relation, Sir *John N—s*, I must suppose, if he has not been guilty of some extraordinary Crime, it is doing him an Injury; and if he has been guilty of such, I should at least know it before I can give my Opinion (if my Opinion

be necessary) for or against what is proposed by the Message from you by Captain *Lovett* to, Sir,

Your's, &c.

RICH. LESTOCK.

*Namur, in Hieres Road, Nov. 10, 1742.*

S I R,

I Desired Captain *Lovett* to acquaint you, that he had been strongly recommended to me by several People, most of whom I was desirous of obliging, and that I designed to give him a Fourth Rate, and to appoint Captain *Lingen* to be Captain of the *Neptune*, judging he would be an agreeable Person to you, as you had bred him up, consequently was well acquainted with him. In Answer to which, you are pleased to write me a Letter, the Contents of which are past my Understanding; except you mean, that no Person ought to be appointed your Captain, but by Way of Punishment for any Crimes he may have committed, and you to be acquainted with them, that you may judge whether or no those Crimes deserve so severe a Punishment. I am, Sir,

Yours, &c.

THO. MATHEWS.

*Neptune, Hieres-Road, Nov. 12, 1742.*

S I R,

I Have the Favour of your Letter of the 10th Instant; I am sorry I should write any Thing to you, not plainly to be understood, and therefore I take the Liberty to explain it thus. — If it be Preferment, or a Favour conferred on Captain *Lovett*, to remove him from being my Captain, to the Command of a Fifty Gun Ship, it is, without Doubt, a Preferment to the Captain of a Fifty Gun

Gun Ship to have the *Elizabeth*, and consequently in my Opinion, an Injury to the Person put to be Captain of this Ship from the *Elizabeth*; for, as I understand it, Captain *Lovett* is to be removed, that Chance may put it in his Power to make his Fortune, which by being here it is not, and, by the same Parity of Reason, he who comes here has it put out of his Power.

Captain *Lingen* I brought up, and he has been always very grateful in his Acknowledgments to me, but he has had a Command upwards of 32 Years, and is now between 50 and 60 Years of Age. I need not trouble you with my Age and Constitution; but I am obliged to say, for the Support of the Honour of the Flag I bear, that a young and active Man is absolutely necessary for a Captain to me, and indeed to all Admirals, and when I lose Captain *Lovett*, I hope to have such a one.—I do not point out to you whom you should prefer, but the eldest Master and Commander is *George Stepney*, who is a young and active Man.—Not that I know any more of him than on the Services he has been employed in since I have been on this Voyage, but by what I have said, I do not intend to dispute your Authority, being, Sir,

Yours, &c.

R. LESTOCK.

*Namur, in Villa Franca Harbour, Nov. 16, 1743.*

SIR,

YOU cannot possibly be more desirous of commanding in chief, than I am of resigning; it is my real Opinion that one of us two will go home, and that soon, but it is not in my Power yet to say which of us will go; let that be as it may, I will take Leave to give you a Piece of good Advice; In the first Place, treat your Captains with  
more

more Decency, and in the Manner Officers ought to be. It ill becomes a commanding Officer to send for Sail-makers into his Cabbin, and to ask him Questions, which, by their Nature, are leading to accuse Captains of indirect Practices, the Consequences of which you are full well acquainted with. Indeed it is the first Time I ever knew that a Flag-Officer gave himself the Trouble of sending for other Ships Sails to repair them in his own Ship, the doing of which (particularly that Ship's Sails) appears to me in a very odd Light, as does the latter Part of your Letter to Captain *Ambrose*, in Answer to an Officer like, well-bred Letter; all kind of Stores belonging to the King are to be made Use of for the Good of his Service. I am no Store-keeper, but when any Demands are brought me, I supply them, if any such be in any of the Ships under my Command: I do not remember that I ever made that Reply to any Commander, nor indeed do I believe it was ever done before by any Flag. It is the Captain's Duty to make known his Wants to his commanding Officer, and I take Leave to say it is his Duty to supply those Wants, if judged to be such by him, and they are to be had either afloat or on Shore. Such Replies are peevish and waspish, and unbecoming the Dignity of a commanding Officer.

I am Yours, &c.

THO. MATHEWS.

*Neptune, Hieres Road, Nov. 18, 1743.*

SIR,

I Do not understand your saying that I cannot possibly be more desirous of commanding in chief than you are of resigning, and it is your real Opinion, that one of us two will go home, and that soon, &c.

I am



I am always glad to be advised, but will not take up your Time in answering the long Paragraph in your Letter relating to the *Rupert*, any more than that her Rudder was on her Deck, she was caulking, and the Captain sent to me desiring to heel, when his Rudder was hung, and the Caulking compleat; in regard to those Circumstances, and to those only, I sent for the Sails to this Ship: And as to my Answer to the Captain's Letter, I had told him I would, on writing to me, supply every Specie of Store desired, and to be had, but as Demands were Scraps of Paper, I would not have them made to me, only such as were to be sent to *Mahon* to the Commissioner: This had been told to other Captains as well as to him, before the Letter he takes Notice of.

I am, Sir, Your's, &c.

RICH. LESTOCK.

After the Fleet got into *Mahon* Harbour, there was a Paper War carried on between them; where it is said, that the junior Flag at last was led by his Attachment to his King and Country, and in Justification to himself, to speak in very strong Terms, and with too little Respect, considering the known Custom and Practice at Sea, which is never to speak Truth in Contradiction to your superior Officer, even if it should happen to be in Defence of your own unblemished Reputation, and absolutely necessary for the Execution of his Majesty's Service. It is a Maxim only to speak such Truths as will be agreeable to him, otherwise you are never to be forgiven. To conclude, either the one or the other must be to blame; the Superior in depriving his Majesty of the Service at this Time, of so able and brave an Officer, or the Inferior in doing something deserving of this Censure:

sure: However, it will be doing Justice to the Publick and to this Gentleman, before we go any farther to take a View of his Character.

We find when the late Lord *Torrington*, who was a great Sea-Officer, introduced him to the King, he was pleased to say, That he took the Liberty to recommend to his Majesty's Favour one of the most able, and the best Quarter-deck Officers that ever had been bred at Sea. This has been always the Judgment of every Sea-Officer, even Mr. *Lestock*'s Enemies cannot help acknowledging his great Capacity and Understanding: That he is indefatigable in his Duty, knowing, well qualified, and so perfectly acquainted with every Branch of the Navy; that the Difficulties of the greatest Command cannot exceed the Bounds and Extent of his Genius. It appears, that he has been constantly employed in his Majesty's Service from his Infancy; never any Length of Time on the Half Pay: Consequently with no more than equal Talents, he must excel those in Knowledge and Experience, who have lived ashore any Number of Years, and are but newly returned to retrieve what they have lost, by a long Absence from their Trade.

These Talents, both natural and acquired, endeared him to Admiral *Vernon*; and he no sooner join'd him at *Jamaica*, than that brave Officer, in Justice to his Merit, gave him a Commission to wear a distinguishing Pendant, and appointed a Captain to the *Boyne* under him.

When the Fleet returned from *Carthagena* to *Port Royal*, he was dispatched home with the three Deck-Ships, where he arrived at the Time that the *French* and *Spanish* Squadrons were triumphantly carrying on the Settlement of Don *Philip* in *Italy*: He, therefore, as the properest Person, was sent with a Reinforcement to the Aid and Assistance of  
Admiral

Admiral *Haddock*; but when he got to *Mahon*, he found that Gentleman, from an Indisposition, altogether incapable of commanding, with the greatest Part of the Fleet very sickly and unfit for Sea; while the *Spaniards* continued to send, and carry on their Embarkations to *Italy* with all imaginable Success.

Admiral *Haddock's* Indisposition, and his appointing Mr. *Lestock* to command during his Illness, appears from the following Extract of a Letter from the Former to the Latter:

*Extract of a Letter from Admiral Haddock to Mr. Lestock.*

Mahon, 6th March, 1741.

S I R,

I Nclosed goes the Copy of an Order I have thought fit to deliver to the Captains of his Majesty's Ships, for their observing such Directions as you shall give them, during my Indisposition, for the more speedy Equipping, and getting their Ships respectively in a Readiness for the Sea, &c.

N——s H——d.

By Nicholas Haddock, Esq; Rear-Admiral of the Red Squadron, &c. and Commander in Chief, &c.

Whereas it is absolutely necessary, from the Indisposition I am at present subject to, that the Equipment of the Squadron in all Respects should be carried on by the Direction of Commodore *Lestock*, the second Officer in Command, you are therefore hereby required, and directed, to cause the Ship you command be kept in a constant Readiness for the Sea, and to observe Mr. *Lestock's* Orders, for the present, in every Thing that shall be most conducive to the Equipment of the Squadron,

dron, and in Consequence the Service of his Majesty. Dated at ——— March 6, 1741.

N——s H——K.

*To the Captains and Commanders  
of his Majesty's Ships and Vessels in Port.*

No Time was lost by this active Officer; and by great Diligence and constant Attendance, the Fleet was equipped and many of the Ships careened. The Seamen were recovered from the Hospital, and by reducing every Ship's Complement in Proportion, with the additional Help of 500 Soldiers from the Island, they were all in a Condition to sail in much less Time than could have been expected: But it seems, as the Admiral's Health could not permit him to go to Sea, it was judged by a Council of War, only necessary to send out five or six Sail under the Command of a Captain. These Ships were just upon sailing, when the *Folkston* from *Marseilles* brought certain Intelligence of the Disposition of the Enemy; upon which Mr. *Lestock* made a proper Representation to the Admiral, with his Opinion of the Consequences of sending so small a Force, which prevailed so far, as to cause a Council of War to be called, where it was unanimously agreed, that it was requisite for the whole Fleet immediately to put to Sea.

1742——Accordingly, the Fleet sailed in the Beginning of *April* 1742, under the Direction of Mr. *Lestock*, who was soon after authorized by his Majesty to take the Command upon him. The Moment we appeared off *Toulon*, where the *French* and *Spanish* Squadrons had been some Time after their Return from *Italy*; a general Alarm ensued, the Batteries were repaired with great Diligence,  
I double



double mann'd, more Guns mounted, new Fortifications raised, Booms got across the Harbour's Mouth, and all the military and necessary Preparations made, as if they immediately expected a sudden Attack at that Port.

• Their Situation, Strength and Forwardness being perfectly viewed and considered ; then by an excellent, well judged Disposition of the Squadron, all along the Coast of *Catalonia*, *Provence* and *Italy*, there was the finishing Stroke put to the *Spanish* Progress. Some Vessels were taken and destroyed, one of which was burnt in Sight of *Toulon* and the united Fleets ; and the Embarkations then on Foot were entirely frustrated, discontinued, and all the Troops disembarked ; the Infant of *Spain*, who was to have gone by Sea to his new Kingdom, being then at *Antibes* with the Royal Gallies of *Spain*, found it now impracticable, and did not attempt it, or indeed any Embarkation. The *French* continued to be under great Apprehensions, especially in Regard to their extensive Trade, which was not the least of their Fears ; and they were taught that their Policy, which they had so long practised in amusing and captivating other Nations with Wiles and Artifice, could not avail.

The *Spanish* Army that had been already transported into *Italy*, on board and under the Convoy of the combined Fleets of *France* and *Spain*, with several other Embarkations which soon afterwards followed, dwindled and moulder'd away : They were not only very sickly, but they deserted by Thousands, particularly to the *Venetians*, who gave them great Encouragement, and this entirely owing to Care that was taken to prevent any Supply, Succour, or Re-inforcement reaching them ; whereby this Army, so much the darling Wishes and Hopes of the Queen of *Spain*, was deprived

of all possible Means of putting her Designs in Execution, and forced to lie in a State of Inaction in daily Expectation of more Force, the real Source of its Miscarriage, until at last, instead of conquering States and Dominions, it was reduced to so small a Remnant, that it was necessitated to act on the Defensive, and fly from Corner to Corner, seeking a Refuge, and leaving behind it many Instances of Distress, with more and more Deserters; the common Consequences of a fugitive Army, without a Supply or Recruit.

This Disposition of his Majesty's Ships had its desired Effect; it occasioned the greatest Consternation to both our public and private Enemies; at the same Time that it gave Satisfaction and Confidence to all the King's Allies: They saw a powerful Squadron employed in the most assiduous Manner, annoying the common Enemy, and assisting and supporting them, under an active Leader, who had nothing more at Heart, than the vigilant Execution of his Master's Commands, and the Service of his Country. Our Merchants at *Leghorn*, who were before in a very deplorable, despairing Way, were protected, and the Appearance of such a Fleet, disposed of in this Manner, deterred the *Spaniards* from making any Attempt upon that Town, and was the Means of preserving a perfect Tranquility there. It was not long before the King of *Sardinia* expressed his Satisfaction in a particular Manner, and not only sent his royal Thanks to Mr. *Lestock*, for his great Zeal, and these his Services in the Common Cause, but caused them to be represented at *London*: And to compleat this Pleasure, he received a Letter from his Majesty's Principal Secretary of State, congratulating him upon the Opportunity which he had to shew his great Zeal and Abilities for his Majesty's Service, and acquainting him with his Majesty's entire Ap-

Approbation of his Conduct in the well-judged Disposition he made of the Squadron for annoying the Enemy, and assisting and supporting the King's Allies ; as will appear from the following.

*Extract of a Letter from the D—— of N——le, to Mr. Lestock, dated Whitehall, the 1st of July, 1742.*

S I R,

I should sooner have returned you my Thanks for the Favour of your Letters of the 28th of *April* and 1st of *May*, in which you gave me an Account of your having taken upon you the Command of his Majesty's Squadron, and your Proceedings in Consequence of it, if I could have found any safe Opportunity of conveying a Letter to you. I have now the Satisfaction to acquaint you with his Majesty's entire Approbation of your Conduct, in the well judged Disposition you made of the Squadron, for annoying his Majesty's Enemies, and assisting and supporting the King's Allies, in which the King of *Sardinia* has expressed a particular Satisfaction.

His Majesty extremely approved your sending some Ships to cruize in the *Adriatick* Sea, in order to intercept any Vessels that might be employed in bringing Stores or Provisions for the *Spanish* and *Neapolitan* Armies.

I heartily congratulate you upon this Opportunity, which you have had, to shew your Zeal, and Abilities for his Majesty's Service, which you have employed in such a Manner, as has his Majesty's most gracious Approbation. I most sincerely wish you a Continuance of your Health, and shall be glad of all Occasions, to convince you of the real Truth and Regard, with which I am,

Sir, Yours, &c.

H——s N——e.

Such

Such was the low, despicable State of the Enemy, and the flourishing Condition of the *British* Fleet, and the King's Allies, when Vice-Admiral *Mathews* arrived from *England* at *Villa Franca* the 27th of *May*, and took upon him the Command of the Fleet. This able Gentleman, when the *East India* Company, in the Year 1721, applied for a small Squadron of his Majesty's Ships in order to destroy some Pirates who infested their Trade to the *East Indies*, was dispatched on that Expedition, and returned in 1724, *after having executed the Errand he was sent on to so good a Purpose, that the East India Directors never afterwards applied for his Majesty's Ships to go to those Seas to protect their Trade.* He had the Resignation to live eighteen Years a shore, and see many junior Captains made Admirals; but now such was the Exigency of the State, and his great Experience, that he was prevailed upon to go to Sea; and he was appointed Vice-Admiral of the Red Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet, and Commander in Chief in the *Mediterranean*.

Mr. *Lestock*, at the same Time, was appointed Rear-Admiral of the White Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet, and on the first of *June* was sent by Mr. *Mathews* with the Body of the Fleet to observe the Motions of the Enemy, as well as to intercept any Embarkation, which they might be possibly carrying on again; but they had given over all Thoughts of any such Undertaking; and, on the contrary, were preparing to force their Passage into *Italy* by Land.

While the Vice-Admiral remain'd at *Villa-Franca* on board the *Namure*, the Rear-Admiral kept the Sea; and, at this time, took the Opportunity of viewing *Hieres Road*; and having anchored there one Night, he found it to be a spacious, commodious, fine Bay, sheltered every Way from



from the Wind and Sea, capable of containing the Royal Navy of *Britain*, and one of the most fertile Spots in *Europe*, having Plenty of Wood, Water, and every Refreshment; *so good and safe* a Situation, as being at an Anchor at *Hieres*, not above nine Miles from the Enemy, where every thing which went in and out of the Harbour of *Toulon* might be very easily distinguished; and this Bay of so great an Extent, that it was not in the Power of the *French* Monarchy to fortify in such a Manner as to hinder our Fleet at all Times and Seasons from having Recourse to so good a Sanctuary, was a painful Mortification to our Enemies.

About the middle of *June*, the five *Spanish* Gallies, which had been prevented on our first Appearance on the Coast from carrying *Don Philip* from *Antibes* with another Embarkation into *Italy*, now venturing to creep all along Shore in their Retreat back, were imprudent enough to put into *St. Tropez* (a *French* Port a little to the Eastward of *Hieres*, incapable and unwilling to make any great Defence) imagining that being moor'd by the Walls of one of his most Christian Majesty's Sea-port Towns, defenceless as it was, with the Terror of his omnipotent Name, would be a sufficient Protection: But such neutral Maxims did not now subsist; such wise Policy was banished; there are Vicissitudes in the Body Politic, as in the Natural; and Capt. *Norris* of the *Kingston*, with the *Oxford* and *Spence Sloop*, did not let this Opportunity escape; but with these Ships went into this Port, and covered the *Duke* Fireship until she burnt the Gallies, in which they had the good Fortune to destroy so many at the Expence of one Fireship; a Vessel perhaps the best expended that ever was burnt, considering the Importance of these Gallies to the Enemy, and the Difficulty of getting more soon enough for their Purpose at so critical a Juncture,

Juncture, when they stood most in need of them : But, the *Spaniards* indiscreetly mooring along Side one another, contributed to the Destruction of them in so easy a Manner. This Observation is not made to diminish so glorious and well-executed a Piece of Service, which is worthy of the greatest Applause, and not only added to our Weight abroad, and the Support of his Majesty's faithful Allies, but gave the *French* their Fears and Apprehensions : At the same Time, that it convinced the Enemy that nothing would be left undone which was practicable, to compleat their Destruction, and render the Aid and Assistance of their Allies abortive.

The *French* continued their great Complaisance and Civilities ; they were too civil a Nation to shew any Resentment ; they were perfectly resigned to the Times : Wood, Water and Refreshments, or any thing that was wanted in a most polite Manner were allowed us : It was not a proper Time, and their Trade was not come home : On the contrary, they insulted the Distressed, and ridiculed the *Spaniards* at *Toulon*, on this their Loss, in the most outrageous Manner, which added Fuel to the Fire, fomented their former Differences ; and these Antipathies broke soon out into endless Quarrels and continual Duelling, till at last it was ordered, that a *Frenchman* and a *Spaniard* should not use the same House, in order to put an End to these Broils. Tho' embarked in the same Bottom, with equally the same Cause at Heart ; yet to such Lengths were those violent Heats and Animosities carried, between Officers of the highest Rank to the lowest of both Countries, that they despised and mortally hated one another, taking all Opportunities to testify their Abhorrence ; and never met on any Occasion but when the  
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Service they were employed on made it absolutely necessary.

But from the Time that these Gallies were burnt, the *French* became more apprehensive, and were kept in a continual Panic, insomuch that one of their trading Vessels having sailed soon after from *Toulon* in the Morning, but meeting with some Accident was obliged to put back in the Night; at which all the Fortifications were immediately alarmed, their Fears would not suffer them to believe her to be any thing but an *English* Fireship, with the Fleet following: In a Moment they began to fire, employed all their Guns, and sunk her presently, whereby the whole Crew lost their Lives. An Argument how much they were over-awed and daunted by our Strength.

*July* the 2d, Admiral *Mathews* joined the Fleet off of the Islands of *Hieres*; and after taking a near View of the Fleet in *Toulon* Harbour, which Ships were unrigged, we anchored the fifth of the same Month in *Hieres* Bay, and on the 20th following the Admiral returned to *Villa Franca*, leaving Mr. *Lestock* with the Charge of the Fleet off *Toulon*.

At this Time the People of *Nice* were in the greatest Tribulation, for fear *Don Philip* should attempt forcing his Passage through that Country, having already requested the Favour of passing with his Troops of the Commandant, who, considering the Engagement of his Master, could not well be so complaisant. In order, therefore, to be the better able to oppose the Infant, the Admiral put ashore the *Minorca* Detachment under the Command of Colonel *Hooke*, amounting to about five hundred Men; likewise assisted in lending some Cannon from the Ships to mount on Redoubts that had been raised to repulse and deter the *Span-*

*niard.* Most part of the Summer was spent, and during the Stay of the Soldiers on shore, we sustained no other Loss than by Desertion, many of them having been abroad too long, thought themselves to be in a manner banished, and despairing to get home, great Numbers were tempted to desert.

The Admiral came to the Fleet in the Beginning of *September* at *Hieres*; as also did Captain *Martin* of the *Ipswich*, who, with the *Oxford*, *Panther*, *Feversham*, and the three Bomb Ketches, had been at *Naples*, and intimidated his *Neapolitan* Majesty into that Treaty of Neutrality which had a general Approbation: Defenceless Walls, Cannon Balls, Bombs, Men's Fears, Women's Tears, the Apprehension of a Capital in Ashes, are prevailing Arguments: There is more Rhetorick in them, and they make more Dispatch, than the wisest Policy and Address of the ablest Minister, who has no such Expedients ready at hand to apply, but must entirely depend on his Art of Persuasion in the Oratory, and Elocution of his Tongue.

The Fleet, in perfect good Order and Health, continued to lie at *Hieres*, a wholesome Climate, the finest Centinel Box, and the best look-out House in the World, where they could hear and see every Motion of the Enemy: Here the different Cruizers daily resorted after being relieved; to Wood, Water, take Provisions on board and refit; then in their Turn, according to the Necessity of the Time, were sent out again. The Tenders also occasionally came from *Mahon* with Provisions and Stores: This constant Sight no doubt was an Heart-break to our Enemies, and much more to the *French*, to experience thus daily one of their own Ports, in spite of all their Power, contribute so much to our Safety and their Disappointment;



pointment ; yet they kept up the Shew of Friendship, and frankly supplied us with whatever we demanded, particularly in fresh Meat for the few sick People, which were chiefly on board of the cruizing Ships that had last come in from a Cruize.

1742-3—Nothing of any Consequence happened until *February* following, when the *Ipswich*, *Revenge* and *Ann Galley* Fireship were sent to *Hiace* in *Corfica*, where, on preparing to attack the *St. Isidore*, a *Spanish* Ship of War of 64 Guns (which Ship had lain there about a Twelvemonth for want of Masts, all other Stores and Men) and sending a Message to Captain *Delage de Cuelly* to surrender the Ship, they, the Moment the Messenger put off, received a Discharge of all her Cannon, and two or three Broad-sides passed : But as the *Spanish* Captain knowing his Weakness against this Force, had provided a great deal of Brush, and stowed it between Decks, intending to set Fire to the Ship rather than be taken, so soon as such a Defence had been made as he thought adequate to his Honour ; upon crying, Fire, Fire, meaning the Guns, the Carpenter, with his Crew, who were quartered by this Brush for that Purpose, took the Word of Command to be to them, and set Fire to the Brush, by which Means the Ship was soon in a Blaze, blew up, and many lost their Lives, having no Time to escape.

1743—In *April* and *May* the *French* at *Toulon*, began to call in their Men ; and it is to be hoped it will not be thought an unnecessary Digression to observe, that they are a People whose warlike Genius and Policy will always make them provide for every Event ; even in the most profound Peace the young Officers and Guard-Marines are perpetually employed (at *Brest*, *Toulon* and *Rochfort*) in those Exercises that are Images of

War, where they are carefully instructed in the different Ways of working a Ship, and learn the Structure of Vessels, with the Names and Uses of all their Parts, where they are chiefly taught to obey and attain to that Dexterity, indispensably necessary to attack and surprize a vigilant and subtle Enemy. To do these Academies Justice, there is nothing neglected to awaken in young Persons the Love of their Duty, and to raise an Emulation in them to out-do one another: All their Thoughts are applied to those kinds of Knowledge which help to rectify the Mind, habituate it to Attention, and to acquire Penetration and Strength of Judgment: Hence that Nation, supercilious and volatile, as it appears in our Eyes, has always a sufficient Number of regular, well-bred Officers to command in their Fleet upon any Emergency.

Fourteen *Xebecks* loaden with Ammunition, Cannon, and other warlike Stores from *Majorca*, bound to any Part of *Italy*, where they could be landed for the Use of the *Spanish* Army, having got safe to *Genoa* the latter End of *June*; Admiral *Mathews* on board of the *Namur*, with the *Barfleur*, *Norfolk*, *Princess Caroline*, *Ipswich* and *Revenge*, went there and concluded a Treaty; wherein it was stipulated, that the Republick, at their own Expence, should send this Cannon and Ammunition in neutral Bottoms to *Corfica*, where they were to be deposited during the present War in *Italy*.

In *July*, fourteen more *Xebecks* with Cannon and Ammunition escaped our Cruizers, by keeping along the Coast of *Barbary*, and arrived at *St. Lawrence*, near *Civita Vecchia*, where they were landed, and afterwards conveyed to *Viterbo* for the Use of the *Spanish* Army, in spite of the Endeavours and Menaces of his Majesty's Ships.

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the *Oxford*, *Diamond*, *Dursley*, and a Bomb-Ketch, which Ships were sent to frighten the Holy Father into a Compliance of what was demanded; who, however, managed Matters very well, in equivocating and asserting that these Vessels were unloaden by Compulsion; and in this Manner did the Priest baffle the *English* Nation.

The *Guernsey* cruizing off *Cape de Gatte*, much about this Time, did a commendable Piece of Service in destroying two *Spanish* Privateers, one of which was a Ship of 22 Guns, and 150 Men, that run in under the Shelter of a Fort of eight Guns, and the Wind blowing very fresh right upon the Shore, it was with great Danger that Capt. *Cornish* beat her to Pieces. This Exploit struck the Privateers with an extraordinary Panic, that for three Weeks or a Month after, none of them shewed their Faces on that Coast, or in the *Gut*, until pressing Orders came from *Madrid* to the Governors of the different Provinces, particularly to him in the Neighbourhood of *Gibraltar*, who forced them out again; and from the Encouragement they met with, they became as troublesome and impudent as ever.

Since which, a Sort of Neutrality was concluded; the Garrison at *Ceuta* being in a starving Condition, the *Spaniards* engaged themselves not to molest us in the *Gut*, provided we would, on our Part, admit their Boats to pass to and fro to *Ceuta*: The commanding Sea-Officer thought it too advantageous a Proposal to be refused; and by an Authority or Credential unknown, which not a little surprized some, agreed to a Truce, which saved our Ships a great deal of cruizing, and for some Time perfectly secured our Trade; and now that the Garrison is well supplied, the *Spaniards* have lately broke this Cessation.

The Merchants complain grievously of the Interruption

terruption of their Trade here, but they are generally drawn away, or blinded by the artful Insinuations of their Skippers, who never fail in the Knack to represent Misfortunes of this Kind, in the Colours necessary to shew they are owing to the Carelessness of others, rather than any Neglect of their own. Likewise the unthinking People of *Gibraltar* join with them in assuming a very great Liberty, who having little to do, have Leisure to animadvert perpetually on the Conduct of Sea-Officers; though their Knowledge in Sea Affairs is very superficial, yet there is not one among them who does not decide with an Air of Sufficiency and Presumption; they talk too much, and do not hearken at all to others, and are vain enough to imagine themselves infallible. In short, nothing can escape their Censure, their Contumely and Observation, and the Judgments they form from Appearances, a Smattering in the theory Part of an Officer, and the Prejudices they have conceived, which dazzle their Eyes, are extremely stupid and ridiculous.

On the other hand, the Gentlemen of the Navy, who are punished with this disagreeable Station, where there is no Possibility of pleasing, have daily experienced the true Causes to proceed from an unalterable Obstinacy and Folly in the Matters of the Merchant ships, which inconsiderate senseless Men have often been warn'd of the Danger, and earnestly requested to stay, perhaps a Day, or less, when the Orders of the Captain cruizing in the *Gut*, or thereabouts, would have admitted him to have seen them safe through, or into *Gibraltar* Bay; nevertheless they have continued their Course in Contradiction to this Caution, rashly depending on their own Strength, and have suffered for their Contumacy: In like manner the *Crawley Pink* was taken.

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The Situation of the *Straits Mouth*, with the many other Advantages, which the *Spaniards* possess in the Extent of Country to harbour these pilfering Vessels, who are in and out in a Moment, all along the Shore from *Cape Trafalgar* to *Gibraltar*, in spite of all the Endeavours and Circumspection in the Power of Man, make it morally impossible for a small Number of his Majesty's Ships to prevent many of our Trade falling into the Enemy's Hands; especially as a westerly Wind, which brings our Ships into the *Gut*, often blows so hard, that no Ship can keep that Station: But though an entire Success is not to be commanded here, yet it is to be confessed that a better Disposition might be made to guard against these paltry Privateers, which would make us the more deserving of it, and entitle the Sea Officers to the like Benevolence and Returns of Gratitude, which our Merchants, on all Occasions, testified in a conspicuous Manner to Mr. *Haddock*, for the Care he always took of their Commerce.

Two Ships off *Cape Spartel*, two more, or Sloops to lie in *Tangier Bay*, with one or more in the *Gut* to look out, and convoy the Trade as the Vessels arrive, never daring to leave on any Pretence whatsoever those Stations, without a Ship or Sloop being upon each; and all Masters of Merchant Ships upon the severest Penalties which the Law can inflict, be obliged, if they miss catching a Convoy off *Spartel*, to look into *Tangier Bay*; but in Case the Wind should be easterly, to search for that Protection in *St. Jeremy's Bay*; doubtless this Method strictly adhered to, would be of greater Service, and answer the Intention much better than any other that has been hitherto practised: Besides which, there should be a prudent Officer of some Judgment, directed to lie constantly in *Gibraltar Bay*, where he could receive  
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the best Intelligence, and give proper Orders to these Cruizers, which would be regulated in many Cases by the Wind and Weather, the daily Occurrences which happen, and the casual Attacks of the Enemy.

*Tariffe*, the *Bee-hive*, from whence they can easily distinguish a Sail whenever she comes within the *Capes*, where commonly may be seen Swarms of them at a Time, is a very inconsiderable Place; a small Force would soon make a Bonfire of the whole Nest, or destroy them effectually, by cannonading, if landing was not thought necessary to lay the Village in Ashes; a much more notable Piece of Service, than any of our late boasted Feats on the Coast of *Catalonia*: It is true, that an Action of this Sort would not totally suppress these pernicious Insects, which, like Mushrooms, are continually springing up and making their Exit; but it would bring about a long Interval from their Insult, the Privateers could not fetch Breath immediately; and if the *Guernsey* frightened them for a Month, by the Mischief she did to them; by the same Parity of Reason, such a Destruction among them, would strike a greater Terror, discourage new Adventurers, and keep them in perpetual Fear and Awe, in Proportion to the Importance of the Injury done them: For which Reason this Enterprize is worth our Consideration, as is every other where there is the least Probability of lessening their Numbers, or intimidating them from harbouring in so advantageous a Situation, whereby they are enabled to do us the Prejudice which has given an Occasion for hideous Clamours and Complaints.

The King of *Sardinia* having defeated the *Spaniards* and *French* shamefully, who did not lose less than eight thousand Men in endeavouring to force the Passes about *Susa*, it was apprehended, that

that the next Attempt they made would be in the Country of *Nice*; therefore all possible Preparations were made to repulse them, and to defend this Passage into *Italy*, new Works were raised, others were added to the old, with great Repairs, and the *Rockester's* lower Tier of Guns, and some others were mounted to the Sea-Side from Mount *Alban*; likewise the *Barfleur* and *Norfolk* sailed from *Hieres* to *Villa Franca*, with great Part of the *Minorca* and *Gibraltar* Detachments serving on board of the Fleet, in order that they might be in a constant Readiness to be landed there, whenever any Necessity appeared; which Ships continued with Admiral *Mathews*, who had been there ever since his Return from *Genoa*, while Admiral *Lestock* watched the *Spanish* and *French* Fleets in *Toulon* Harbour.

All the Prudence, Penetration, Policy or Address, which human Nature is capable of, could not have prevented the Enemy from facilitating and forwarding their Designs and Views in *Italy*, had it not been for the Advantages that the Fleet reaped from lying at *Hieres*, particularly in the Situation of that Bay, in its Nearness to *Toulon*: It was impossible that the Fleet, or any Force sufficient to cope with the combined Fleets, could have kept the Sea two such severe Winters, in such extraordinary hard Gales of Wind and great Seas, which were so frequent in these Gulphs: Loss of Masts, crippling and disabling the Fleet, if not losing some of the Ships, would have been the Consequence of endeavouring it: As it was, all the Stores which his Majesty's Yard at *Mahon* could furnish, barely supplied the Exigencies of the Cruizers that were employed. Whether this proceeded from the Violence of the Weather and Sea, or the Ships being over masted, especially those of the new Establishment, as they did cer-

tainly suffer the most, or want of Discretion, it is not easy to determine ; but it is easy from thence to form this Judgment, that had the whole Fleet kept the Sea, and such Accidents happened equally alike to every Ship, it would have taken all the Stores in his Majesty's Yards in *England* to have kept the Fleet in good Repair : Besides, the Ships must have been refitted after such long Cruizes, where many Men would have died (which Loss could by no Means have been made good) since we have experienced, that the greatest Skill in Physick cannot provide Remedies against the Diseases, which the sudden Heats and Colds, the Inclemency of the Weather, and, above all, salt Provisions, unavoidably subject Seamen to. At such Junctures then, when Want of Provisions and Water, Sicknes, Loss of Masts and Stress of Weather, or any other Incidents in the Power of Wind and Sea, forced the Fleet to go to *Mahon* or to *Villa Franca* to repair ; or even, when we were blown off the Coast, which must have been often our Misfortune ; in any of these Cases, it would have been practicable for the Enemy, with the Assistance of the *French*, to have put their favourite Schemes in Execution, and laughed at our vain, ridiculous Endeavours, in striving against these Impossibilities to hinder them.

Nothing is more obvious, than that this Bay was the principal Cause of preventing the *Spaniards* from gaining their Point, as it not only kept our Strength together, but preserved it from falling into an inferior Force to the Enemy, and the *French* Squadron : It saved also a great Expence, and many Seamen's Lives to his Majesty : It kept the Fleet in good Order, and constant Readiness for sailing ; the Officers and Seamen fattening in a fine Climate, with Indolence, and slumbering without Anxiety, enjoying all the



Conveniencies and Advantages that could possibly be procured in any Harbour, excepting that of careening our Ships, which was our only Trouble, as no great Number of them could be spared at a Time, in order to keep the Fleet, in general, tolerably clean, allowing for the Force of the *Toulon* Fleets, the Distance from *Makon*, with the Conveniency and usual Dispatch made there. In this Time of Necessity we had very few clean Ships, all the three Deck Ships were extremely foul, some of them having been off the Ground three Years and an half; however, the *Marlborough* was dispatched to *Makon*, but alarmed back again without being able to heave down; and the *Barfleur* was on following her, had not Mr. *Lestock*, considering the Forwardness of the Enemy, and that there was already more Work to be done at *Makon*, than the Artificers could possibly do at a Time, taken the Liberty to stop her.

This was a Misfortune, and a great Extenuation of our Power, in the Opinion of every Man, who is a Judge of the Difference of a foul, and a clean Ship.

On the contrary, from the Time that Don *Philip*, with the *French* Auxiliaries, had been ignominiously defeated by the King of *Sardinia*, the *French* and *Spaniards* at *Toulon* began to fit and equip their Ships.

In *September*, Orders came to careen the *French* one after another; soon after, an Order to clean three at a Time; and afterwards they dispatched no less than five: Then the *French*, whenever they were done, removed into the outer Basin to make Room for the *Spaniards*, who likewise careened all their Ships, and refitted with all possible Expedition.

While these Preparations were going on, nothing was more talked of, nothing so often repeat-

ed in all their News Papers, than that they should be out very early in the Spring, to sink, burn and destroy our Fleet, if we did not leave the *Mediterranean*; but there is little Dependance on what a *Frenchman* says; however, much our Fleet wished for their coming out, yet they had their Fears and Doubts, that all this Bustle and Noise would prove in the End as usual, to be meer *French* Boast, designed to amuse the Queen of *Spain*, and to gain more Influence in the Courts of *Europe*, or perhaps a Stratagem to harrafs or keep us together, in order to prevent the necessary Cruizers going out to annoy the Enemy, and hinder Embarkations or Supplies getting to *Italy*; as also to stop any Assistance being given to his *Sardinian* Majesty, to put him in Possession of *Final*, according to the Treaty of *Worms*.

But these Apprehensions were dissipated before the latter End of *December*, when they appeared to be so much in Earnest, that all their Ships were cleaned, refitted and compleated in Readiness for the Sea.

The *Spaniards*, considering their great Necessities, had made an unusual Dispatch, having been obliged to make their own Cables, and a great deal of their Rigging; they were forced to unman four of their smallest Ships, which, however, did not compleat the Complements of the rest, but they daily expected the Number wanted from *Catalonia*: And these four Ships which were to be left behind, at all Events, would be getting ready to steal away the first unguarded Opportunity with Embarkations to *Italy*.

The *French*, notwithstanding their excellent Regulation of the Marine, and the extoll'd Advantages of having Recourse, on every Occasion, to their Register Seamen for the equipping and manning a Fleet in the Twinkling of an Eye, or  
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in a surprizing incredible Time, gave, at this Juncture, a Proof, that they were almost as slow as their Neighbours, and that the boasted Value of their great Strength in having such Numbers Seamen at a Moment's Warning, is rated by Appearances, and not in Reality; for it was manifest, after five or six Months trumpeting, proclaiming Pains and Penalties on the Backward and the Fugitives, with all the Power and Oppression which an arbitrary King can inflict, as well as laying an Embargo on all their Trade (which is exceedingly great in the *Mediterranean*, especially to and from *Turky*, that there may be seen near an hundred Sail at a Time coming from thence, bound to *Marseilles*; no pleasant Sight to an *Englishman*; but what has been frequently observed since our Fleet has lain at *Hieres*) they were forced to drag into their Service Seven thousand Men not registered; One thousand of which were Masters of trading Ships, and small Vessels; and to this Streight and extream Distress were they reduced, only to mann sixteen Ships of the the Line of Battle.

Our Cruizers were daily resorting to *Hieres*; the Frigates, as well as those Ships of the Line of Battle. Mr. *Matthews* himself arrived in the *Namur* the 28th of *December*, after six Months Absence from the Fleet; the latter Part of which Time he had been at *Turin*, and was saluted by all the Ships, being now Admiral of the Blue Squadron of his Majesty's Fleet, and Mr. *Lestock* Rear Admiral of the Red Squadron.

1743-4—The 3d of *January* Mr. *Lestock* hoisted the *St. George's* Flag at the Foretopmast-head on board the *Neptune*, as did also Captain *Rowley* the same Flag at the Mizentopmast-head on board of the *Barfleur*. This Gentleman was first appointed a Captain in 1716, and commanded a  
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*Twenty-Gun Ship for some Years on the Irish Station, where, if he had not so good an Opportunity to ripen his great Talents, and to perfect his Judgment and Experience, as in Fleets, or in the many different Expeditions the Royal Navy has since that Time been employed on, he, however, reaped the Sweets of an advantageous Station, from whence he was paid off, and continued on the half Pay, and did not receive a Commission till 1741, when he was appointed Captain of the Barfleur.*

Until the 12th of *January*, we could not muster up more than eighteen Ships of the Line ; consequently we were under the most anxious Apprehensions, lest the confederate Fleets should hurry out of *Toulon*, and attack us ; in which, were we to judge from their late Conduct and distinguished Bravery, they would have certainly obtained a compleat Victory ; but they let slip this Opportunity, and our Ships the *Elizabeth*, *Berwick*, *Princessa* and *Marlborough* joined the Fleet from *Mahone*. No sooner than the third of *February*, did the *Somerset* and *Warwick* arrive, two Ships looked upon to be unserviceable, and represented to be almost ready to drop to Pieces, from being abroad six or seven Years, that were just then upon failing for *England* ; but on this pressing Occasion, luckily enough countermanded. And the same Day the *Dragon*, Capt. *Charles Watson*, unexpectedly came to *Hieres*, which Ship had been lately employed on the several Cruizes between *Toulon* and *Gibraltar* ; and, in Consequence of her Orders, was in her Tour to have cruized some Time off *Cadiz*, and then proceed to *Lisbon*, where the Captain of her was sure of the Benefit of eight hundred Moidores Freight Money ; yet the Moment he heard of the Preparations of the Enemy, and the Likelihood of their coming out to Sea, he made no Hesitation. The alluring Advantages



vantages of a Trip to *Lisbon*, the darling Wishes of the Captains in his Majesty's Fleet, with the fair Prospect of catching an immense Fortune, on a Station extremely envied and sought after, did not weigh with him, when he found them incompatible with the Service of his King and Country- But from the most disinterested Motive, without Orders, he, with the utmost Expedition, joined the Fleet at *Hieres*, whereby this Gentleman may have possibly lost that considerable Prize, which was taken by the *Solebay*, to the Value of 300000 *l.* For at that Time he would have been on that Station, and the *Solebay* probably, either in *Gibraltar Bay*, or protecting our Trade in the *Gut* from the *Spanish* Privateers. A Demonstration of his great Esteem of personal Poverty, when the true Interest of his Country called him; such an ardent Zeal, such just and unbiaſſed Sentiments, ſo uncommon, nay without an Example in the Navy, cannot but raiſe our Admiration to the higheſt Pitch, and inſpire us with the moſt fervent Wishes for the Welfare and Happineſs of ſo much real Merit, which cannot be rewarded with too much Diſtinction, nor public Acknowledgments.

Captain *Graves* of the *Marlborough*, the Senior Captain in the *Mediterranean*, who had wore a broad Pendant, during the Time he had been Abroad, and repeated Signals, as the Superior of the third Division, and commanding in the third Poſt; an Officer of approved Loyalty and Capacity, whoſe firſt Commiſſion, as a Poſt Captain, bears date *January 1712-13*; having been ever ſince employed in his Majesty's Service, always contenting himſelf with ſuch Voyages or Services, as his Superiors had allotted him; eſpecially on the late Expedition at *Carthagera*, when many others ſneaked away from their Duty to his Ma-  
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jeſty and Publick, and got themſelves excuſed: He, with the greateſt Alacrity, went that Voyage, and behaved himſelf with remarkable Bravery and Diſcretion; finding on his Arrival at *Hieres* Mr. *Rozley*, (a Junior Officer) Rear Admiral of the White Squadron, he immediately reſigned his Commiſſion, and went Home by *Land*, univerſally lamented by all his Officers and Ship's Company. He was not Maſter of that Docility and Submiſſion to continue ſerving under a Junior; his Spirit was not tamed enough, neither would his Senſe of Honour ſuffer him to be thus pliant: He therefore thought quitting the Navy the only Reſentment in his Power, as he could not bear the Mortification which he always fairly endeavoured not to deſerve; and he apprehended the Injury done to his Seniority, Pre-eminence and long Services, entirely ſet him free from all Subjection, or the leaſt Stain and Reproach for leaving the Fleet, when ſo fair an Opportunity was juſt ready to offer, to make known his further Abilities, Courage and Pretenſion to a Flag.

The Addition of ſeven ſuch Ships gave us great Spirits; and if we were diſpirited, or caſt down before, we were now got into the other Extream, exulting and deſying our Enemies and their Auxiliaries; a general Joy was diffuſed all over the Fleet, at the ſame Time that the *French* and *Spaniards* did not at all like the Appearance of ſuch a Reinforcement; and though the Enemy had received the Complement of Men expected from *Catalonia*, yet it was now given out that they ſhould not fail, until they had farther Orders from Court: This Rumour joined to that good Opinion we are always inclined to conceive of ourſelves, and our invincible *Armadas*, with a very deſpicable one of our Enemy, led us to that Vanity of Conceit, that they

they durst not venture : So easy are we puffed with with any View of Prosperity.

The *French* and *Spanish* Admirals came to *Hieres*, and took a View of our Fleet ; Couriers were daily dispatched to Court and arriving from thence ; *Councils of War*, *the Resource of all consummate and experienced Commanders* were frequently held \* ; in one of which, the *Spanish* Officers opposed going to Sea, until they were reinforced, when the *French* Admiral, to put an End to the Debate, read his Master's Orders, which were to proceed immediately to Sea in Conjunction with the *Spanish* Squadron, and after they had begun the Action, he was directed to destroy us, or to bring our Fleet into *Toulon* Harbour.

While we were vainly boasting of our Strength, and foolishly enough echoing ashore, the Expectation we had of more Ships joining us every Day from *England* ; the *French* had Recourse to their accustomed Artifice and Policy, in undervaluing and extenuating the Force of our Fleet ; and with great Art and unwearied Industry, brought their poor deluded People to believe that we were very inconsiderable ; only a few great Ships amongst us, all the rest Frigates, infinitely distressed for want of Men, Powder, and every necessary Store, requisite to compleat a Ship of War : No Stone was left unturned, no Lye untold, however foolish and ridiculous, that could possibly serve to enliven and animate their Men. But though these Re-

\* This we neglected, though the constant Practice of the greatest Generals that ever lived ; who have esteemed it of the highest Importance in Affairs of War, to deliberate with many, and to decide with few ; to assemble their principal Officers, to hear all their Opinions, and from thence form a secret Resolution to be executed with all possible Speed.

ports were credited by the *French* with as wonderful a Facility as the Authors of such Falshoods told them, yet neither the *Spanish* Officers, who were equally able with the *French*, if not their Superiors, nor their Men, could be imposed upon in this egregious Manner; nay, even Truths well attested by many concurrent Circumstances, and clearly discerned by indifferent Persons, that they would not admit of the least Doubt, if told by a *Frenchman*, a *Spaniard* was sure to refuse his Belief. Truth and Falshood from that Quarter, were alike regarded by the *Spaniard*, whose Dectestation was become invincible, through the ill Usage and repeated Insults they had been continually receiving from the *French* Nation in general, since their Residence in *Toulon* Harbour; and by all Accounts, joined to the many Civilities and great Respect, which, upon every Occasion, they paid to the *English* Gentlemen they casually met with, either at *Marseilles* or *Toulon*, as well as their own Conversation, they would have rather joined us to have fought the *French*, than engaged with them against us.

The *French* had concerted many Projects, to annoy and destroy us, which were heartily ridiculed and laughed at by the *Spaniards*; among which were the Bridges that they tryed the Experiment of, and exercised with wonderful Dexterity and Success in *Toulon* Harbour, when the Water was as smooth as a Pond. These extraordinary Machines reached from the Laniards of their Shrouds upwards, and were intended to be made Use of in boarding our Ships; they were contrived to let fall in an Instant upon us, by which thousands were to enter, to swallow up our small Numbers, and thereby take our Ships in a Trice. Another subtle Invention of Destruction was a Contrivance to let drop Boxes of Combustibles from the Yard Arms,



Arms, to set us on Fire ; Scythes very long to cut our Rigging, and the Nettings which they had heard that we had provided to catch the Boarders in, if they should inconsiderately attempt this silly Stratagem. However excellent these Schemes and Devices seemed to be in Speculation, it is hardly possible that they could be executed in Fleets, and on Board of Ships much higher and loftier than those from whence they were to be performed ; wherefore the *Spaniards* very judiciously contemned them as illusive and insignificant ; and as the Fruits and Expedients of Brains acquainted with the Theory, but altogether Strangers to Practice.

About the middle of *January*, the *Winchelsea* was ordered off of *Toulon*, to observe the Motions of the combined Fleets ; and notwithstanding the many hard Gales of Wind which happened between that Time and the 8th of *February*, the Day that the Enemy got under Sail, yet that Ship kept her Station in a most surprizing Manner ; keeping continually in Sight of the opening of *Toulon* Harbour, in which Captain *Marsh* gave a signal Evidence of his Vigilance and good Conduct, which very justly acquired him the Applause of the whole Fleet as an able Officer, in whom might be placed the greatest Confidence and Trust, who might be entirely depended on in his indefatigable Look out, and unwearied Pursuit of Intelligence.

The *Diamond* was sent some Time after to join with the *Winchelsea* in observing the Enemy, but she was soon blown off her Station.

Next Day after the *Winchelsea* sailed, the *Essex*, *Feversham* and *Chatham* anchored under the Island of *Porquerole* (likewise the *Dunkirk* and *Kingston*, and some Days before the Fleet sailed) and were stationed there, being about half Way between

the Admiral and the *Winchelsea*, in order to observe and repeat Signals from both ; and as the most convenient Intercourse for the Passage of all Orders and Intelligence.

The latter End of this Month, by the Diligence of our faithful little Cruizer, we were informed that the *French* Squadron had got out into the great Road at *Toulon*, but an hard Gale of Wind coming easterly, prevented the *Spanish* Ships from following until a Week after ; these Truths were soon confirmed from the Shore, and still some of the Unbelieving, imagined the united Fleets would never come to Sea.

*Wednesday, February 8*, at Three in the Afternoon, the *Winchelsea* came in Sight, in the Western Passage of the *Bay*, and made the Signal that the combined Fleets were coming out ; upon which the *Effex*, at an Anchor under the Island of *Porquerole*, repeated the Signal, and then the Admiral answered them \*. Immediately after, the publick and private Signals were made to unmoor with all possible Expedition, when the Fleet unmoored, hove short, and lay so all Night ; being little Wind, the *French* and *Spanish* Ships came to an Anchor under the Land near *Toulon* Harbour, and the *Oxford* and *Guernsey* got under Sail, in order to lie without the Islands to observe them.

*Thursday, February 9*, at Dawn of Day, little Wind and almost Calm, we saw the *Real*, the *Spanish* Admiral, with a *French* Ship of War over the

\* Vice Admiral *Lestock* says, in the Account he delivered to the House of Commons, that he at this Time waited of Mr. *Mathews*, and desired to know, as he had the Honour to command next to him, and the Enemy was in Sight, if he had any particular Commands or Instructions, but he answered No, saying it was very cold, and bid him go aboard.

low Land standing off and on. At Nine, the *Essex* made the Signal that the combined Fleets were under Sail. At Ten our Fleet weighed on a little Breeze of Wind springing up Westerly; *when the Admiral for the first Time, since he commanded in the Mediterranean, made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle, one Ship a-head of another;* and the Vice-Admiral with his Division made Sail a-head, but about Noon the Admiral made the Signal for the Van of the Fleet to tack, and we continued all the rest of the Day plying to Windward, between the Islands and the main Land in the Bay of *Hieres*, where there was not room to form a Line. At Five the Fleet anchored in the *Bay*, the Enemy were employed this Day in forming a Line of Battle in the best Order, and by haling their Wind, they not only seemed to be sensible of the Advantage they already had in the Weather-gage, *but they, like able Officers of cool Heads and solid Judgments, were preparing to get into the wisest Disposition of Battle in their Power, and were unwilling to make an ill Use of the Assistance of Providence, by making too much haste to bear down upon their Enemy in Disorder and Confusion.*

Friday, February 10, the Fleet, at Day break, weighed with the Land Breeze, and at Seven the Admiral having made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle one astern of the other, with a large Wind, and for those to lead who were to lead with their Starboard \* Tacks abroad  
by

\* *Tack*, is a Rope so called, which is fasten'd to the Clew, or Corner of the Mainfail or Forefail, which when hauled down, makes the Sail stand fairer, and gives the Ship more Way through the Water.

*To tack*, is to put the Ship about, so that her Head  
may

by a Wind, the Vice-Admiral and his Division answered this Signal, by making Sail immediately a-head; but the little Wind, with an high western Swell, and the unaccountable Impatience of many of the Ships in crowding and pressing upon one another, whose unseasonable Eagerness was not to be held in, even by Order and Discipline, hindered the Fleet from getting out of the Bay in the Disposition of Battle, according to the Signal abroad. Instead of Obedience, the first Habit which a military Man should learn, no less than twelve or fourteen Ships of the Van and the Center, with both their Chiefs, were got into the Southern Passage where there is no anchoring; mixed in an Heap, Heads and Sterns athwart, just upon being aboard of one another, entirely governed and conducted by the Swell, with all their Boats endeavouring to tow them clear of this imminent Danger, without any Probability of escaping a greater Loss than any in the Power of the Enemy to inflict; a pleasant Sight to them, and an anxious Situation and Concern to us, yet beyond the Judgment and Expectation of a Man, who depends not on the coming of Miracles in every Exigency of Life, the Ships were extricated from these Difficulties, as it were, by the Intervention of the Deity.

We discovered the Enemy, the Body of their Fleet bearing about S. W. distant four or five Leagues, who stood towards us, seeming to have

may look another Way.

When a Man stands at the Stern of a Ship, with his Face towards the Head, the right-hand Side of the Ship, to him, is called the *Starboard*, and the left-hand Side, the *Larboard*.

So that the *Starboard-Tack*, is, when a Ship's Head stands to the Right, and the *Larboard-Tack*, when it stands to the Left.

the



the Wind westerly, while what little we had was easterly. At Noon, the *Boyne* and *Chichester* joined us from *England*, and saluted the Admiral. Half an Hour after, the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle, one Ship a-head of another. At Two o'Clock, he hoisted a Blue Flag at the Flag-staff on the Mizentop-mast head, and fired a Gun; which Signal, by the 8th Article of the fighting Instructions, is for him that commands in the 3d Post, and the Ships of the Larboard Quarter to clap by the Wind, and to come to their Larboard-Tack; but by the 9th Article of the sailing Instructions, it is for all the Ships of the Fleet to bring to with the Larboard-Tack; the Admiral having brought to, the inferior Admirals repeated the Signal, and the Fleet brought to with the Larboard-Tack, little or no Wind, and the Swell driving us nearer and nearer the Island of *Porquerole*. At Three, the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle, one Ship a-breast of another, and with a little Air of Wind Easterly he stretched with his Division to the South-westward, the Vice Admiral with his Division to the Westward, and the Rear Admiral with his Division made all the Sail they could in order to extend the Fleet, and to form the Line of Battle. But in the Evening we were not at all regular, the Rear Admiral's Division was straggled, and a great Way a-stern of the Center; neither was the Center, nor the Vice Admiral's Division formed in Order of Battle. On the contrary, the Enemy's Fleet seemed to be in an excellent Disposition, and a good Line, not above the Distance of four or five Miles, to the Number of 36 Sail, 28 of which formed their Line, 16 *French*, and 12 *Spanish*, the other eight were Frigates and Fire-ships. The *French* Admiral, Monsieur *de Court* with

with a white Flag at the Mizen-top-mast-head was in the Center; Monsieur *Gabaret*, with a Cornet or Flag with a Swallow Tail, was in the Van; and Don *Navarro*, the *Spanish* Admiral, with a Flag at the Mizen-top-mast-head, on board of the *Real*, a Ship of 114 Guns, was in the Rear; with five of the *Spanish* Ships a-head of him, and the other Six a-tern.

About half an Hour after it was dark, the Admiral put abroad four Lights in his Fore Shrouds, and fired eight Guns, which is the Night Signal for the Fleet to bring to, the windwardmost Ships to do it first, and to lie by with their Larboard Tacks aboard; the Fleet accordingly brought to, being very near the Enemy, and in Sight of them all Night. The Wind variable in the Eastern Quarter.

*Saturday, February 11*, when Day appeared, instead of being formed in tolerable Order, or any Thing like a Line of Battle, the Ships were scattered, and extended wide of one another, rather more uneven than when we brought to at Night, which proceeded from a Line never as yet having been formed, and the Current with the Wind being variable. The combined Fleets kept in an uniform Line, and had made Sail in good Order, stretching to the Southward, the Body of their Fleet distant from ours seven or eight Miles. In this Disposition, little Wind about N. E. with a Swell, the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to make Sail; and kept edging down upon the Enemy, the Wings endeavouring their utmost by crowding Sail to get into better Order, and keep up with the Center. At half an Hour past Seven, the Admiral made the Signal for the Rear Admiral and his Division to make more Sail. And at Eight, he also made the same Signal for the Vice Admiral and his Division; then he made the

the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle, one Ship a-breast of another. At nine, the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle, one a-stern of another, with a large Wind, and the Rear Admiral to lead; and in half an Hour after, he made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle, one Ship a-head of another.

It cannot be foreign to the Purpose to endeavour at the Definition of a Line of Battle, its Use and Constitution, by Way of Explanation to those of our Readers that are unacquainted with the military Discipline at Sea.

A LINE OF BATTLE is the Basis and Foundation of all Discipline in Sea Fights, and is universally practised by all Nations that are Masters of any Power at Sea; it has had the Test of a long Experience, and stood before the Stroke of Time, pure, and unalter'd, handed down by our Predecessors as the most prudential, and best concerted Disposition that can possibly be used at Sea.

This Order consists in a Fleet of Ships being extended in a strait Line, either a-head or a-breast one Ship of another; to keep as close together as the Weather will permit, that at all Times every Ship may be ready to sustain, relieve, and succour one another: Thus the Fleet must move to attack, or receive an Enemy, in a firm Body together, as it were united and cemented: A strong Bulwark perfectly formed in this Manner, which makes all its Motions together, not only prevents Disorder and Confusion, but it is the wisest Precaution that Thought can start, and a certain Advantage which may be look'd upon as the surest Token of good Success.

All other Stratagems and Devices avail not; the most exalted Valour, Superiority of Force, and

the most intrepid daring Fellows, who fight otherwise with more Fire than Order, must submit to that Side where there is the most Discipline in the Uniformity and Closeness of the Line : How impotent, then, must the greatest Fleet be, when scattered up and down, equally incapable of supporting itself, and repulsing its Enemies? Though Courage without Conduct, or Rashness may not always be discomfited; and Fortune, with an Intolence peculiar to herself, is sometimes pleased to exert her Power against Prudence, she is, however, foil'd in the long Run, and forced to yield; so true it is that the Strength of a Fleet consists not so much in the Number of its Ships, and the Bravery of their Crews, as in the Exactness in forming a Disposition of Battle in this Order, *and the Experience of him that commands them.*

It is for these Reasons that fighting in a Line of Battle at Sea, is continued to be the constant Practice of every Nation; a military Maxim by all approved, and not to be dispensed with upon any Consideration, however specious, safe, and expeditious a contrary Conduct, to oppose and destroy the Enemy, may appear in the Execution and Performance. Hence, by the Instructions established by his Majesty in Council, the Admiral and Commander in Chief is directed to exercise the Ships under his Command, and to draw them frequently into Lines of Battle, that, by a long Course of Practice and Obedience in this their capital Instruction, every Officer may become perfect, and acquire a thorough Knowledge, especially those who have arrived at a Command, without any other Merit, besides that of their Birth or Interest.

Sir *John Norris* and Admiral *Vernon* have been indefatigable in maintaining this naval Exercise, this indispensable Lesson, suffering no seasonable Oppor-



Opportunity to escape whereby the Raw and Unexperienced might be properly educated.

It is the Duty of an Admiral commanding in Chief, before he proceeds to Sea, to give every Captain, under his Direction, his Order of Battle, which, by shewing the Station of each Ship, no Ship can mistake, together with the sailing and fighting Instructions; both which are signed by himself, and are, to all Intents and Purposes, express Orders, not on any Pretence or Motive to be violated.

These Instructions are well concerted; their principal Injunction is to enforce Obedience to the Order of Battle, when the Signal is made by the Admiral, as, next under the Protection of Heaven, the Success of the Fleet depends on it, including Signals as the most expeditious, if not the only practicable Method of directing the different Ships to keep, or endeavour their utmost to get into their proper Station: Among many other Articles which intirely contribute to the Support of this Discipline and Order, it is directed, that each Ship in the Line of Battle shall keep within half a Cable's Length of one another, which is about fifty Fathom: That if his Majesty's Fleet should have the Wind of the Enemy, the Van shall steer with the Van of the Enemy's, and there to engage them; by which means every Ship knows her Adversary, and from the foremost in the Van to the Rear, attack them successively: An admirable Article to preserve the Order and Discipline of the Fleet. The Prohibition is expressed in the strongest Sense that Words can utter, no Room for Misapprehension, or the least Plea to evade it, that none of the Ships in the Fleet shall dare to pursue any small Number of the Enemy's Ships till the main Body is disabled, or run; and that no Ship shall leave her Station upon any Pretence

whatsoever. No Temptation, nor Allurement of any sudden Advantage to destroy the Enemy, no Exploit, let it be ever so considerable, and well-executed, can extenuate the Guilt of Disobedience, and this Breach of Discipline. Junior Officers are strictly enjoined to adhere to these Articles, they are not proper Judges, passive Obedience is their Duty; and it is the Admiral alone who holds the Power in his Hand that is the Judge; therefore, without Orders, or Signals made by him to authorize and justify a Ship's breaking the Line of Battle, it is a Subversion of all Command, bad in its Example, and dreadful in its Consequences.

Had the Fleet, agreeable to any of these Signals, been ever formed into a close regular Line of Battle, either a-head or a-breast one Ship of another, doubtless it would have been an easy matter to have varied them into either, according to the Wind, or the Enemy's Disposition; like a Rank of Soldiers, which after having been formed into a strait Line, standing Side by Side, can, at the Word of Command, turn about either a-head or a-breast one Man of another, wheeling with great Ease and Dexterity, either to the Right or Left; but order these Men, to the Number of twenty-eight or thirty, mixed and confused together, to go and engage an Enemy some Distance off, directing them never to stop or wait for one another, but in their way thither to form a Rank or strait Line; this is a Thing impracticable, and aiming at an Impossibility. In like Manner our Fleet set out, and continued their Course in Disorder; and tho' it was less difficult for the Center to form than the other two Divisions, yet it was far from being formed, and closed conformable to Discipline, and the fighting Instructions; as the Center out-tailed the Wings, and did not lay by for them, or  
allow

allow for the little Wind, the Swell, and a sufficient Time for so great a Number of Ships, which were to compose the Line of Battle, to get into Order, no Neglect can be imputed to the Wings; they could not provide any Remedy, and they are not at all answerable for the Consequences \*.

The *Royal Oak*, which joined the Fleet from *Mahon*, a Ship of Seventy Guns, with two more of Eighty the Day before, were no small Addition to our Strength; and in this critical Conjunction seemed to be a Prediction of our future Success; in short, it was very providential, as it were leading Fortune in a String; and what made their Arrival more welcome, and the Satisfaction more

\* Mr. *Lestock's* Account says, that before Eight o'Clock Lieutenant *Jasper*, the Admiral's Lieutenant, came on board, and told him, that the Admiral would lay by until he could get up with his Division to close the Line of Battle with Admiral *Mathews*; but having observ'd to Mr. *Jasper* that the Admiral had rather made more Sail, and went faster from him, he reply'd, that soon after he put off from his Ship (the *Namur*) she had made more Sail; nevertheless he thought it his Duty not to return, before he had delivered to him Mr. *Mathews's* Message. And soon after Lieutenant *Knowler* came on board of Mr. *Lestock*, with Orders for him to make more Sail, upon which he bid him look aloft, and see whether he could make any more Sail: Every Sail which could draw being then set. Lieutenant *Knowler* acknowledg'd the Truth of what he said, and added, that the Admiral was very uneasy that the Rear Admiral and his Division did not make more Sail to get into the Line of Battle; and upon Mr. *Lestock's* saying to him that according to the Line, the *Real* must be his Adversary, he reply'd, that Admiral *Mathews* had told him so; and after giving his Compliments to the Admiral, with Assurances that nothing should be left undone that he had Power to do to get along-side of the *Real* with all possible Expedition, Lieutenant *Knowler* return'd on board of the Admiral.

general,

general, was the Apprehension we laboured under, since the combined Fleets had put to Sea, which Fear at last became extremely anxious and troublesome, lest they should fall in with the Enemy, in their Way to *Hieres*; which Disaster would have been the Difference of six Ships to us, and the Enemy would have spared Men enough to have fought them against us.

At half an Hour past Ten, the Admiral made the Signal to engage the Enemy, about the Distance of five or six Miles, and kept bearing down in the same Disorder, unformed and extended, wide one Ship of another \*. The *French* Admiral no sooner observed this Signal, than he hoisted his Colours, as did also all the *French* and *Spanish* Ships, and crowded Sail abroad; continuing their Course to the Southward with little Wind, and a Swell so high, that most of our Ships could not bear their Ports up of the lower Deck.

Beyond all Dispute, this Officer who had disposed of his Ships like an experienced Admiral, and kept them in that Order for Battle, had it at Heart, by this Motion, to deprive us of the Ad-

\* This is the first Time that ever the Signal to engage was made before the Fleet was form'd in a Disposition of Battle, according to the Signal abroad for the Line.

Mr. *Mathews* made this Signal about three Hours before Action, while the Fleet, so far from being form'd in a Line of Battle according to his Signal, was in great Confusion and Disorder, bearing down on the Enemy, who were perfectly form'd, stretching to the Southward, whereby it soon became impracticable for our Fleet to keep the Advantage of the Wind, considering the Foulness of our Ships, and have Room to form in a proper Disposition of Battle, before Action, unless we had immediately haled our Wind to gain Time for that Purpose, which would have brought the Enemy more a-stern of our Fleet.

vantage



vantage of the Wind, and to secure it to himself; whereby he might have it in his Power to make a proper Use of the Fireships, upon which both *French* and *Spanish* Squadrons had great Dependance. In attempting this he had the greatest Prospect of Success; he had experienced that his Ships in the general sail'd three Foot to our one, so great is the Benefit and Difference between foul and clean Ships; and as we kept advancing on them with a Security ever dangerous, as if we had been going to a certain Victory, he was determin'd to profit from this Conjunction, foreseeing what would happen from our Impatience, and that it would be impossible for the Rear of our Fleet to come into the Battle: A well-judged Feint to gain the Wind, and draw us unguarded and inconsiderately on, to engage at so great a Disadvantage.

Notwithstanding there was rather less Wind than more, yet the combined Fleets stole away surprizingly from us; about two Hours after the Signal for Battle was made, take the following View of the *British* Fleet.

Admiral *Mathews* on board the *Namur*, with his Division compos'd the Center of the Fleet; the Ships a-head of him were the *Norfolk*, *Princessa*, *Somerset*, *Dragon*, *Bedford*, and close a-head of them were the *Kingston* and *Berwick* of the Rear Admiral's Division; those Ships a-stern of the Admiral, were the *Marlborough*, *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert* and *Royal Oak*, in all thirteen Ships, that were all a breast of the *Spanish* Squadron, and seven of the headmost of his Ships, out of Twelve that compos'd the Rear of their Fleet; and according to the Line of Battle, should have fallen to the Rear of our Fleet, the Vice Admiral and his Division.

Rear Admiral *Rowley* on board of the *Barfleur*, with his Division compos'd the Van of the Fleet.

It

It is necessary to take Notice here, that from the Time the Signal was made for Battle, and some Time before, to that Time when he engaged, was not less than three Hours and a half; and though he went down all the Way quartering, he did not sooner get within Gun-shot of the *French* Admiral, who in great Order in the Line of Battle kept stretching to the Southward: An undoubted Testimony of our great Distance off, as well as the general Disorder we were in, since the Signal for the Line of Battle, one Ship a head of another, had been flying from half an Hour past Nine, and yet this Division was necessitated all the Time to keep sailing before the Wind. The Ships a head of the Rear Admiral, were the *Boyne*, *Chichester*, *Nassau*, *Warwick*, and *Sterling-Castle*, with the *Chatham*, a Ship of 50 Guns not in the Line; the three last Ships with the Frigate were greatly extended, and almost reached to the foremost Ships of the Van of the Enemy's Fleet; in course left a Space for a great Number of Ships between them and the *Chichester*, while the Rear Admiral himself was near being a-breast with the *French* Admiral, and the *Princess Caroline* astern of him, with two Frigates of 50 Guns, the *Salisbury* and *Guernsey* at a good Distance off.

It appears by the Signal for a Line of Battle abroad, and this View of the Fleet, that the Rear Admiral, whose straggling Division reach'd all the Way from the Van of the Enemies Fleet to the *Poder*, a *Spanish* Ship in the Rear; no less than the Extension of 19 Ships, was where the Admiral should have been, abreast of the *French* Admiral, the Center of their Fleet; consequently the Rear Admiral should have been much farther a-head to have been able to attack the *French Chef de'Escadre*, the Chief in their Van; and by the same Rule the Vice Admiral should have been a-breast of  
of

of the *Spanish* Admiral, the Chief of the Enemy's Rear, where the Commander in Chief and the *Marlborough* were, instead of being such a great Way a-stern, through the Haste and Expedition which the Center had made from him; and indeed, the little Wind, the Swell, and the great Probability of a Calm, made it the more dangerous and improper in the Time of Action, that any of his Majesty's Ships should have been at that Distance off.

At One o'Clock the Admiral haled down the red Flag, the Signal to engage, and hoisted the white Flag at the Foretopmast-head, the Signal to give over Chace \*; upon which some of our Ships in the Van tack'd, concluding from the Weakness of their Disposition, and the Strength and Number of the Enemy's Ships, that this Order abroad was meant as a Direction to them; but the Rear Admiral, their Chief, continuing to bear down, they also thought proper to follow him, as warily as possible, and allowing for their Inferiority.

In this Disposition the Admiral made the Signal to engage the Enemy, but kept abroad the

\* What this Signal could be made for, no body can comprehend: It is certain that there were two Thirds of the combined Fleet had got far enough a-head to be a-breast with our Van, and that it was therefore necessary to order the Rear Admiral to hale his Wind, to prevent the Enemy from taking and destroying his Division; but this Signal did not express any such Caution, for it is a general Signal for the Fleet to give over Chace; besides the Signal for the Line of Battle was kept up, which obliged the Rear Admiral to endeavour to get into the Line, and to engage against so great a Superiority; as the Signal for Battle was soon hoisted again instead of the white Flag, the general Signal to give over Chace.

Signal for the Line of Battle, one Ship a-head of another, and with the *Marlbrough* bore down directly upon the *Real*. The Engagement began with equal Fury on both Sides; the Admiral and the *Marlbrough* having attacked with great Briskness, making extraordinary good Fires; and the *Real* with her Seconds defended themselves with distinguished Bravery: The *Norfolk*, the Admiral's Second a-head of him, having also bore down, engaged the *Constant* the *Spanish* Admiral's Second a-head of him. As the three headmost Ships of the *Spanish* Squadron continued their Sail abroad, and closed with the *French*, after receiving and returning two or three general Discharges, *en passant*; there remained then only the *Constant* a-head of the *Real*, and the *Poder*, a Ship of 64 Guns, that was fir'd at by the *Princessa*, *Somerset*, *Dragon*, *Bedford*, *Kingston*, with the *Salisbury* and *Guernsey*, two Frigates of 50 Guns, that kept firing, not within Gun-shot, exposing themselves to the publick Ridicule; but indeed it did not become them to go down nearer than the Ships in the Line of Battle, that kept them in Countenance; being mingled and intermixed in the greatest Confusion at a great Distance off, incapable of vindicating their own Conduct, or giving any Account of it, much less in the Power of a Looker-on, and far more in Danger of one another's Shot, which were fired away in this wild fantastical Manner, than of the Enemy's; nay even the *Somerset*'s People alledged, that she receiv'd many of the *Kingston*'s Shot, when the *Berwick* bore down and gave the *Poder* Battle, becoming the *British* Honour, an Officer, and an *English* Seaman.

The Ships astern of the Admiral and *Marlbrough* were the *Dorsetshire*, *Effex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal Oak*, that kept to windward of their Station, trifling away their Powder and Shot, in a  
Manner



Manner more idle and inexcusable: These bold intrepid Defenders of their Country's Cause lay at a cautious Distance off, where not one of their Shot reached the Enemy, who were too wise to venture casting many away in Return to them: *The Rupert, heretofore the vigilant Cruizer, eager and keen to run after every unresisting Foe, an inconsiderable and defenceless Enemy, the Idol of the Merchants, the Receiver of their Munificence, and the Guardian Angel over their Properties, whose Praises had been wantonly blazoned in every Newspaper; now out of Reach, and all Possibility of Danger, poured out her vain, fruitless Fires, and bore Testimony of all her former Puffs, Boasts, and Bragadocioes: Such, O Britons! are the dismal Effects of intrusting your best Garrisons under the Prowess of those, who, like fearful Women, lie distant in a perfect State of Security, waiting with Anxiety for the Event of Battle.*

At Two o'Clock, the Rear Admiral got along side of *Monfieur de Court*, where one of the *French* Squadron having fired at him, the Engagement began between the two Admirals; then the *Princess Caroline* bore down and seconded her Admiral: But the *Boyne* and *Chichester*, agreeable to the Humour which prevailed in the *British* Fleet, kept to Windward, and plunged their Shot into the Sea. The *Nassau*, *Warwick*, and *Sterling-Castle*, the three extended Ships in the Van, kept also out of the Reach of the *French*, as if they were resolved not to go within Gun-shot of them, at least they were more saving than the others, and did not throw away the King's Stores, (contrary to the famed *Douglas*, who, according to *Burchett's* Naval History, died a Martyr to Discipline, 'leaving an Example behind him worthy of the great Name, in chusing rather to be consumed with his Ship in the Flames, which was

' become past Redemption, than desert her, when  
' he had no Orders to do it.') They judiciously  
saw their Chief in the Heat of Battle, yet kept to  
Windward from it, believing it to be the only  
Means left them to save themselves, and prevent  
the *French* Squadron from tacking and swallowing  
up the Van. Undoubtedly the dreadful Consequences  
which would have otherwise happened  
from keeping in the Line of Battle, and engaging  
the Enemy according to these Signals abroad,  
which are Orders that admit of no Hesitation,  
make this a noble Exploit, even in Opposition to  
the Faculty of Obedience, the Basis of the military  
Trade, and in preferring the Safety of his Majesty's  
Ships to that of their own Commissions. Tho' a  
keen Disciplinarian complained grievously at first  
of this Conduct, yet he soon changed his Opinion,  
and turn'd from the most violent Resentment  
to Sentiments of the strongest Approbation;  
highly applauding this Disobedience as the most  
skilful Stratagem to frustrate the Designs of the  
Enemy, in saving the Van from unavoidable Destruction.

The *Marlborough* kept pouring in her Fires  
very fast on the *Spanish* Admiral, who, with the  
Second a-stern of him, maintained the Fight with  
extraordinary Fierceness and Obstinacy. The  
*Marlborough*, armed with the Resolution of the  
amiable Gentleman that commanded her, in full  
Pursuit of Glory, forced herself a-head between  
the *Namur* and the *Real*, determined to save the  
Admiral altogether from this Prodigy of incessant  
Fire; dauntless in the midst of Danger, inflamed  
with Eagerness to give and receive all the Fire; an  
uncommon Example, truly noble and meritorious:  
What Pity it is, that such matchless Heroism  
should fall a Victim?

The

The Admiral soon clapt up a Wind, No doubt to give the necessary Orders suitable to the present Exigencies, and the Disposition of both Fleets, as well as having been about half an Hour in the Heat of an Action, where eight of his Men were killed out-right; some of which were by the blowing up of a Chest of Musket Cartridges upon the Poop.

Between two or three o'Clock the *Marlborough's* Main and Mizen-Masts were shot away by the *Real*, and her Second a-stern of her; which last Ship lay on the *Marlborough's* Quarter, and clear'd her Decks, having no other Adversary to take her up; nevertheless the *Marlborough*, with great Firmness, after clearing the Masts and Rigging away, continued to make good Fires on the Enemy, unprotected, unassisted, and destitute alone for near two Hours, not one Ship out of those that were Neighbours in the time of Battle coming near enough to take a small Share. Let us examine whose Power it was in? The Answer is easy, in the Center, beyond all Contradiction. In what manner were those Ships employed? the Reader must take a View of them. The *Namur* had been in Battle, besides she was the commanding Ship; the *Norfolk* a-head of her in the Line of Battle, now lay idle, having engaged the *Constant*, the *Spanish* Admiral's Second a-head of him, very smartly for about three Quarters of an Hour, and beat her out of the Enemy's Line; and though the *Real* and her Second a-stern, had warm Exercise against the *Marlborough*, yet they found some spare Guns to fire at her, in order to call her back, but she never more returned to Battle: The *Dragon* took a small Run after her, but the Captain reflecting on the Consequences of breaking the Line, and giving Chace without Orders, was exceedingly glad to return to his Station; and she with  
the

the *Bedford*, *Kingston*, *Guernsey* and *Salisbury*, kept barking at the *Poder*, while the *Berwick* was engaging her like a *British* Man of War. The *Princessa* had fir'd two or three Broadfides at the *Spanish* Ships when they pass'd on to the Southward with the *French*, and likewise at the *Poder*, but now lay on the other Tack, with her Fore-top-gallant Mast gone, and Main-top Sail split. The *Somerſet*, as the *Princessa* lay, instead of being the next Ship to the *Norfolk*, conformable to the Line of Battle, as that Signal was still kept abroad, had now, by a wonderful Regard to Discipline, and an uncommon Dexterity, fought herself, how, or in what Manner is past Comprehension, into the Neighbourhood of the Rear Admiral, who, wanting Assistance very much, sometime afterwards pelted some Shot at her to come down, to his Succour: But the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert* and *Royal Oak*, tho' they were Ships just ready at Hand, yet they kept to Windward, and beheld the *Marlborough's* Distress with Unconcern, and perfect Tranquility, persevering in flinging away their Shot, not within Reach of the Enemy.

Good God! what Subterfuges or Evasions can the Fertility of their Brains furnish them with, to extenuate or gloss over this pretty roying away their Time until Night came, which denotes a Puerility of Mind, and a Weakness unpardonable.

Heaven! is it possible, that five Sail of *Spanish* Ships that have never been used to conquer, should out-brave, and withstand the Power of thirteen *British*, besides two fifty Guns Ships? For four Ships of the Enemy were not yet got up, and three were gone with the *French*, which were seven out of the twelve! \*

The

\* Admiral Matthew's Account published by Authority, says, That Monsieur de Court left most of the *Spanish*



The Signal for the Line of Battle was flying,  
and we were better Disciplinarians in the Center,  
than

*nish* Ships a-stern of him, which admits, that some of the *Spanish* Squadron clos'd with the *French* to the southward: This Account also mentions, that the *Norfolk* engag'd Don *Navarro's* Second a-head, and that the *Somerset*, *Princessa*, *Dragon*, *Bedford*, *Kingston* and *Berwick*, omitting the *Guernsey* and *Salisbury*, engag'd the *Spaniards* a-head; consequently, as the *Spanish* Admiral had six of his Ships a-stern, and five a-head of him, three of which having gone with the *French*, even from this Account, it appears there were only two of the Enemy that the Ships above-mentioned engaged, being the *Constant* that soon bore away from the *Norfolk*, and the *Poder* that struck, and was afterwards retaken by the *French*. The *Berwick*, the next Ship in the Line of Battle to the *Princess Caroline*, is said to engage the *Poder* by Mr. *Mathews's* Account: It is not evident then that all the Ships between her and the *Norfolk*, no less than eight, including the two fifty-gun Ships, were thus employ'd, that the *Norfolk* lay idle after she beat away the *Constant*, is certain, and that the *Marlborough* was left in Distress by the *Namur*, against the *Real* and her Second a-stern: — And had the *Dorsetshire*, *Effex*, *Rupert* and *Royal Oak* bore equally down with the *Marlborough* at the Beginning of the Action, the *Real* must have fallen into her Hands, as the *Spanish* Admiral's Second (the Ship that distress'd the *Marlborough*, and clear'd her Decks) would have been then overpower'd or match'd; and the sternmost Ships that were laid to the Vice-Admiral's Charge, tho' they never got near enough to fire at the *Marlborough*; by this Means would have been stop't from getting a-head for our Rear, the Vice Admiral's Division. — Falshood and Malice have aspers'd without Controul; but we now call on Mr. *Mathews*, and his Adherents, or the Advocates for the *Dorsetshire*, *Effex*, *Rupert* and *Royal Oak* to prove otherwise, than that the *Marlborough* was sacrificed; and the Cause that the *Real*, and her Second a-stern did not fall into our Hands, was for want of that Assistance which was so near at Hand, and not any Ways owing to the Conduct of the Vice Admiral.

than the foremost Ships in the Van, that prudently forbore coming into the Line, and engaging according to the Signals abroad, from the clear Foresight they conceived, that the *French* in that Case would have been soon enabled to have doubled upon them, and destroyed all the Ships in the Rear Admiral's Division. But here in the Center these Casuists would sooner suffer the *Marlborough* to be sacrificed than fall to Leeward of the Line: Admirable Policy! How came it at this Time to subsist? because their Chief in the Center was close haled upon a Wind, from whence they were directed to take their Disposition of Battle; but let these cool, considerate Men answer the Nation, why they did not observe the same Order when he was in the Heat of Action: Sure, there is not one among them, adventurous enough, in Opposition to Demonstration, and the Conviction of the whole Fleet, to advance that they were not to Windward of him all that Time †.

Boats

† The Articles of the fighting Instructions that seem to be violated by the *Marlborough's* not being supported, are:

#### INSTRUCTION I.

When the Admiral would have the Fleet draw into a Line of Battle, one Ship a-head of another (according to the Method given to each Captain) he will hoist an Union Flag at the Mizzen-peak, and fire a Gun; and every Flag Ship in the Fleet is to make the same Signal, and every Ship is to observe and keep the same Distance, those Ships which are next the Admiral always taking it from the Center.

#### INSTRUCT. XIII.

As soon as the Admiral shall hoist a red Flag on the Flagstaff at the Foretopmast Head, and fire a Gun, every Ship in the Fleet is to use their utmost Endeavour to engage the Enemy, in the Order the Admiral has prescribed, and

Boats were perceived to go on board of the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex* and *Anne Galley* Fireship from the Admiral, with such Orders, it is to be supposed as the general Instruction Book has not provided any Signals for; an infinite Loss, as it is the perfect Soul of Battle, to be able, in every Situation, with the Cast of an Eye to correct and reform Abuses in it; to push on the Backward, the Timid and Slow, or to recal the Rash and Inconsiderate, who often, by the Heat of a false Courage, are insensibly carried on to Confusion, are Points of the greatest Importance towards the conducting of a Fleet, and cannot be so suddenly instructed and executed, as by the Use of Signals, which, in many Cases, might be brought to animate, forbid, threaten and reproach \*.

Nothing

and strictly to take Care not before the Signal be given by the Admiral.

#### INSTRUCT. XX.

Every Commander is to take Care that his Guns are not fired till he is sure he can reach the Enemy upon a Point Blank; and by no Means to suffer his Guns to be fired over any of our Ships.

#### INSTRUCT. XXII.

If any of the Ships in the Fleet are in Distress, and make the Signal, which is a Wast with the Jack or Ensign, the next Ship to them is strictly to relieve them.

What could be greater Signals of the *Marlborough's* Distress than losing her Masts?

\* It has been pretended that Fire and Smoak obstructed the Admiral's Sight; Had he continued longer in it, he would have been still able to judge of what was doing, as he was to Windward: And it will be allowed, that Smoak always goes to Leeward.—Nothing is more certain, than that he left the *Marlborough* long before she lost her Masts. He was then in a Situation to distinguish

Nothing is stable and permanent in this World : The *Marlborough*, that had signalized herself from the Beginning, soon after she lost her Masts, had gathered Breath, and alone stood the Shock of all the Battle, could not persevere thus for ever ; She now began to slacken, her Fires were neither so fierce, nor so frequent ; on the opposite Side, the *Real* became quite silent, sickened and weary, her Rigging greatly shattered, and torn to Pieces,

what was doing from the Van to the Rear of the Fleet. He had done with fighting his own Ship, where his Person was not wounded, in which all the Plan of Operation was center'd (as the Vice Admiral was not trusted with any Part of it) therefore he could see and judge how to make proper Signals for the Destruction of the Enemy : And it is well known that he sent Boats on board of the *Dorsetshire*, the *Essex* and *Anne Galley* Fire-ship, that this Truth cannot be disputed — Nay, we have Authority to say, that Lieutenant *Bentley*, now a Captain, carried a Message on board of the *Dorsetshire*, and, at the same Time, called on board of the *Essex*. This he declared to the Vice Admiral when he came from Mr. *Mathews* on the third Day to call him off Chace. After so glaring a Truth in Defiance of Malice, can it be said with the least shew of Reason, that as the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert* and *Royal Oak* were far enough a-head from the Beginning of the Action to attack the *Spanish* Admiral, and the Ships a-stern of him, Mr. *Mathews* had it not in his Power to correct and reform any Abuses from their scandalously trifling and throwing away their Shot, or order'd them to a close Engagement with the Enemy——He was at Leisure, his Stern lay to the *Marlborough*, and it was impossible for him not to see how the Ships a-head and a-stern of him in the Line of Battle were employed : He alone who held the Power in his Hands, was in this Particular the sole Judge, the only Person who could authorize and indemnify ; and what are we to think, when we find that the Conduct of these four Ships is Part of Admiral *Mathews*'s Charge against the Vice Admiral ?

Topfail



Topfail Yards shot down to their Slings, Main-yard down upon the Gunnel, and by her Main-topfail hanging right up and down, her Mainstay must have been gone.

In this desperate Condition she had lain some Time, muzzled, without being able to command her any Way, with her Stern to our Line of Battle.

At half an Hour past four, the *Anne Galley* Fireship made all the Sail she could croud, and steer'd directly for the *Real*, that lay thus defenceless and disabled. Here Imagination startles at the Boldness of this Enterprize, and is seized and transported at the Manner in which it was to be accomplish'd: The immediate Dissolution of 1350 Souls, though Enemies, by this sudden Incendiary, make a rational Creature feel a generous Pity, and turn from the most violent Fury to Sentiments of Compassion.

But these extraordinary Commissions of Destruction are not so easily executed; the Fireship was neither covered nor conducted; a Design of that dangerous Kind cannot be too well guarded with every necessary Precaution, else it is in vain to expect Success. Two or three Ships a-stern of the *Real*, that were come up nearer, and were crouding on this dreadful Occasion with a small Air of Wind, kept firing at the *Ann Galley*, though at a Distance, where none of their Shot could reach her; she past daringly on until about five, when she came within Pistol-shot of the *Real*, and then blew up without doing Execution. Though the *Real's* Distress was such that she could not bring many Guns to bear on her, yet she kept an incessant Volley of small Arms firing at her, which induced the Captain to order the Lieutenant, Mate, Gunner, with two Hands more to leave the Deck, while he stood it with a Match

in his Hand ; and the Boatswain, with the Remainder of the Crew, in all eleven Men, were in the Yaul along Side (the Barge having not yet returned from carrying the Rest of the Complement on board some of the Ships) ready to receive the Captain, and the others, who steer'd the Ship below, the Moment their important Errand was finished.

The *Spanish* Admiral, after a noble Defence, and giving the most signal Proofs of an invincible Bravery, superior to all Dangers, now unshaken and immoveable, in the Consternation his Ship must be in, from the Expectation of being swallowed every Moment in the Flames, neglected no Expedient in the Power of Man, to overcome the impending Ruin. It was all he could do to bring six or seven Guns of his lower Tier to bear, and aimed them, when she was within Pistol-shot, so sure, that every one of them took Place, besides two Guns that were fired afterwards ; so that, by this Account, in which the Men that were saved, all agree, she must have sunk before she could have burnt the *Real*, had she not blown up. This is not all, a Launch full of Men were sent to take her, which otherwise must have happened ; consequently, if she could have been kept above Water, the Enemy would have made her fire the *Marlborough*. In that imminent Danger, where the *Real* kept pouring in small Shot, firing these great Guns, and the Launch almost on broad of the Fireship, the Captain unaided, his Officers all drunk, without any other Reliance than on his impotent self, and the Support of his own personal Courage, kept firing Blunderbusses at the Launch, and, at last, was reduced to the fatal Necessity of venturing to fire the Guns in the Water ; by which Means, with the many Matches unwarily placed, Hatches unlaid, Scuttles open, Funnel

Funnels, uncapt, running down unprepared, and primed with a great deal of loose Powder, plunged in inextricable Distress and Despair, no room for the least Glimpse of Hope; every Ship (excepting the *Marlborough*) and every Friend far off, the setting the Fireship so soon on Fire is accounted for.

The People that were in the Yaul, affirm, that she did not receive any Hurt from the other Ships that fired at her, for they saw every Shot fall short of them; that she seemed to sink down by the Head, and blow up by the Stern, with the Captain, Lieutenant, Mate, Gunner, and two Quarter Masters; one of the last was taken up alive, and lived a shocking Spectacle about a Fortnight: There was only a Boy killed in the Boat by the Explosion; after which the Lanuch endeavoured to take the Yaul, but their own Barge returning very opportunely, took her in Tow, and delivered her from that Danger.

Had any Ship gone down with the *Anne Galley*, considering the helpless Situation of the *Real*, she could have run no manner of Risque, but have been more than a Match, by raking her fore and aft, while the *Real* could not bring any great Number of Guns to bear, and in that Case the Fireship would have been protected until she had burnt the *Real*, and the Captain's Retreat with his People would have been secured; and really without such effectual Measures agreeable to Practice, and the Conception of this Duty in all its Consequences, Attempts of this dangerous Kind are not feasible, but desperate, *building Castles in the Air*, and defeated with less Difficulty than can be imagined. The deceased Captain *Mackay*, who fell thus a Sacrifice, was generally beloved; he arrived to this ill-fated Command, by a long Course of Obedience, Diligence, and a thorough Knowledge  
of

of his Duty, which was his whole Study, the Instruction and Example he gave to others; yet it has been asserted, that at this Time he was extremely backward and slow in priming his Ship, which should have been done before, in Readiness at the first Moment's Warning; and had he gone sooner down, the Enterprize could not have fail'd. Inhuman, to endeavour to blast the Memory of a Man who has so bravely lost his Life in his Majesty's Service; one who gave such Proofs, that he neither feared the Enemy nor Death; and that in the Instance of keeping the Deck himself, while he ordered every Body else below, puts it beyond all Doubt, there was no Labour nor Danger in War, that he would not have exposed himself to, in Duty to his King and Country.

Inconsiderate Men! he had no Orders to prime; consequently could not be ready at the time he was order'd down; for those who are Judges will readily allow, that a Fireship cannot be primed in less time than an Hour and a Half; and to be directed upon Service before he had Authority to get ready for it, is enough to confound a Man: Hurry to dispatch, Fear of displeasing, Concern to feel what he never had felt in all his Service, Reproofs and Menaces, Eagerness and Precipitation to execute, all help, on such an Occasion, to excite a Gust of Passions, with which the Conflict must be violent, and the Success uncertain. He, poor Man, was forced to go down priming all the way thither, and it is evident he had not the least Assistance; for so severe was his Necessity, that he was obliged to send his own Boat away with his People, which did not return before the unhappy Blast †.

To

† As a Proof the Fireship had no Orders to prime before she was wanted, we will quote Mr. *Mathews's* Account



To destroy Calumny, or expose the empty Speeches of Vanity or Ambition, who catch at the least Pretence to blacken others in their own Vindication, is due to Merit under Persecution, and the more, that this Merit has bid us an eternal Adieu; and it is to be hoped that a Justice of this Kind will not be thought any Interruption to our Relation. It often happens, that Men, when they commit Faults in an exalted Station, when they suffer themselves, by their Negligence, to be surprized by an Enemy, or their Measures are frustrated or disconcerted, the Credit, Cabals of their Friends, their Swarms of Creatures cover all; the Losses they occasion are conniv'd at and disguised, or thrown upon subaltern Officers: The Truth never pierces the Cloud, form'd by the Authority of the Great, and the Flattery of their Slaves.

This

Account, published by Authority, which says, " That  
 " after the *Spanish* Admiral was totally disabled, and his  
 " Second had bore away, he made the Signal for the  
 " *Ann Galley* Fireship to burn the *Real*; but that her  
 " Commander was so tedious in priming her, and coming  
 " down, that the four Ships a-stern got so near to her to  
 " prevent her Success; when by some of their Shot, or  
 " some unlucky Accident she blew up, (being then within  
 " Pistol-Shot of the *Real*) with her Captain and several  
 " of her Men; and also the *Spanish* Admiral's great  
 " Launch full of Men, which had been sent to prevent  
 " the Fire-ship from boarding him; that the Admiral  
 " was at the same time within Musket-shot of the  
 " *Real*—Had Admiral *Mathews* been within Musket-  
 " Shot of the *Real* when the Fireship miscarried, he would  
 " have seen that the *Spanish* Launch did not blow up with  
 " her, but that she endeavoured to take the Yawl, and was  
 " prevented by the Barge returning. The Distress of the  
 " Fireship was such, that when she went under the *Dorset-*  
*shire's* Stern, the Captain hail'd her, desiring the Assist-  
 " ance

This was a narrow Escape, an happy Deliverance to the *Real*; her Boats were seen to take Men up all round her, whose Hearts and Resolutions having failed them, in the most terrible Apprehensions that Men can labour under; had jump't into the Water for fear of the Fire.

The Rear Admiral, and his Second, the *Princess Caroline*, had been engaged very warmly

ance of a Boat, and said he was going down to be sacrificed, as no Ships were ordered to cover him. At this time there was neither Fire nor Smoke on either Side; indeed the *Namur* a little before had fired a Shot at the Fireship to hurry her down; and it seems very extraordinary, that the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal Oak*, should be suffered to keep to Windward to look on, where the Danger and Necessity of their Country's Cause called them: But what is still more astonishing, is, after such Neglect and notorious Misconduct, that the Fireship's Miscarriage should be another Part of Mr. *Matheus's* Charge against Mr. *Lestock*. It appears that Mr. *Matheus* did not give Orders for the Fireship to prime before the Fight, according to Practice, and the Nature of this Service, otherwise he would not have censured the deceased, by complaining of his Tedioufness in priming and coming down, but punish'd his Disobedience, since such Attempts entirely depend on Readiness and sudden Execution; for though a Ship may be so disabled as to give a fair Opportunity for burning her, yet if the Fireship is not primed ready to catch the Occasion, when it offers, the time she will take to prime, may very probably put the Enemy in such a Condition as to defeat the Enterprize; for which Reason, we find the Vice Admiral, not only ordered the Captain of the *Mercury* Fireship to prime, in the Morning before the Action, but to send the People on board of him, above what were necessary for burning the Ship; and likewise directed the Captain to keep a good Look out, and to depend on all proper Assistance, particularly that of an Officer and Boats to attend him, when burning the Ship was thought to be necessary and practicable.

above

above an Hour ; that nothing might be left undone, no Skill nor Dexterity unexecuted for the Destruction of the Enemy, the *Barfleur* very politically cut away her Lee-Anchors. The *Boyne* and *Chichester* neither hurt the Enemy nor receiv'd any themselves ; the other Ships in the Van, as has been observed, seeing into Consequences, prudently kept their Wind \*.

The *French* Admiral, whose Ships only a few of them fired, being unwilling, in these Circumstances, to expend Ammunition unnecessarily, decrying Don *Navarro* to be in imminent Danger ; the Center and Rear of our Fleet at the Distance he was off, appeared to be pretty well closed together ; he could only tell seven of our Ships in the Van, where he had himself nineteen, including the three *Spanish* Ships, but could not make a proper Use of them, as we kept to Windward. The remaining twenty-one of our Fleet of the Line, with the fifty Gun Ships, he apprehended were perfecting the Destruction of the *Spanish* Squadron ; heretofore the *English* were not accustomed to trifle away their Time in making ineffectual distant Fires ; a terrible Fire and Smoke, a continual roaring of Cannon, with all the Indications of a direful Defeat, presented themselves to his Mind ; he therefore made sail, and tack'd with his

\* Mr. *Mathews's* Account publish'd by Authority, says, " That there were but three of the *French* Ships engaged, the rest kept their Wind in order to tack and weather us ; but that our Van keeping the Wind of them, prevented their Design's taking place"—As it is notorious that Admiral *Mathews* did not direct the three foremost Ships to keep their Wind, but, on the contrary, he kept the Signals abroad for the Line of Battle, and engaging the Enemy, the Van then of our Fleet was saved by these Ships Disobedience, which proves  
K that

his whole Fleet in the finest Disposition and Order, doubling upon our Rear Admiral, who, with the greatest Precipitation, got upon the other Tack, making Signals for his Division to follow him; some of which tack'd, others wore, just as the little Wind and the Swell, still predominant, would let them.

In this State, the *French* Squadron had it in their Power, by their great Superiority, to overthrow our Van; but they ranged within Pistol Shot of four or five of them, where they could have raked them fore and aft, and did not fire one Shot. The Redemption of their Rear, in the desperate Situation they seem'd to be then in, was the important Cause in View, and any Interruption to that, let the Bait be ever so alluring, was not to be regarded, or put in Competition with it: To subdue our Van, while their Rear was vanquished, could be no Incitement to an eminent Officer, truly sensible of the thorough Distress of his Master's Friends and Allies combined in one Fleet together; whereas the rescuing them would not only acquire him Glory, but, by attacking us in the Disorder we were in, would likewise give him great Advantages over us. In short, the Certainty of disengaging the *Spanish* Admiral, with the Prospect of striking a general Pannick, confounding, dismaying, or increasing

that the Rear Admiral had only seven Ships against nineteen, more than two Thirds of the combin'd Squadrons, yet he was not directed to keep his Wind, as might be expected, considering his Weakness; and if Mr. *Mathews*, with thirteen Ships of the Line, and two fifty-gun Ships under his Direction, was not a Match for five, surely Mr. *Rowley*, with seven, could not be supposed to be a Match for nineteen; there could not be so great a Difference in the consummate Knowledge and Bravery of these two Commanders.

our



our Confusion, in the perplexed Manner our Van and Center would be mixed, were Presages of a Victory, and Points of more Moment than to be outweighed by the other Consideration. In this Confusion, where there was neither Discipline nor Command, the Fireship's Miscarriage, our Van running to join our Center on the opposite Tack to the Line of Battle; the *French* doubling upon them, and coming in great Order; the Rear of our Fleet not yet closed with the Center; the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge* a-head of the Vice Admiral, following the Example of their Neighbours a-head of them in throwing away their Shot; the Vice Admiral having tried to reach the sternmost Ship of the Enemy, and fired a Broadside at her, but could not stop her from going a-head, before his Beam, Topgallants lower'd, only under her Main and Foretopsails, with her Mizen-Topfail a-back; notwithstanding which she drew a-head of him, though he had all his Sail set, and there was so little Wind, with so high a Southern Swell, that it was all he could do to keep the Ports open to fire his lower Tier of Guns. As soon as he fired, she returned it, then hoisted her Top-gallant-sails, filled her Mizen Topfail, and let fall her Foresail and bore away from him: He kept going down after her, until he found he should only be able to fetch into her Wake; and all the Ships in the *Spanish* Admiral's Rear, crouded up to the Relief of their Admiral, like Officers of Judgment, and Men of Resolution, who knew what to do; whose Minds were fixed upon what was their immediate Duty. In this universal Terror, where every Body being possess'd by Fears, had renounced the Duties of their Office, or entirely ignorant of it; in a perfect Maze, incapable of Direction, but as it were, receiving Orders from their Apprehensions, we were no longer the in-

trepid *Britons*, Masters of the Sea, that we used to be; the Courage and Wisdom of our Fleet seem'd to be gone over to the Enemy. The Admiral haled down the Signal to engage the Enemy, likewise the Signal for the Line of Battle one Ship a-head of another, and made a Signal to give over Chace. At half an Hour past five, the Admiral made the Signal again for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle one Ship a-head of another; and haled down the Signal to give over Chace. At that Time it was beginning to be duskish, very little Wind with the Swell still up, and the Ships had hardly Steerage-way, or could be commanded; unquestionably then the Signal was made in order to collect the Fleet out of the Confusion they were in, into a proper Disposition of Battle, in Defence of any Attack from the *French*, that were now almost at Hand to Windward, but bearing down to relieve the *Spanish* Squadron. The Admiral, in wearing his Ship to stand the other Way to form the Line of Battle on the Starboard Tack, lost a good deal of Room, and near'd the Enemy, as he did not endeavour to tack, which, in that Case, would have look'd more like flying, and been an Indignity to his Flag; by which means a Ship a-head of the *Spanish* Admiral that had been dismasted, and struck, was left to be retook by the *French* Squadron, with a Lieutenant, and twenty-three Men — So precipitate was our Flight, and so great was our Disorder, that it seems there was not Time to save these People. The *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert* and *Royal Oak* wore when the Admiral did, which brought them much nearer to the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy than they had ever been before; and in passing by one another on the contrary Tack, the Admiral, *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert* and *Royal Oak*, with the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*,

*Cambridge* of the Vice Admiral's Division, fir'd on this Occasion, as did the Enemy for a few Minutes, without much Injury of either Side; but Night-Flashes, and violent Reports of Guns, made it appear very horrible, but in the Consequences altogether insignificant, only the Expence of so much more Ammunition, having in this last not one Man kill'd that we have heard of †.

The

† Mr. *Mathews's* Account, published by Authority, says, "That the Admiral was himself at the same Time, "when the Fireship blew up, within Musket Shot of the " *Real*, and was afterwards engaged within less than " Musket Shot by the same four Ships which had passed by " Mr. *Lestock*; which Ships the Rear of the Admiral's Division engaged, but at too great a Distance."

But if the Admiral had been so near the *Real* as within less than Musket Shot, he would have seen that the Launch did not blow up with the Fireship, as the Smoak of firing one single Gun at the Launch, which was all that he fir'd at this Juncture, could not possibly obstruct his Sight, even had this Smoak, contrary to Custom, past to Windward:—But his saying he was engaged afterwards within less than Musket Shot, by the same four Ships which had passed by Mr. *Lestock*, was what alarm'd the Nation, and exasperated the People to the highest Degree of popular Clamour and Fury against Mr. *Lestock*, as if the Vice Admiral had not only looked with Unconcern on his commanding Officer in the Heat of Battle, and tamely suffer'd those Ships, without endeavouring his utmost to engage and stop them from getting a-head to attack the Admiral, *who, tho' he was before over-power'd, yet continued dauntless against this superior Force.* In this Manner was the Nation imposed and deluded with the first Rumour and Noise; and this Account (without weighing long-liv'd Enmity, Passion and Prejudice, as well as the Necessity of laying the Blame somewhere, to draw a Veil over the most notorious Misconduct) captivated all Degrees of People: Therefore we think it necessary to observe, to undeceive our Readers, that as these

The *Poder* of sixty-four Guns, and six hundred Men, after standing the Fire of the *Somerset*, *Princessa*, *Dragon*, *Bedford*, *Salisbury*, *Guernsey* and *Kingston*; and having lost her Main-mast, and Foretop-mast, struck to the *Berwick*; several Officers boarded her, claiming the Honour that they had not merited; but the Captain pointed the Ship out to whom he had submitted, and when he found her to be the *Berwick*, he deliver'd his Sword to her Lieutenant, protesting to him at the same

these four Ships never got far enough a-head to fire at the *Marlborough*, her Distress could not any ways proceed from them—And that Admiral *Mathews* having form'd a Line of Battle a-head on the other Tack (on purpose to get away from the *French* who were just at Hand, else why was the *Poder* left with the *Berwick's* People) in standing from the Enemy, and leaving the Place of Battle, some Shot were exchanged as they passed one another, which Mr. *Mathews* calls engaging within less than Musket Shot; and also that this hindered the *Real* from falling into his Hands, and occasioned him to be torn to pieces, altho' it is evident he had left the *Real*, and he had, besides the Ships a-stern, six Ships a-head, viz. the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, *Royal Oak*, *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*, that fired on this Occasion in passing, and only four Ships of the Enemy fired. As an undoubted Proof of what I affirm, I appeal to Mr. *Mathews* and his Adherents, whether he did not fire his Larboard Guns, the contrary Guns that he first engaged the *Real* with? Consequently that this was a forced Fire, in endeavouring to get away. What is more, in saying the *Real* of the Admiral's Division engaged these Ships, but at too great a Distance, and asserting, they passed by Mr. *Leflock*, Mr. *Mathews* must also allow, that before they got up where he was, they must necessarily pass by the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, *Royal Oak*, *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*, which Ships were far enough a-head to have bore away, and to have engaged Yard-arm and Yard-arm; consequently had they equally bore down at first with



same Time, that he had held the others in the greatest Contempt; and had not she come down, his Honour would have never suffered him to strike the *Spanish* Colours to them. The *French* approaching very near, the *Berwick* had no more Time than to take out the Captain with some of the other Officers, and precipitately left behind his Fourth Lieutenant, and twenty two Men \*.

The

with the *Marlborough*, if they were not all of them able to have engaged at the Beginning of the Action, at least they would have been in the Way to have attacked them as they came up, or obliged them to have put before the Wind; why, therefore, if the Captains neglected their Duty, and could not be brought to obey Messages sent to them, others were not appointed in this Contest of their Country's Cause, is a Matter of great Surprize: It is certain, the sternmost Ship passed by Mr. *Lestock*, but with Submission to the Admiral that commanded on that important Day, she passed by out of his Reach, and with the same Justice and Propriety it might have been said she passed by, had she been in Sight fifteen Miles wide of him.

\* Admiral *Mathews's* Account, published by Authority, says, "That notwithstanding the *French* tack'd upon the Rear Admiral *Rowley*, they did not think proper to engage him; they, however, retook the *Spanish* Ship, it being impossible to do any thing with her, as she had not a Mast standing, and as it was near dark, and the whole *French* Squadron had tack'd upon them; that thereupon Captain *Hawke*, of the *Berwick*, left her, but could not get his Lieutenant, and twenty three Men out of her, his first Lieutenant having done all he could to persuade the Men to quit her, but in vain."

We must beg the Admiral's Pardon; the *Spanish* disabled Ship had only lost her Main and Foretop Masts; therefore she had her Fore and Mizzen Masts standing: But the first Lieutenant of the *Berwick* having observed the Situation of both Fleets, the Admiral leaving the  
Place

The whole Amount of this Fight is, that the Center, consisting of eleven Ships, *viz.* *Namur*, *Marlborough*, *Norfolk*, *Somerset*, *Dorsetshire*, *Princessa*, *Essex*, *Bedford*, *Royal Oak*, *Rupert*, *Dragon*, with the *Berwick*, *Kingston*, *Guernsey*, and *Salisbury* of the Rear Admiral's Division, were able to destroy the whole *Spanish* Squadron, much more so, as three of those Ships went with the *French*, and four of the sternmost did not get up to close with their Admiral before it was duskish, long after the Fireship's Misfortune; so that the whole Afternoon there were only five, out of which the *Constant* was beat away in less than an Hour; what then fifteen Ships could be doing from half an Hour past one till past five, no less than four Hours, and these Ships not taken, burnt and destroyed, is the Question which behoves them to answer: But here we declare lies the Neglect: For if the Admiral had not thought himself powerful enough with such a Force, he would have had the Prudence and Patience to have forborn engaging, until the Rear of our Fleet had come up, and been ready at Hand to succour and support the Center.

It is certain, that few of the Ships that fired at the *Spanish* Squadron, engaged within a Point-Blank Mark; 'tis true, they fired as many Shot as the others; but where, and how, what Damage

Place of Battle, and going from the *Poder* and *Real*, the *French* Squadron drawing near to their Deliverance, his Ship the *Berwick*, making Sail after the Admiral, wisely judged, that neither he, nor his People would be safe, came away, leaving the Fourth Lieutenant and twenty-three Men behind him, recommending Dispatch; and what may serve to support this Truth, and prove the Hurry our Fleet was in, to get away, the First Lieutenant did not get on board of his own Ship that Night, but lay on board the *Royal Oak*.

did

did they do the Enemy, or receive themselves? And there is not one among them can say, they had it not in their Power to attack; they were to Windward, and up with them from the Beginning, only wanting to bear away to a proper Distance; and there was the Fireship to strike a Pannick withal: In that Case, all other Assistance was superfluous; for there were more Ships already than could come to engage so small a Number; and if the sternmost at Night escaped our Rear by outtailing them, still after four Hours to dispatch Business in, there were with the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge* then far enough a-head, after the Signal was made to give over Chace, seventeen Sail to nine, even including the whole; the *Poder* that had struck, the *Real* altogether disabled, and the *Constant* beat out of their Line.

If the Apprehension of breaking the Line of Battle was the Motive which hindered the Center from going near enough to attack the Enemy, tho' a Line was never formed, yet it is certain that the Signal was kept abroad, while the Van was left exposed to nineteen Ships of the Enemy, not so much as directed to keep the Wind from that Superiority, at the same Time that the Center fell upon their Rear, the *Spanish* Squadron and our Rear with very little Wind was a great Distance off a-stern, surely the Signal had been better haled down; for in that Case it seemed to serve no other Purpose than as a Bugbear to intimidate our Ships from going within Gun-shot of the Enemy; and as to Discipline in the Order of a Line of Battle, all that was foregone when the Center bore away and attacked the Rear of the Enemy.

There was little Wind all Night, variable, and sometimes calm; the Fleet stood in shore, leaving the *Marlbrough* under the Care of the *Salisbury* and *Feversham*, not without general Fear, that she would be burnt, sunk or taken; but in the Morning we had the Pleasure to see her safe, to

the great Joy and Satisfaction of the whole Fleet, and her own Ship's Company, who had laboured under the most terrible Apprehensions all Night.

*Sunday, February* the 12th, the *Namur's* Masts having received some Damage, at Day-light the Admiral's Flag appeared to have been hoisted on board of the *Russel* †: Saw the Enemy in the *S. W.* Quarter distant four or five Leagues, and the *Somerset* having been wandering in the Night, something like her *Knight Errantry* of Yesterday, fell in with one of the *Spanish* Squadron in the Morning, and exchanged some Shot with her, without losing more than two Men in both Battles of Yesterday and To-day. Little Wind about N. E. the Fleet bearing down upon the Enemy, soon met the *Somerset* in their Way. At nine the Vice Admiral made the Signal for his Squadron to give Chace to the *South West* and crouded Sail a-head. At eleven the Admiral made the Signal for the

† Vice Admiral *Lestock's* Account, as delivered to the House of Commons, says, that he received this Morning a Letter from Admiral *Mathews*, directing him, when he made the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head of each other, to lead with his Division, let it be with the Starboard or Larboard Tack. How can this be practicable? For when a Fleet is once extended and form'd in order of Battle, how can the Van on the Starboard Tack become the Van on the Larboard Tack, without Confusion and Disorder, Loss of Time, and running the Gauntlet of the whole Fleet, to obey this Order; whereas in the common Course of Discipline in Tacking, or wearing to form on the other Tack, the Van becomes the Rear, and the Rear the Van, like wheeling about? At the same Time the Vice Admiral sent his Compliments to the Admiral, by Captain *Long*, with his Opinion, that we should do nothing, unless we engag'd the Enemy in a proper Disposition of Battle.

Fleet



Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle one Ship a-breast of another. At Two the Admiral brought to with the Fleet, in order to wait for the Rear Admiral's Division, that was some Distance a-stern, but the Rear Admiral having brought to also, the Admiral made the Signal for him that commands in the third Post to make more Sail. All this Day kept forming into a Line according to the Signal, and going down upon the Enemy, who was going before the Wind. About five we got into perfect Order and Disposition, fit to give and receive Battle, seeming determined to make a good and proper Use of our Strength, and the Assistance from our setting out, which Heaven continued to us.

The confederate Fleets saw our Strength as it were united and cemented in its proper Efficacy to be invincible; they trembled and were confounded, the exact Practice of Order and military Discipline had forsaken them, they were dismayed, and did not seem to know what it was: The Irregularity and Confusion of the *British* Fleet had overtaken them; we had espoused their Maxims, while they, in the Panic of their Hearts, had degenerated into ours, with this material Difference, they were sensible of their own Weakness, instead of running headlong to attack, or waiting for our coming down, they kept away from us, fluctuating and dividing in all their Motions, like Men whose Minds are filled with Fears, and cannot come to any Resolution. The *Spanish* Squadron was a-head and to Leeward of the *French*, four of their Ships were disabled, among which was the *Real*, their Admiral, whose Flag was still flying on board of this Cripple, without a Topmast on end, or a Yard a-cross, excepting her Main-topgallant and Sprit Sail Yards, under a Sprit Sail and Fore-stay Sail in tow of a large Ship, suppos'd to be the *Isabella*, with all the Sail she could set. A second without a main Topmast; a third with-

out a fore Topmast, and the fourth without a Bowspit. Besides the *Poder*, another *Spanish* disabled Ship, that had struck to the *Berwick* Yesterday, and in the Evening having been retaken by the *French* Fleet, she had been all Day in their Rear; when on our drawing near she was deserted, and the *Essex* was sent to burn her; being found already on Fire, and one of her Beams almost consumed, they added to this slow Fire, and kindled more fore and aft, which soon made a pleasant Blaze, and attracted the Eyes of the whole Fleet: This was a delightful Prospect in a fine Moon-light Night, and was look'd upon as a certain Prefage of an easy Victory next Day, at least the Certainty of forcing them to leave all the rest of their disabled Ships. The *Poder* burnt about an Hour, and at Night blew up in Sight of both Fleets, each imagining the Action to be their own handy Work; and a general Shout echo'd thro' our Fleet, from the Van to the Rear.

At half an Hour past five the Fleet brought to with the Starboard Tack on board, a fine Evening, little Wind in the N. E. Quarter, the Enemy bearing S. W. by W. six Miles. In the Morning the *Marlborough* had been sent to *Mahon* under the Protection of the *Oxford*; and in the Evening the *Burford* arriv'd from *England*, and fell into her Station in the Line of Battle, which Ship having been at *Hieres* in search of the Fleet, observing Yesterday a great Smoak ascend in the *Offing*, concluded from thence that both Fleets must be engaged, and got under sail immediately, leaving her Boat behind, which had been sent on Shore for Intelligence. \*

Our

\* Admiral *Mathews*'s Account publish'd by Authority, says, ' That at Break of Day he saw the Enemy's Fleet to Leeward of them, and found they had tow'd all the cripled Ships before the Wind all Night; the Admiral chas'd them again; the *French* laying in a Line

Our Advantages were conspicuous and many, even admitting that the Day before, the Force of both Fleets had been equal. We had only lost the Use of the *Marlborough*, in lieu of which the *Burford* very opportunely came, inferior no more than 20 Guns, all the other Ships were as able as ever to engage the Enemy. On their Side, the *Poder* had been burnt, with the four Ships which we had observed to be disabled and incapable of making any Defence, much less of giving Battle, especially the *Real*, their capital Ship, and, indeed,

‘ Line of Battle to Windward of the *Spaniards*, most of  
 ‘ them Hull to ; but as he drew near them, they made  
 ‘ Sail, and left the disabled 60 Gun Ship. The Admiral  
 ‘ then sent the *Effex* a-head, and order’d Capt.  
 ‘ *Norris* to burn the said Ship (not being able to spare  
 ‘ any of his Squadron to carry her to *Minorca*) which  
 ‘ Capt. *Norris* did, and she blew up at half an Hour  
 ‘ after Nine at Night ; that there was great Reason to  
 ‘ believe, that if there had been any Wind, the *French*  
 ‘ would have left the *Spanish* crippled Ships, as most of  
 ‘ them had suffer’d greatly. That in the Afternoon  
 ‘ Capt. *Watkins* of the *Burford* join’d the Fleet ; he had  
 ‘ been in *Hieres* Bay, and hearing the Report of Guns,  
 ‘ and seeing the Smoak, he made directly for it. That  
 ‘ at Night the Admiral brought to, that the Sternmost  
 ‘ Ships might get up with them.

It is surprizing as this Account mentions so many Circumstances and Appearances of a fugitive Enemy, disabled and encumbered with cripple Ships, that Admiral *Mathews* should have brought to so far to Windward of the Enemy, in so fine a Moon-light ; if he imagin’d the Enemy capable of running from him before Action, as some of his Advocates have given out, to palliate Matters, in order to excuse his engaging them, contrary to the Line of Battle, he must be truly sensible that they would, now, more endeavour at it, as their only Resource lay in the ensuing Night, to get away with their lame Ships. In the Night before the Action he brought to by his own Account, ‘ within a little  
 more

deed, that of the World, that had been so well prepared and fortified in the most extraordinary surprizing Manner, that they had the greatest Dependance on her. Her Sides being lined four or five Foot thick every where with Junk or old Cables to hinder the Shot from piercing them—Her Guns from the Poop, and Patteraroes from her Tops (which Places were barricaded with Woolpacks) did great Execution, and made great Havock among the Soldiers on the *Marlborough's* Poop. Their Officers and Seamen, all of them,

‘ more than three Guns Shot of them, and order’d the  
 ‘ *Effex* to lie a Mile to Leeward of him, and the *Win-*  
 ‘ *chelsea* a good Musquet Shot to Leeward of the *Effex*,  
 ‘ to watch their Motions, and to make the proper Sig-  
 ‘ nals, and stand after them, in case they should make  
 ‘ fail; that he was so near that he could count the Ene-  
 ‘ my’s Ships after the Moon was down.’——Here were  
 all the necessary Precautions taken, lest the Enemy  
 should endeavour to escape us, when we were not so  
 much as form’d in Order of Battle, and they were laying  
 by for us in good Order; but when we had gain’d the  
 Advantage of disabling four of their Ships, and burning  
 another, we became more cautious, and brought to at a  
 much greater Distance in Order of Battle, without send-  
 ing Cruizers to observe their Motions. What cou’d oc-  
 casion two such extraordinary Extremes of Rashness and  
 Diffidence, equally prejudicial to the Nation, as the  
 least Danger could not arise by going nearer at this  
 Juncture, is impossible to say? but it is certain they are  
 opposite to the Rules of War and Prudence, especially  
 as it was so easy for us to have kept Sight of them all  
 Night, by making more and more Sail, as the Enemy  
 appear’d less and less perceptible. It is what we cannot  
 allow, considering the Disposition of both Fleets, that  
 there could not be spar’d a Frigate or two to have saved  
 the *Poder*, a good Man of War, which would have been  
 a Trophy of the Enemy’s Flight; neither can we agree  
 that the Admiral brought to, that the sternmost Ships  
 might get up with him, because we were in an excellent  
 Line at the Time we brought to.



on this prodigious Bulwark had grounded their Hopes of Victory; such a melancholy Prospect could not but dishearten; such a Change could not fail to throw the most daring into a Consternation; however, we put off our Joy till next Day; we, with great Circumspection, stopt running nearer to a certain Victory, and keeping in Sight of them, though to Windward in one of the finest Moon-light Nights that ever was seen; we thought ourselves sure of the Purchase so soon as Day-light appeared; and that then we should attain to the Height of all our Wishes. It seem'd to be impossible for their crippled Ships to escape, and from all Circumstances our Conquest was secure and easy to be compleated.

In this Excess of a sure Victory, we were lulled fast asleep laying to, while the Enemy wisely took the Advantage, to free themselves from the Danger of being obliged to renew a Fight, where they could not but expect to be defeated, in making Use of the Night to retire with all the Precipitation that their Condition would permit; what else could they do? They had engaged us, according to their peremptory Orders, whether superior or inferior; and it is certain, that their Conduct all along from our first Meeting, to the Time that they did, shewed it to be their real Design; but now finding the Superiority to be so great, the most prudent Course they could possibly take was to make the utmost Expedition out of our Sight to save their Fleet. \* *Monday,*

\* The Captain of the *Poder*, who was our Prisoner, inform'd us that before they sail'd from *Toulon*, the *French* took infinite Pains to make the *Spaniards* believe, that we had only a few capital Ships, and the rest were all Frigates; that we were in great want of Men, the *Namur* having the highest Compliment, which was no more than 300; that we had very little Powder, and that the Men we had were sickly, and enfeebled with the Scurvy; though these Reports might serve to ani-

mat.

*Monday, February* the 13th, the Wind northerly, at half an Hour past Two in the Morning, the Admiral fired *Ten Guns*, which is the Signal to make Sail; a sufficient Alarm to the Enemy if within hearing; and the Fleet continued their Course to the Westward with a fresh Gale of Wind †. At Day-break instead of being within Gun-

mate the private Men, yet they were not at all credited by the *Spanish* Officers; insomuch that in a Council of War held the Day before their sailing, the *Spanish* Members argued against their going to Sea, but to end all Disputes, Monsieur de Court, the *French* Admiral, produced the King's Order to proceed immediately to Sea, and give us Battle; we had therefore no great Cause to be so impatient, for from thence it is evident that had we stay'd till next Day, when we should have been in perfect Order of Battle, that agreeable to their Orders before they retreated, they must have engag'd; and indeed from their Behaviour all along, and Method of acting, it seem'd to be their real Intention. For had it not been so, as the first Day they had a strong Westerly Wind, and at Night our Fleet anchored in the Bay, there was nothing to hinder them from passing to *Italy*, had they been bound there; and had they been bound down the *Streights*, next Day when the easterly Wind prevail'd, they would have made sail from us, instead of bringing to, in order of Battle. In short, in Spite of Falshood and Misrepresentation, in order to hide so notorious a Breach of Discipline, nothing is more certain than that they came out on purpose to give us Battle, and that their Design by making sail, on seeing us make the Signal for engaging while our Fleet were in Disorder and Confusion, was to have gain'd the Weather Gage; an Advantage which every good Officer will endeavour to obtain, and be cautious of losing.

† Though this Signal, (the 6th Instruction to be observed in the Night-time) is the Signal for the Fleet to make sail after lying by, yet we cannot think it a proper one on this Occasion, when the Enemy was on the Retreat; therefore we have the more Reason to lament  
that

Gun-shot of the Enemy, no body could discern them; they had made the best Use of their Time: Hands were sent to the Mast-Head, Emissaries of every Sort, with the keenest and sharpest Eyes were kept on the Stretch; all employed to look out for the Enemy, when the Vice Admiral made the Signal for seeing above 20 Sail. At Seven the Admiral hoisted a Flag striped red and white on the Flag-staff at the Fore-top-mast head, and fired a Gun, which Signal, by the 13th Article of the fighting Instructions, is for the Vice Admiral and his Division to draw into a Line of Battle a-head of one another; but by the 14th Article of the sailing Instructions, it is for the Vice Admiral to send Ships to chace, upon which the Vice Admiral repeated the same Signal, and with his Division in the Line of Battle one Ship a-head of another, gave Chace a-head. At Eight

that other Signals more applicable, were not provided and appointed: For this not only alarm'd the Enemy, but it was no certain Guide nor Direction: It neither pointed out the Course the Fleet should steer, nor that it should sail in a Line of Battle; and though the Rear of the Fleet might guess at the Admiral's Course, by seeing his Distinguishing Lights, yet the Van could not possibly see, or make any Judgment, without proper Lights (as should have been at the Bow-sprit End) forward. In support of what we have said, in regard to Night Signals, we will insert a Preamble of Admiral *Vernon's*, to one of his additional Signals, *viz.* Whereas the Night Signals, 'in the general Instruction Book for 'lying by, or making sail after lying by, are Signals 'generally conceived for bad Weather, and so for being 'better distinguished, are directed to be made with a 'great Number of Guns, which in moderate Weather, 'and our present cruising Station might be inconvenient: And it is certain that such Signals are improper, within hearing of our Enemy, and so defective, that they can serve no Purpose but that of bad Weather, which is the only Use of them.

the Admiral made the Signal for the Ships to Windward to bear down into his Wake: And at Nine he made the *unfortunate Signal* to give over Chace, which the Vice Admiral answered by shortening sail; and the Enemy soon after got out of Sight with all their lame Ships. At Ten the Wind came to the Eastward, a good Wind to give Chace, without straining our Masts, but though it continued so, the Fleet lay by all that Day, and next Night †.

On *Tuesday* the 15th, made *Cape St. Sebastian*, then bore away for *Minorca*, and saw the Island the 17th, when the *Sutherland* Hospital Ship was dispatched into *Mahon* Harbour with the wounded Men.

In this Month we bore away twice more to *Minorca*, which, if we had not been so unlucky as to do, we should have got to *Hieres*, where it was judged we were bound, and thereby escaped an hard Gale of Wind, in which most of the Ships were greatly disabled, by losing their Masts, falling on board of one another, through the Misapprehension of Signals, as well as some of them  
very

† Mr. *Mathews's* Account published by Authority says, ' That he saw the Enemy again next Morning, but at a great Distance. That after the Admiral had lost Sight of the Enemy's Fleet, he found all his Endeavours to rejoin them, or procure Intelligence of them ineffectual, they being gone, as he suppos'd, down the *Streights*.'

Here he acknowledges that he saw the Enemy, but not one Word of calling the Vice Admiral off from chasing them, who gain'd so much on the Enemy, as to make them from the Deck, with a Separation between the *Spanish* and *French* Squadrons. Not satisfied with the Signal, the *Winchelsea* was sent with Orders for the Vice Admiral to come into the Fleet; and if it was Weather for her Boat to go on board of the Vice Admiral,



very near ashore in the Night in a Storm of Wind upon the Island of *Minorca*. From these Disasters the Fleet was obliged to go into the Harbour to refit, from whence the Ships did not put to Sea till the latter End of *March*; before which Time the Vice Admiral was suspended and sent Home, to the great Surprize and Astonishment of the Fleet. *Rear Admiral Rowley, now commanding in the second Post, hoisted his Flag on board of the Neptune; on whom the Command in the Mediterranean has since devolv'd, as a consummate Commander of great Abilities and perfect Experience.*

In the mean Time the *Spanish* Squadron, in the most infinite Distress, parted from the *French*

miral, surely it was such as might have been employed in going after a fugitive disabled Enemy, without injuring our Ships that were disabled. The Day before he says, 'there was great Reason to believe, that if there had been any Wind, the *French* would have left the *Spanish* crippled Ships, as most of them had suffered greatly.' And now that there was Wind sufficient to bring him up with the Enemy to gain these Ships, or force a general Engagement, he gives over Chace, passing over this important Particular, in his Account, or giving any Reason for such extraordinary Conduct; at the same Time pretending that he us'd all his Endeavours to rejoin the Enemy, or procure Intelligence of them, when he acted quite the contrary, and lay by all Day and next Night with an Easterly Wind.

Every Consideration seem'd to enforce our Fleet pursuing the Enemy down the *Streights*, especially as it was reported, they expected Reinforcements from *Brest*, and not one against it, even if it could have been possible to have strain'd our disabled Ships Masts, by going almost afore the Wind;—so great an Advantage and such sure Omens of Victory were worth running some Risque; and as the Enemy escaped by the Vice Admiral's being call'd from the Chace, Mr. *Mathews* who gave the Order is alone answerable.

the Day after we lost Sight of them, but afterwards they arrived safe in *Cartagena* Harbour; while the *French* had been looking for them at the Island of *Majorca*, and did not anchor in *Alicant Road* till the 27th of *February*, N. S.

Nothing can exceed the Severity of this Misfortune and Disappointment; a national Grievance and Calamity, what the richest and poorest Men must feel, all Degrees from the highest to the lowest. Had we pursued them, it is now obvious and manifest to the whole World, that we should have reap'd an Harvest adequate to the immense Expence of watching their Motions at their Harbour's Mouth above two Years; the whole *Spanish* Squadron must have been entirely destroyed, or become ours, and nothing could have saved the *French* but their Heel. Separate or together, this irrecoverable Overthrow to our Enemies must have ensued; all their Designs must have been frustrated and defeated; our Allies supported; the *Spaniards* taught to pursue their true Interest, while the Power of the insolent Controller of *Europe* had been pull'd down, and he become flexible to our just Demands; the Harbingers of Peace, Trade, and Plenty, with Glory to the Nation and its triumphant Fleet.

*The preceding Account is given by a Friend of Mr. Lestock; we shall next offer to the Reader that of Mr. Mathews, as published by Authority; after which we shall introduce some Letters that were wrote upon that Occasion; together with some other Matters, all tending to elucidate the true Cause of the ill Success of our Navy in their Engage-*  
ment

*ment with the combin'd Fleets of France and Spain, off Toulon Harbour.*

The Account published by Authority runs thus :

*Makon Harbour, Feb. 3, 1743-4, O. S.*

**T**HE *Somerset*, *Dragoon*, and *Warwick* join'd him ; on the 8th he received Advice, that three Expresses came to *Toulon* the Day before, in a very short Distance of Time one after another : That he was likewise informed, that the Conjunct Fleet would put to Sea the next Morning : That between Three and Four that Afternoon, Capt. *Marsh*, of the *Winchelsea*, one of the Ships appointed to watch the Conjunct Fleet's Motions, made the Signal for some of the said Fleet being under Sail ; upon which he made the Signal for Unmooring, and putting the Ships in a Condition for Action, which was done with the utmost Alacrity and Expedition : That in less than Half an Hour, they could see several of them from their Ships. That the Signal was made by Capt. *Marsh*, before it was dark, for seeing nineteen Sail, and about two in the Morning he sent the Admiral Word, that they anchored again under Cape *Sepet* : That as soon as it was Day they saw those, that came out the Night before, under Sail, and in a very little Time the rest coming out, their Number in all being 34 : That the Admiral then got under Sail, the Wind blowing very fresh Westerly, expecting they would have come down to him ; but soon found they had no such Intention, at least for that Day, for they kept plying to Windward, tho' there was all the Appearance of dirty Weather, and some of the Weathermost Ships were, at Night, Hull to : That he therefore stood to and fro in the Bay till Night,  
and

and then anchored, having left Cruizers out to watch their Motions; during which the *Warwick* touched the Ground, but by starting 30 Tuns of Water, was got off about Nine that Night, without any other Damage.

That by Break of Day the next Morning, our People seeing from the Mast-head 15 Sail (the rest being hid by the Island of *Porquerole*) the Admiral immediately got under Way, having but little Wind, and that at North, and made all the Sail he could get to them, they standing at the same Time towards the *English* Fleet with a small Breeze Westerly: That after an Hour or two's Calm, there sprung up a small Breeze Easterly, by which Means they neared each other. That at the same Time the *Boynes* and *Chichester* appeared in Sight from under *Levant* Island, and the Easterly Wind prevailing, they, and a Tender with Provisions from *Makon*, soon joined the Admiral, having had the good Fortune to fall in with the Land to the Eastward, without which they must have fallen into the Enemies Hands. That the Enemy brought-to in a Line of Battle, but for want of Wind, and having a very ugly Sea, it was Night before the Admiral could get near them, having had the Signal out all Day for the Line of Battle, and kept it out for some Time after it was Night. At Dusk he brought-to, within a little more than three Guns Shot of them, and ordered the *Effex* to lie a Mile to Leeward of him, and the *Wintbelsea* a good Musket's Shot to Leeward of the *Effex*, to watch their Motions, and to make the proper Signals, and stand after them, in Case they should make Sail: That they were so near, that he could count the Enemies Ships after the Moon was down, but could not at the same Time see Vice Admiral *Lestock* and his Squadron, he having brought  
to



to so far to Windward, that, when it was dawning, and the Admiral had made Sail, and the Signal for the Line of Battle a-breast, the Vice-Admiral was full five Miles a-stern of him: That the Enemy also made Sail, and went with their Topsails and sometimes set their Foresails.

That about Eleven, the *Royal Oak* and two Tenders with Provisions from *Mahon* join'd the Fleet, having luckily fallen in to the Eastward.

That Rear-Admiral *Rowley* led the Van, but could never come near the *French* Squadron, as *M. de Court* would sometimes lie to, as if he designed staying for them, but when they drew near him, he made Sail again, till at last he had left most of the *Spanish* Ships a good Way a-stern of him: That the Admiral was then fully convinced he never would come to a general Engagement, but judg'd his Design was, by this Way of acting, to draw him down the *Streights*: That about half an Hour after Eleven, the Admiral made the Signal for engaging, and soon bore down upon the *Spanish* Admiral, and ordered the *Marlborough* to do the same: That the Action began about One: That the *Norfolk* engag'd *M. Navarro*, (the *Spanish* Admiral's Second) who soon bore away, and never shortened Sail, whilst they could see her. The rest of the Admiral's Division a-head engaged those a-head. The *Marlborough* driving a little too near the Admiral, obliged him to fill his Sails to prevent her coming on board him. That the little Time *Mr. Mathews* was engaged, they greatly disabled his Masts and Rigging; and that having but little Wind, and an ugly Swell, his Mizen Topfail handed, to prevent the Masts and Rigging tumbling about their Ears, hindered their working the Ship, tho' he reeved new Braces three several Times, so that he could not give the *Marlborough* the Assistance *Capt. Cornwall* wanted,

ed, whose Behaviour is mentioned by Mr. *Mathews* to merit all imaginable Praise, and whose unfortunate Fate he greatly laments. That the Enemy were extremely well served with Gunners, the *French* training up a great Number of them, and having been exercising them at a Mark for upwards of three Months before the Engagement: That the *Marlborough's* Main-mast was brought to by the Board, as if it had been but a Twig; and that the Admiral's Main-mast and his Bow-sprit were shot thro' and thro', and the former had only two Shrouds to support it, and all his Topmasts were wounded. That the Enemy fired chiefly at our Masts and Rigging; for tho' the Admiral engaged within Pistol-shot, he had but nine Men killed outright, and forty wounded. That his Captain's Arm was shot off the first Broadside. That the *Spanish* Admiral's Ship, the *Real*, was totally disabled, and when Mr. *Mathews* attacked her Second, she soon bore away, and made all the Sail she had in her Power to set. That he then made the Signal for the *Ann Galley* Fire-Ship to burn the *Real*, but that her Commander was so tedious in priming her, and in coming down, that the four Ships a-stern got so near her, as to prevent her Success; when by some of their Shot, or some other unlucky Accident, she blew up (being then within Pistol-shot, or less, of the *Real*) with her Captain and several of her Men, and also the *Spanish* Admiral's great Launch full of Men, which had been sent to prevent the Fire-ship from boarding him. That the Admiral was himself, at the same Time, within Musket Shot of the *Real*, and was afterwards engaged within less than Musket Shot by the same four Ships, which passed by Mr. *Lestock*, which Ships the Rear of the Admiral's Division engaged, but at too great a Distance.

That

That the *Somerset*, *Princessa*, *Dragon*, *Bedford*, *Kingston*, and *Berwick*, engaged the rest of the *Spaniards* a-head: That one Ship of Sixty Guns of the Enemies fell into our Hands, and that during this Time M. *de Court* let Rear Admiral *Rowley* come a-long-side of him, when they had warm Work for near three Glasses, as had the *Princess Caroline*: That after that Time M. *de Court* set his Foresail and left Mr. *Rowley*, who was then engaged by the *French* Admiral's two Seconds, but not for above twenty Minutes, before they went off: That there were but three of the *French* Ships engaged, the rest kept their Wind in order to tack and weather us, but that our Van keeping the Wind of them, prevented their Design taking Place: That the Night coming on with little Wind and a very great Swell, hinder'd our improving the Advantage we had got; and that the *Barfleur* had eighteen Men kill'd, and thirty eight wounded.

That notwithstanding the *French* tack'd upon Rear Admiral *Rowley*, they did not think proper to engage him: They however retook the *Spanish* Ship, it being impossible to do any Thing with her, as she had not a Mast standing, and as it was near dark, and the whole *French* Squadron had tack'd upon them; that thereupon Capt. *Hawke* of the *Berwick* left her, but could not get his Lieutenant and Twenty three Men out of her, his first Lieutenant having done all he could to persuade the Men to quit her, but in vain.

That about Eight at Night, the Admiral shifted his Ship, and hoisted his Flag on board the *Russel*, Capt. *Long*, not caring (should there be an Engagement the next Morning) to risk the falling of all his Masts. That at Break of Day they saw the Enemy's Fleet again to Leeward of them, and found they had towed all the crippled

Ships before the Wind all Night. The Admiral chased them again, the *French* lying in a Line of Battle to Windward of the *Spaniards*, most of them Hull-to; but as he drew near them, they made Sail, and left the disabled sixty Gun Ship. The Admiral then sent the *Essex* a-head, and ordered Capt. *Norris* to burn the said *Spanish* Ship, (not being able to spare any of his Squadron to carry her to *Minorca*) which Capt. *Norris* did, and she blew up about Half an Hour after Nine at Night. That there was great Reason to believe, that if there had been any Wind, the *French* would have left the *Spanish* crippled Ships, as most of them had suffered greatly.

That in the Afternoon Capt. *Watkins* of the *Burford* join'd the Fleet; he had been in *Hieres* Bay the Day before, and hearing the Report of Guns, and seeing the Smoak, he made directly for it.

That at Night the Admiral brought-to, that the sternmost Ships might get up with him. That he saw the Enemy again the next Morning, but at a great Distance.

That after the Admiral had lost Sight of the Enemy's Fleet, and found all his Endeavours to rejoin them, or to procure Intelligence of them, ineffectual, (they being gone as he supposed, down the *Strieghts*) he labour'd for several Days, against contrary Winds and Storms, to get back to the Bay of *Hieres*, which however he found impracticable, and was obliged to put into *Port Mahon*, where he was at Anchor on the 29th past, and proposed to get again to Sea the first Moment that the necessary Reparations could be made of the Damages sustained by several of his Ships, as well in the Engagement with the *French* and *Spanish* Fleets, as in the constant Storms and Weather he had since met with.

As the Admiral had not then had his Returns  
from



from the several Captains, who were engaged, of the Loss they might sustain in the Action, he was not able to send the Particulars by this Courier.

All that he mentions upon that Head, besides what is above, is, that the *Marlborough* lost in the Action 43 Men, her Captain and Master included, had 90 wounded, who had been sent to the Hospital in *Minorca*, and 30 slightly wounded, who remained on board, and would soon be able to do their Duty.

*We shall next give our Readers Copies of some original Letters, that passed between the two Admirals, Mathews and Lestock, immediately after the Engagement.*

Adm ——— l M ——— s to Adm ——— l  
L ——— k.

S I R,      *Russel* at Sea, the 12th Feb. 1743.

I AM exceedingly sorry you did not judge proper, when I had made the Signal to engage the Enemy, to bear down yourself, or at least to have made the Signal for a sufficient Number of your Squadron, to have endeavoured to cut off the five *Spanish* Men of War, that were in the Rear of the *Spanish* Admiral. Such an extraordinary Proceeding of yours greatly surprizes me, and I hope you will be able to give me a very good Reason for such your Conduct.

In case we should see the Enemy, when I make the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head of each other; you are to lead with your Squadron; let it be with the Starboard or Larboard Tacks, in regard the Rear Admiral's Masts are much wounded; and for ought I yet know, so may be

the *Princess Caroline's*, and *Chichester*, who were engaged with him. I am,

S I R,

*Your most Obedient Servant,*

T—M—ws.

To R——d L——k, Esq; &c.

*Adm——l M——ws's Letter which accompanied  
his Queries to V. A——l L——k.*

*SIR,* Namur, *off* Mahon, 20<sup>th</sup> Feb. 1743.

**I** Writ you a Letter the 12th Instant, to which I have had no Answer; I judge it my Duty to send you the inclosed Queries, which I desire you will be pleased to answer, and transmit to him, who is,

S I R,

*Your most Obedient,*

*Humble Servant,*

T—M—ws.

To R——d L——k, Esq; &c.

*Vice A——l L——k's Letter, and Answer to  
the above Letters of A——l M——ws.*

*SIR,* Neptune, off Mahon, 21<sup>st</sup> of Feb. 1743.

**I** Received your Letter of Yesterday's Date, wherein you take Notice of your having written to me of the 12th Instant, to which I had given you no Answer: I now own the Receipt of that of the 12th, together with the Queries, which I have answered, Part of which answers your Letter of the 12th Instant. I am,

S I R,

## Four most Obedient

*Humble Servant,*

**R—d L—k.**

To the Honourable A—l M—s.

## Queries

*Queries stated by Adm——l M——ws.*

*The first Query.*

Did you not see the Signal out for the Line of Battle, when I made the Signal for bringing to, the 10th Instant at Night?

*Answered by Vice A——l L——k.*

*First Answer.*

It being dark, we could see no other than the Night-Signal to bring to.

*Second Query.*

Was it not your Duty to have brought to, in the Line of Battle, agreeable to the Signal then out?

*Second Answer.*

As a Proof that we were in the Line with you, I think we were within four Miles of the Enemy; and all my Officers that took any notice affirm, that we were not above three Miles from the Enemy, when we brought to. Several of the *Spanish* Ships edg'd from us soon after we brought to.

*Third Query.*

Your Reason for bringing to, with your Division, at least five Miles to Windward of me, the doing of which you must know would make you be (as the Wind was then) that Distance a-stern of me, as you was when we made Sail.

*Third Answer.*

I must repeat again, that I was in the Line with you, when we brought to, the Wind at that Time was at E. S. E. at 10 o'Clock it came to E. N. E. at 12, to N. E. at 2 to N. N. E. and  
continued

continued so till 8 o'Clock in the Morning, which brought us to Windward of you.

*Fourth Query.*

Did you not see the Signal made by me, to engage the Enemy, your Reason for not repeating the said Signal, and endeavouring to cut off the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy, and for not making the Signal for any of your Division to perform that Service; especially as you had clean Ships in your Division; and also your Reason for shortning Sail, and altering your Course by halling upon a Wind.

Namur, off Mahon-Harbour, T— M——ws.  
the 20th of Feb. 1743.

*Fourth Answer.*

We did see you make the Signal to engage the Enemy, which is never to be repeated, as may be proved by the Words of the 13th Article of the Fighting Instructions, beginning with the Words; "As soon as the Admiral shall hoist a Red Flag on the Flag-Staff, at the Foretopmast-Head and fire a Gun, every Ship in the Fleet is to use their utmost Endeavour to engage the Enemy, in the order the Admiral has prescribed unto them." Which Article leaves no room for its being repeated; for where repeating is necessary, every Article expresses it shall be repeated. And as I have been in two General Battles, I do affirm, that the Signal for Battle was not repeated in either. In that off *Malaga*, I was Lieutenant to the Admiral of the *White*, who did not repeat it, nor did any other Flag-Ship, either *English* or *Dutch*.

It was impossible for me to make more Sail than I did; those of my Division a-stern of me, made



made all the Sail they could, none of which could come within Shot of the sternmost of the Enemy's Ships; those of my Division, that were a-head of me, were the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*, both which Ships could have made more Sail, but they kept to Windward of their Station, particularly the *Dunkirk*. And tho' there was but little Wind with a Swell, yet as they sailed well, it was my Opinion, they might have stopt those four Ships of the Enemy, until I and my Division got up; therefore I fired a Shot to Windward of them, and at the same time made the Captain of the *Dunkirk's* Signal, but to no Purpose.

I kept bearing down, until I found I should not be more than able to get into the Wake of the sternmost Ship of the Enemy. Farther, to divert her from getting up to the Protection of the *Spanish* Admiral, as the only Remedy left me to bring on an Engagement, at the Distance I was off, I fired a Broadside; she return'd it, sheer'd farther from me, and made more Sail towards the *Real*.

In this Situation you haled down your Signal to engage, and made the Signal to leave off Chace. I immediately shortned Sail; you haled your Wind, I did the same; as it appeared to me, to protect the Rear Admiral and his Division, the Van of the *French* Fleet being then tackt, and endeavouring to double upon him.

From the Time you bore down upon the *Real*, till the Time you made the Signal to leave off Chace, the little Wind and the Distance of the Ships a-stern of me, put it out of my Power to direct the clean Ships, viz. *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham*, and *Revenge*, to go a-head of me; for from that Instant you bore away, it appeared to me, that all the Sail they could make was then abroad, and continued so. Consequently before this Time,

when

when I neither knew, nor saw, that you intended to attack the *Spaniards*, which, according to the Line of Battle, should have fallen to my Share, it did not become me, to make any Alteration in your Line, as by Signal then abroad: But had you been pleased to have dropt a Boat with your Directions to the Ships of your Division, and mine, between you and me, to have attack'd the four mentioned Ships of the Enemy, they would have forced them a-stern, for our coming up.

Neptune, off Lair Mahon, R——d L——k.  
the 21<sup>st</sup> Feb. 1743.

A——l M——ws his Letter, which accompanied his Replies, to Vice A——l L——k's Answer to the Queries.

SIR, Namur, in Mahon Harbour, 4<sup>th</sup> March, 1743.

YOU have herewith my Replies to your Answers to the Queries I judg'd proper to desire you to answer; and 'tis with Concern, that I do not judge them satisfactory. I hope you will be pleased to consider well my Replies to them, and to answer them so soon as you shall have so done. I am,

SIR,

Your most humble Servant,

T——s M——ws.

To R——d L——k, Esq; &c.

A——l M——ws's Replies to Vice A——l L——k's Answers to the Queries.

BY the Namur's Logg Book the Wind was at E. N. E. when we brought to the 10<sup>th</sup> of February; and from Ten o'Clock that Night to Six the next Morning, from the N. E. by N. to N. E.

N.E. *Query*, Whether you ought not to have kept the Line? Notwithstanding the Alteration of the Wind, since it was in your Power to have done it; instead of being at Break of Day, full five Miles in the Wind's Eye of me; consequently so many Miles a-stern, when I made Sail, which is notorious to the whole Fleet.

It's true, that the 13th Article of the Fighting Instructions does not mention, that the Signal for engaging the Enemy shall be repeated by the other Flag-Officers; but I have reason to believe, that every Captain in your Division, for want of your having repeated it, as Rear A——I R——~~wl~~——y did, judg'd he was to keep the Line, and not to make Sail a-head of you, in order to engage; which many of them could and would have done, had they not expected your repeating the Signal.

*Query*, Why did you not set your Studding Sails, and order the Sailing-Ships of your Division to make Sail, and engage the four Sternmost Ships of the Enemy, particularly the *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham* and *Revenge*? And why did you suffer any of your Division to shorten Sail? You say, that the *Cambridge* and *Dunkirk* could have made more Sail, and engaged the four Sternmost Ships; and that you fired a Shot at the *Dunkirk*, and made her Commander's Signal, but all to no Purpose; for that he still kept to Windward of you, as did the *Cambridge* likewise. *Query*, Why did you not make the Commander of the *Cambridge*'s Signal also? And why did you not send your Lieutenants to command those two Ships, when you judg'd their Commanders did not do their Duty; and you must have seen, that the Service suffered by their ill Behaviour? Surely it would have been right to have done so, and I should have thanked you heartily for it; for in

the Situation I was, I could not possibly see what was doing a-stern of me. You are pleased to say, that you fired a Broadside at the four Sternmost Ships, and that the Enemy return'd it: I take it for granted, that you judg'd yourself to be within Gun-shot of them, else you would not have fired; tho' it seems all your Shot fell short of them. You are likewise pleased to give me for Answer to the last Part of my fourth and last *Query*, viz. that you left off pursuing the Enemy, and clapp'd upon a Wind, in order to protect the Rear Admiral, &c. I must confess, that I am not a little surprized at the Reason you are pleased to give me, for breaking the Line of Battle, and quitting the Enemy, so near you as those four Ships were by your own Confession. Had I judg'd Rear A——I R——y in so great Danger, as you seem to insinuate him to have been in, there is a proper Signal to be made for that Service by the commanding Officer. I must take leave to affirm, that had you not clapp'd upon a Wind with your whole Division, by all the Account I have received, you and your Division (tho' not all your Sail abroad) might, and must have engaged these Sternmost Ships of the *Spaniards*, in one Quarter of an Hour at least, by which Means the *Real* could not have escaped me, as I was within Musket-shot of her, when all the Sternmost Ships of the Enemy came up and tore me to Pieces: And I must add, that your Neglect of that Piece of Service was obvious and plain; and it's certain, that all the Captains in your Division judg'd they were to follow you, notwithstanding the Signal for engaging the Enemy was out. I must take Leave to say, that if you had been pleased to have undeceived them on that Head, it would have been doing, not only the Duty of an Officer, but likewise a friendly Part to me. To conclude,  
I must



I must take leave to tell you, that I am greatly concern'd to find you judg'd it was necessary for me to have dropt a Boat a-stern to order, not only those Ships of my Division a-stern of me, but likewise those of yours (which were in the Line of Battle a head of you) to do their Duty. The Situation I was in at that Time, did not permit me to see that such Orders were necessary; but why did you not do it, who was at leisure, and tell me that such Orders were necessary? Yet, acted contradictory to your Judgment, by first shortening Sail, and soon after clapping upon a Wind. It therefore appears to me, that you was willing to assist me with your Judgment in doing what was not in your Power to do, *viz.* to go to the Assistance of Rear Ad——l R——~~al~~——y, yet you would not assist me when it was absolutely in your Power, *viz.* by ordering the Ships in the Rear of my Division to bear down upon the Enemy, to prevent their getting up to the Assistance of the *Real*, and all of them attacking the *Namur*. This, Sir, is under your Hand; but what is more extraordinary, you would not yourself do it, or order any of your Division, to do what you are pleased to tell me I ought to have done; and I take leave to affirm, that it was absolutely in your Power to have prevented the Enemies Ships getting up to me, either by disabling them, or obliging them to put afore it. In either of the two Cases the *Real* must have been burnt by the Fireship (being when she blew up within Pistol-shot of her, and, as I am credibly inform'd, must have sunk by the Shot she received from those Ships of the Enemy had she not blown up) or have fallen into my Hands, as I was at that Instant of Time within Musket-shot of her.

Namur, in Mahon Harbour,  
the 4th March, 1743.

T— M——ws.

O 2

A——l

*A——l M——ws's Letter to Vice A——l  
L——ck, requesting an Answer to his Replies.*

*Namur, in Mahon Harbour, March 15, 1743.*

*SIR,*

**A**S I cannot close my Packet till I receive your Answer to the *Queries* I sent you the 4th Instant; and it is necessary that I should dispatch a Ship away with a Messenger without Loss of Time; I desire you will be pleased to return me your Answers to the said *Queries*, as soon as you conveniently can. I am,

*SIR,*

*Your most humble Servant,*

*T—— M——ws.*

*Vice A——l L——k's Answer to the pre-  
ceding Letter.*

*Neptune, in Mahon Harbour, March 15, 1743.*

*SIR,*

**I** Have yours of this Date, setting forth, you cannot close your Packet, until you receive my Answers to your *Queries* of the 4th Instant.

The three Days constant Attendance at Courts-Martial, took up so much of my Time, that it has prevented me being able to send them; and, as you hinted to me, to consider well your Replies, it has made me the more circumspect in my Answers which are almost finished; and I hope will be so by to-morrow Morning, I am,

*SIR,*

*Your most Obedient,*

*Humble Servant,*

*R——d L——k.*

*To the Honourable A——l M——ws.*

*Vice*

*Vite A——l L——k's Letter which accompanied the following Rejoinder to A——l M——ws.*

*Neptune, in Mahon Harbour, March 17, 1743.*

*SIR,*

**A**FTER you had received my Answers to your Queries thirteen Days, I did not expect any such Replies, with such an Addition of new Matter; which, however, gives me the Satisfaction, that it has prepared me for the worst that can come from you. I hope you will do me the Justice to weigh well, and consider this Rejoinder to your Replies. I am,

*SIR,*

*Your most Obedient,*

*Humble Servant,*

*R——d L——k.*

*Vice A——l L——k's Rejoinder to A——l M——ws's Replies.*

**T**HE *Namur's* and the *Neptune's* Logg-Book differ the 10th of *February*, when we brought to. The Ship came up S. by W. till 10 o'Clock; then she came up S. E. off S. S. E. At 12, she came up E. S. E. off S. E. At 3, she came up E. of E. S. E. and continued so, until we made Sail at half past 5 o'Clock in the Morning, before you made the Signal to make Sail.

In answer to your Query in this Paragraph, which has been already answered in my Answers to your Queries, I should be glad to know, as you found it so late in the Night, as to be obliged to make the Night Signal to bring to, whether it was possible for the *Neptune* to see a Day-Signal abroad for the Line of Battle a-breast,  
(as

(as you have not thought proper to appoint a Night-Signal for that Purpose) and whether the last Signal is not to be comply'd with, even if it was in Contradiction to the first? Neither did the Signal appear at Dawn of Day for the Line of Battle a-breast; for you did not think proper to make it again until 8 o'Clock: Before which Time two of your Lieutenants, on the back of one another, came on Board of the *Neptune*. One told me, that you would lay by, until I came up to close with you, and the other told me, that it was your Directions to me, to make more Sail. Upon which I bid him look aloft, and see whether it was in my Power; all my Sail being then aboard, Studding Sails and all. At the same Time, he said, that you was very uneasy, that the Rear-Admiral with his Division did not make more Sail. And as an incontestable Proof that he was farther from you than the *Neptune*, you made the Signal for him that commands in the third Post to make more Sail, before you made the Signal for him that commands in the second Post: At this rate, the *Neptune* and *Barfleur* must have been above 10 Miles asunder, which I never can bring myself to believe. When I brought to, as I have already alledg'd, I was in the Line with you, and could go no nearer the Enemy, unless that I broke the Line, or you had been pleased to have given me your Directions to chase and engage the Enemy. At five o'Clock in the Morning, it appears by the *Neptune's* Logg-Book, that the Enemy bore off her S. W. by W. only distant four or five Miles: How she then could be at Day-break, when you made Sail, right in the Wind's-Eye of you, full five Miles, "The Wind, by the *Namur's* Logg-Book, being from the N. E. by E. to N. E, and this so notorious to the whole Fleet," is a Matter of great Astonishment



nishment to me, and what I cannot allow; notwithstanding I have not consulted any of the Fleet thereupon.

The Rear-Admiral's repeating the Signal to engage the Enemy, contrary to the Tenor of the 13th Article of the Fighting-Instructions, and all Precedents from our Predecessors, was no Precedent to the Vice-Admiral; neither does Reason oblige the Vice-Admiral to answer for the Expectations of the Captains of his Division, when they are so unjustly grounded, and so inconsistent with Discipline and Service. But one would have imagined, that if you had intended that this Signal should have been repeated, that while you made the *Manuscript Addition* to this very Article, *viz.* "And strictly charged to take care not "to fire before the Signal be given by the Admiral," that you would have then ordered the Repetition of it by all Flag-Officers.

The Studding Sails continued abroad, long after you made the Signal for Battle, and were haled down for the *Torbay* to come up into her Station, (according to the Order of Battle that you had been pleased to prescribe) which Ship, with every Sail set, could not get into it; tho' these Sails were not altogether so proper to engage with, the old Practice having been to furl the Main-sail, to prevent firing the Ship. Neither do I apprehend, that as soon as this Signal appears abroad, it is a Justification, or an Authority to an Officer to break the Line, while the Signal for the Line of Battle is kept out, and to engage the Enemy in Disorder and Confusion: No, my Understanding teaches me, that this very Article binds every Officer to engage the Enemy, in the order the Admiral has prescribed unto them. To what Purpose then should I have broke this Instruction, in Contradiction to the  
Signal

Signal for the Line of Battle then flying; also in Contradiction to the twenty-first and twenty-fourth Articles of these Instructions? *viz.*

21st. "None of the Ships in the Fleet shall pursue any small Number of the Enemy's Ships till the main Body be disabled or run."

24th. "No Ship in the Fleet shall leave her Station upon any Pretence whatsoever, &c. &c."

And to do this merely to fall into Confusion by separating from you to Leeward, without the Possibility of coming near enough, even to the Sternmost Ship of the Enemy to do any real Service, had she or they kept afore it: Had I chaced so unthinkingly with my Division, and in the mean Time the *French* had made a proper use of my Indiscretion, by coming upon you and Rear A—I R—*wl—y*, when I could not get to Windward again, who would not have blamed me? I am sure you yourself, Sir, would not have thought my Conduct justifiable, to have done this without a Signal: This would have been erring with my Eyes open; and then indeed with great Justice and Propriety, you might have retorted upon me, that had you judg'd it proper for me to have acted in this Manner, there was a proper Signal to be made for that Service by the commanding Officer; and agreeable to which the twenty-seventh Article is very explicit, *viz.*

27th. "If the Admiral would have any particular Flag-Ship and his Squadron, or Division, give Chace to the Enemy, he will make the same Signal, that is appointed for that Flag-Ship's tacking with his Squadron or Division, and weathering the Enemy."

It

It did not appear to me, that the Ships of my Division a-stern of me, shortened Sail; and where I could not so well distinguish myself, my Officers, on whom I could depend, frequently informed me of this Truth; and as to directing the clean Ships to go a-head of me, particularly the *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham* and *Revenge*, my Answer already to your fourth Query, leaves no room for you to demand any other. But supposing, Sir, that these Ships, contrary to my Observation, did shorten Sail at Times, to keep in the Order of Battle, according to the Line, either before or after you engaged; yet, nevertheless, I had no Authority to alter your Disposition. The twenty-fourth Article of the Fighting Instructions enjoins every Ship to keep her Station; and that, nor no other Article, impowers an inferior Flag-Officer to direct any Breach of it, upon any Pretence whatsoever; while the commanding Admiral keeps abroad the Signal for the Line, and does not make the Signal for that Flag-Officer and his Division, to give chase to the Enemy. Furthermore, had I taken upon me what I could not answer, to direct these Ships going a-head of me, before you engaged the Enemy, I believe it was impracticable for them to execute it, considering their Distance a-stern of me, the little Wind and the Swell.

The *Cambridge* was not so far to Windward of me, as the *Dunkirk*, therefore the Captain's Signal was not made; and at that Time I apprehended the firing a Shot to Windward of them both, would be a sufficient Check and Direction to both Captains, especially to so old an Officer as Captain *Dr—m—nd* is, being near thirty-three Years a Commission Officer. But tho' it may not be so proper to insert any thing here, which has not fallen under my own Observation; yet as you

have been pleased to shew me an Example, give me leave in my turn also to tell you, that it has been alledged in defence of these two Ships, tho' they were to Windward of me, yet they were in the Line with the Ships a-head of them; and in the first Article of the Fighting Instructions, You, Sir, yourself have made a Manuscript Addition, viz. " And every Ship is to observe and keep the " same Distance those Ships do, which are next " the Admiral, always taking it from the Center." As to sending my Lieutenants to command the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*, the Shortness of Time between the Shots being fired, and your making the Signal to leave off Chace, would not (had there been much greater Necessity to do it) admit of such a Proceeding.

Notwithstanding the Replies you have been pleased to make to my Answers to your *Queries*, I find that I must repeat to you again, that I did the utmost to cut off the four Sternmost Ships of the Enemy; and as my last Recourse, to bring on an Engagement, where I had the Prospect to divert those Ships of the Enemy from endeavouring to destroy the Fireship, as well as to stop them from getting a-head to the Assistance of the *Real*, I fir'd a Broadside at the nearest Ship, which was the Sternmost; the Shot of which did not all fall short of her, but she directly bore away, and made more Sail, which was what I could not do.

I defy Malice itself to say the contrary, with the least regard to Truth; and I must tell you, Sir, that no Man ever had it more at Heart, or could endeavour more than I did to get up to your Assistance; and also to get up to the Relief of the poor *Marlborough*, who was torn to Pieces indeed!

I never



I never broke the Line of Battle, neither did I ever shorten Sail, or hale upon a Wind, till you haled down the Signal for Battle, and the Signal for the Line of Battle, and make the Signal to give over Chace. I did not give you for an Answer to the last Part of your fourth and last Query, that I left off pursuing the Enemy, and clapp'd upon a Wind in order to protect the Rear-Admiral; be pleased to consider my Answer, you'll find my Words are these: "That when  
 "you haled down the Signal to engage, and  
 "made the Signal to give over Chace, I imme-  
 "diately shortened Sail; you haled your Wind,  
 "I did the same, as it appeared to me to pro-  
 "tect Rear A——l R—w—y, and his Division;  
 "the Van of the *French* Fleet being then tackt,  
 "and endeavouring to double upon him."

Do these Words mean more, or can they be taken in any other Sense, than that in Obedience to your Order then abroad, to leave off Chace (no Ships being then in Chace but me and my Division) I was necessitated to comply with it: And that this Signal was made by you for the Protection of the Rear-Admiral?

You have been pleased to make many Repetitions, asserting, that I broke the Line of Battle; therefore, however unwilling I may be to take up Time by unnecessary Repetitions, there seems to be an absolute Necessity for me to fall into them.

I am greatly surprized to find you should tell me, that I had given you Reason, for what I never did: Be pleased to look over my Answers to your *Queries*, and I desire that you would not misapprehend them to my Prejudice, for I never could acknowledge an Untruth. I never broke the Line of Battle, nor quitted the Enemy, that is what I never did; nor never would do: And

I now likewise affirm, that I never clapp'd upon a Wind, with my whole Division, or any Part of it; neither did I ever shorten Sail, until you was pleased to call me off Chace, by hoisting the White Flag at the Fore-top-mast Head, and at the same Time haling down the Signals for the Line of Battle, and engaging the Enemy; and I am sensible it was my Duty to do it, without regarding the Situation of the Rear-Admiral. But surely there could be no great Crime, in observing what many others did, that you from all Circumstances, made this Signal for his Protection.

You have likewise been pleased to draw this Inference, that by all Accounts, had not I clapp'd upon a Wind, with my whole Division, which I never did (until it was my Duty so to do) "That in a Quarter of an Hour at least, I " might and must have engaged these four stern-  
" most Ships, by which Means the *Real* escaped  
" you." Give me leave to affirm, that you haled down the Signal to engage the Enemy, and the Signal for the Line of Battle; and made the Signal to give over Chace, before the four sternmost Ships got up to you, and that you had left the *Real*, before they could possibly get a-head to *tear you to Pieces*; and to this Truth I have the strongest Affeверations.

You continued your Charge, by adding, that my Neglect of this Piece of Service was obvious and plain. To whom, Sir, was it obvious and plain? From whom had you these Accounts? It would have been doing a friendly Part to me, to have mentioned your Authors; and what Person that has either Honour or Honesty could inform you, "That had I not forsaken the Enemy  
" with my whole Division, I must have en-  
" gaged them in a Quarter of an Hour at least."

For

For you yourself, Sir, have more than once said, that your Situation was such, that you could not distinguish what was doing a-stern of you. It appears then to me, that you have altogether depended upon Information; and I must take the Liberty to tell you, in my own Defence, that my Character, at this Time of Day, after such a tedious Length of Service (where I have always had the good Fortune to gain the Approbation of my Superiors, and the good Wishes and Friendship of my Inferiors) is not to be blasted thus by Hearsay; or prejudiced by the infectious Breath of Slanderers: Nothing being so easy as general Charges and Assertions; nothing so true, as the old Maxim, *Throw out your Calumnies with Assurance, and some of them will find Credit.* I am sorry, extremely sorry, that any Thing like this should seem to be the Case between you and me.

I have already taken Notice, that I was rather to Leeward with my Division, than to Windward of the Line of Battle; therefore the Captains of my Division, notwithstanding the Signal for engaging the Enemy was out, did their Duty in following me: for which Reason I am at a loss to apprehend your Meaning, as you are pleased to say, "That to have undeceived them, would have been doing, not only the Duty of an Officer, but likewise a friendly Part to you."

When I answered your Queries, I was conscious to myself, that I had done my Duty as an Officer, and a Friend to you; and tho' these Answers do not give you Satisfaction, which is no Instance of your Friendship to me, and you have sent me Replies to them, after a Delay of thirteen Days: Yet, even from them, I am more and more convinced, that nothing was left undone for his Majesty's Service, and the Destruction of the Enemy, that I had Power to do.

I am

I am greatly surprized, that you should be displeased, because I concluded in my Answers to your Queries, that had you been pleased to have dropt a Boat with your Directions, to those Ships of your Division and mine, between you and me, to have attack'd the four mentioned Ships of the Enemy, they would have forced them a-stern for our coming up. And really, Sir, I cannot help wishing, that you had been pleased to have done so, before you yourself began the Engagement; for I think it could not have failed of answering the Purpose. It would have been at least a great Aggravation of that Man's Crime, who, after such a Direction, neglected coming to your Assistance.

I could not make the *Neptune* go faster a head; a Boat from me at the Distance I was from these Ships, was striving at what was out of my Reach. For you will be pleased to consider, that there is a wide Difference between dropping a Boat a-stern, and sending a Boat a-head to Ships at such Distances off, that were all under Sail; neither could I take upon me to direct your Division, that was much nearer the Commander in Chief, than the Vice-Admiral. Besides, had it been necessary for the Ships to have gone to Leeward of the Line with you, (especially as you have been pleased to make a *Manuscript Addition* to the first Article of the Fighting Instructions) I, that was bound to the Order myself, as much as any Captain, could not authorize and impower others to break it.

I would not willingly give Offence, or irritate Matters more; but when I am attack'd in so violent a Manner, so injurious to my Honour, and my constant Practice all my Life long; you must give me leave to wish from my Soul, that you had had a little more Patience before you engaged,  
and



and since the sole Dependance was on my Division, to have waited until the Line had been formed, and we had come up to close with you, *agreeable to the Message* which your Lieutenant brought me in the Morning.

I must be blind, Sir, if it could possibly escape my Observations; neither indeed can any Impartial Person help seeing it, that while I and my Division have been thus undeservedly blamed, nothing by you, like *Censure*, has been imputed to the Center. It is notorious, that not above seven Sail of the Enemy engaged (and probably a less Number) where there were eleven Ships in our Center, besides the *Berwick* and *Kingston*, in all thirteen Ships, that from the Beginning had it in their Power to reach the *Spanish* Squadron, in what Manner you had been pleased to have directed. And surely, without any great Degree of *National Vanity*, thirteen Sail of *English* Ships of War, such as these were, and under *Your Direction*, Sir, were a Match for seven Sail of *Spanish* Ships; at least to have kept, or forced astern the four mentioned Ships for our coming up, that could not possibly fire a Gun to *tear you to Pieces*, before the Time that you made the Signal for the Fleet to give over Chace, and haled down the Signals for the Line of Battle, and for engaging the Enemy.

Your last Page, and the latter Part of the preceding one, are a Repetition of what has been already answered. But, however, give me leave to ask, Sir, why you judged proper to hale down the Signal for the Line of Battle, as well as that to engage the Enemy, and made the Signal to give over Chace, if you did not expect me to shorten Sail, and clap on a Wind, (as you yourself did) in Obedience to you the Commanding Officer? For I insist upon it once more, that I  
did

did not do it till you commanded me by this Signal. To what Purpose then, Sir, have you been pleased to say, "That I assisted you with my Judgment, in doing what was not in my Power to do, *viz.* to go to the Assistance of Rear Admiral R——y, yet would not assist you, when it was absolutely in my Power? &c." I do not think it improper here to say, that my Judgment, or Opinion was never ask'd. I have had a Proof from you, Sir, these two Years, that it was not worth a Summons, tho' I had the Honour to bear his Majesty's Flag; yet I have always, *even in the Day of Battle*, been kept ignorant of your Designs, more than many private Captains.

I must take the Liberty to tell you, that I have always assisted you to the utmost of my Power, as Vice A——I; and if you have deprived yourself of my Assistance, by your great Impatience, in never suffering me to close with you, nor did not give me more Authority by proper Signals, I am no ways answerable.

It gives me Pain to repeat to you again, that I endeavoured my utmost to hinder the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy getting a-head, and I could not possibly do more: Which Endeavours, I do affirm, stopt these four Ships from getting near enough to attack the *Namur*, till long after you made the Signal, to leave off chase; and when they did fire upon you, it must have been at the Close of the Day, when soon after, all firing ceased.

It's true, Sir, that you have my Answers to your *Queries* under my Hand, and you have now my Answers to your Replies under my Hand, both which you may make what use of you think proper; knowing very well, that if you can take any Advantage, either in Defence of your own  
Conduct

Conduct, or to arraign mine, that you will be sure to do it. And I shall therefore be extremely careful in keeping your *Queries*, as well as your Replies to my Answers; which are both under your Hand, and a great Comfort to me.

To conclude, Sir, I take upon me to affirm, that it was neither in my Power, to prevent the four Ships of the Enemies getting a-head, either by disabling them, or obliging them to put afore it, unless you had, instead of making the Signal to give over Chace, made the Signal for me and my Division to give Chace: And then, Sir, tho' I could not have come up to disable them, yet I might have certainly kept them afore it, and myself with my Division been justified in breaking the Line of Battle, which Signal was then abroad.

I must not forget to add, that at least three of these four Ships did not reach the Fireship; I am sure the sternmost did not fire one Shot at her; so that in Fact they were no great Hindrance to the *Real's* being burnt, nor any to the *Real's* falling into your Hands; because you had left the *Real*, and made the Signal to give over Chace, before they came near enough to attack the *Namur*.

Neptune, in Mahon Harbour, R——d L——k.  
16th March, 1743.

Vice A——l L——k's Letter to the D——  
of N——le.

Neptune, off Mahon, Feb. 16, 1743.

My L— D—,

IT is now become my Duty to take the first Opportunity of acquainting your Grace, that on the 11th of *February*, the Day of the Action  
Q between

between his Majesty's Fleet, and the Combined Fleets of *France* and *Spain*, that Mr. M——s, who had made the Signal for the Line of Battle in the Morning, and continued to keep it abroad, by which Means no Ship dared to break the Line, or give Battle to any other Order; notwithstanding which, to my great Astonishment, without hinting to me the least Information of his Design, or waiting until the Fleet had stretched a-head, and closed in the Line, he bore down with the *Marlborough* upon the *Spanish* Admiral, whose Ship and Squadron were in the Rear of the Enemy's Line, and according to A———l M——s's Disposition of Battle, ought to have fallen to me and my Division. And what is equally surprizing, he attack'd the Enemy when I was a great way a-stern of him, with all the Sail I could spread abroad. Consequently my L—d D—e, he deprived himself of my Assistance by his great Impatience, in not suffering me to close with him, agreeable to a Message sent to me in the Morning by one of his Lieutenants. And although not above seven Sail of the Enemy engaged, and the Admiral, from the Beginning of this Action, had it in his Power to order the following Ships to attack the *Spanish* Squadron in what Manner he thought proper, viz. The *Namur*, *Marlborough*, *Norfolk*, *Dorsetshire*, *Somerset*, *Essex*, *Princessa*, *Dragon*, *Rupert*, *Royal-Oak*, *Bedford*, *Berwick*, and *Kingston*, in all thirteen Ships, eleven of which composed the Center of our Fleet; yet as he has failed of his Attempt, in order to justify himself, and to lay the Blame or Odium upon me, he has arraign'd me and my Division: Therefore, for his Majesty's Information, and in my own Defence, I think it my indispensable Duty to transmit to you what has passed between us; which are Letters, his Que-  
ries,



ries, and my Answers to his Replies to them, and my Rejoinder ; all which will serve to shew to your Grace, how much this Gentleman has injured me, and how necessary it is that an Officer of my Rank and Service should be justified, from so violent and undeserved an Attack upon his Honour and Experience.

It does not yet become me to trouble your Grace with farther Observations, and Animadversions on the Causes of this Miscarriage ; but that you may the better inform yourself, I have likewise taken the Liberty to send you the Minutes of the Proceedings of the Fleet, from the Time that the Enemy sailed out of *Toulon*, to the Time I was directed to give over chasing them, since which we have not seen them ; tho' at that Time four of the *Spanish* Squadron were disabled, and we had a very fresh Gale of Wind, the Weather-Gage, and thereby they must have given up their lame Ships, particularly the *Spanish* Admiral, or given us Battle, when we had the Superiority of them at least by those four Ships disabled, and one already burnt.

Before I take leave of your Grace, I must observe, that altho' there were many Signals made for the Lines of Battle a-head, and a-breast ; yet, I affirm, there never was one formed, excepting that Evening we brought to, before the Enemy run from us.

I have only to add, that, according to the Custom of the Sea, the Day begins at 12 at Noon ; so that the ninth Day is the eighth, by which Evening and Morning make the Day. I am,

My L—d D—e,

Your Grace's

Truly Devoted,

Humble Servant.

R—d L—k.

P. S.

P. S. *I am sorry I should have so much Room to acquaint your Grace, that Mr. M——s, instead of doing me the Justice due to my Character, after so violent an Attack, endeavours to stop the Channel of all Correspondence between your Grace and me, by keeping me entirely in the dark, where any Ship is bound; which has been the Cause that you have not received this Packet as soon as you may have heard from him. So severe is my Necessity, that I am obliged to catch at all Opportunities of addressing your Grace; and I hope, not too late, to overtake him.*

*Adm——l M——ws's Letter of Suspension to Vice A——l L——k, the Evening after the Rejoinder was received.*

Namur, Mahon Harbour, 16th March, 1743.

S I R,

**I** Have received your Answers to my Replications to your Answers to the *Queries* I first sent you; I should not at present, had I Time, trouble you with any Reply to them, but shall defer that till my Conduct shall be enquired into at a Court Martial. I shall therefore content myself at this Time with acquainting you, that I do not think your Answers do by any Means justify your Conduct in the late Action; and for fear that His Majesty's Service should suffer for the future by your Misconduct, I do therefore judge it is my indispensable Duty to order you Home, where you will have Time to prepare yourself for your own Defence, and likewise to make good the many Neglects of Duty you charge me with having been guilty of. You are therefore hereby  
directed

directed and required, forthwith to repair on Board His Majesty's Ship the *Salisbury*, whose Commander will have my Orders to proceed directly with you to *England*; and I do hereby suspend you from all further Authority in His Majesty's Fleet, till His Majesty's Pleasure shall be known. I am,

S I R,

*Your most humble Servant.*

T—— M——ws.

To R——d L——k, *Esq*; &c.

*Vice Adm——l L——k's Answer immediately upon receiving the Order of Suspension.*

Neptune, Mahon Harbour, March 16, 1743. at Night,

S I R,

WITH Pleasure I have received your Order of Suspension, have taken down my Flag; and am,

S I R,

*Your most Obedient,*

*Humble Servant,*

R——d L——k.

To the Honourable A——l M——s.

*We have hitherto been very prolix in the Justification of Mr. Lestock, and given him all the fair Play, that the most sanguine of his Friends could desire; let us next see what Mr. Mathews can say in his Vindication;*

*cation; since he, likewise, has been charg'd with Misconduct on that important Day, wherein our Naval Glory was greatly eclipsed. For this Purpose we shall make some Extraëts from a Pamphlet which has been published by a Friend of Mr. Mathews on this Occasion.*

**W**HAT begins the Dispute between Mr. *M——s* and Mr. *L——k*, says the Author, is chiefly grounded upon Mr. *L——k*'s Conduct in the Command of the Fleet before Mr. *M——s*'s Arrival with a superior Commission; but what Purpose that answers, other than to amuse the Reader with a Taste of his Abilities, which no body ever question'd as a Seaman, in no Sense appears. The Question now before the Publick, is not whether Mr. *L——k* did his Duty before Mr. *M——ws* arrived? But whether he did it in the Time of the Battle, lately the Object of a parliamentary Enquiry? which if he did, is well for both his own Honour and Reputation? But if he did not, his accusing Mr. *M——ws*, and exposing his Defects, will serve very little to excuse his own Errors, or worse; much less to clear him of the Charge brought against him. Any Delinquent may do this, and I am not the least in Doubt, that there are many Persons accus'd of male Practices every Day, who could say a great deal of the ill Conduct of their Accusers; but our Courts of Judicature consider only the Rectitude of the Accuser's Charge, and the Fault of the Delinquent, never entering into adverse Matter no ways connected with it. The Delinquent is in the first Place to clear himself of the Crimes alledg'd against him, and if afterwards he is enabled to accuse in his turn, he will be fairly heard.

Mr



Mr. *L——k* complains much of the Body of the People being exasperated against him without just Cause; how that may be will best appear in the Event; mean Time it would not have been much amiss if he had wav'd some random scurrilous Reflections, until his Affair had been determin'd in his Favour, and even then a more modest Man would not have so much forgot himself; as it is, the plain Aim of his prolix Writings, is to incumber the Truth, and bury it in a Grave of Words from general Comprehension; to make himself Judge of his own Cause, and to prejudge the P——ts Proceedings.

How either this, or his Complaint of Mr. *M——ws's* Behaviour to him here, or his Account of that Officer's Conduct in the *East-Indies*, is to turn to his Advantage in a Point no way relative thereto, must be found out by wiser Heads than mine; but I am clearly satisfied it will have no Effect on those who are immediately concern'd as Judges in the Cause, whatever it may have on such as his superfluous Matter has confounded and deceiv'd.

There is a vast Difference between being warm and just; between stating a Case in Point fairly, and leaving its Discussion in the Breast of proper and authorized Judges; and of writing Encomiums on one's Self, and bitterly inveighing against one's Accusers. The one shews the calm, the honest, judicious; the other the desperate, mischievous, and designing Man, which of these appears to be Mr. *L——k's* Case is left to those who have Will and Leisure to read and consider his loaded and vindictive Writings, dictated by the Heart of a meer Seaman, and the Head of a meer Priest.

Our Business here is chiefly to consider the Matter of Fact, as it stands confess'd in his own


B

Libels,

Libels, clear'd from the Dust and Rubbish where-  
with they abound; and disregarding all idle and  
silly Reflections, no way tending to render the  
Point in Question obvious and intelligible. This  
is only what the Publick want to know, and shall  
here be exhibited, without Regard to Persons.

For this Purpose we must leave at least one  
Third of the tedious and unmeaning Narrative be-  
hind us, and take the first material Point, which  
is according to his own Account, the Foulness  
and Unservicableness of the Ships, by which it  
appears, that the *French* and *Spaniards* could sail  
three Foot to their one; that previous to, and in  
the Engagement, there was little Wind; and a  
great Head-Swell, which I believe, he must agree,  
rather added to, than diminish'd from, the Ad-  
vantage on our Side; and contributed infinitely to  
prevent the forming of the Line of Battle, in that  
Order, and with that Dispatch which might other-  
wise have been effected. That several of the Head-  
most Ships in the Van, viz. the *Nassau*, *War-  
wick*, *Sterling Castle*, *Boyne* and *Chichester* did  
not bear down, nor engage the Van of the Enemy  
for judicious Reasons; the *Princessa*, *Somerset*,  
*Dragon*, *Bedford*, *Kingston*, *Salisbury*, *Guernsey*,  
*Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal Oak*, in  
their respective Stations, did not chuse to engage  
the Enemy to any Effect; the *Revenge*, *Elizabeth*,  
*Buckingham*, *Neptune*, *Russel*, *Torbay*, *Cambridge*,  
*Dunkirk* and *Burford*, chose under Mr. L—k's  
Division to lie to, far enough to windward out of  
the Enemy's Shot; so that in Mr. M—ws's  
Division, he had only in Fact the *Namur*, *Marl-  
borough*, and *Norfolk*. In Mr. R—ly's Divi-  
sion, only the *Barfleur*, *Princess Caroline*, and  
*Berwick*. In Mr. L—k's Division, none; so  
that the whole Number of Ships Mr. M—ws  
and Mr. R—ly had to fight twenty eight Ships  
of

*A View of y<sup>e</sup> British, & Combined Fleets of France & Spain in y<sup>e</sup> Mediterranean Feb. 11. 1744: at y<sup>e</sup> Time  
to y<sup>e</sup> number of 19 had Tack'd upon y<sup>e</sup> English Van, which oblig'd R. A. Rowley & his Division to Tack  
into his Wake; upon which A. Mathews hald down y<sup>e</sup> Signal for Battle, y<sup>e</sup> Signal for y<sup>e</sup> L*



## *E X P L A N A*

- a The Anne Galley Fireship blown up without doing Execution.....*
- b The Spanish Admirals Ship the Real.....*
- c Sternmost Ships of y<sup>e</sup> Enemy, y<sup>e</sup> Fired at y<sup>e</sup> Anne Galley Fireship, but did not seem to reach her.*
- d { Dorsetshire Essex Rupert & Royal Oke y<sup>e</sup> did not go down nor were they sent to cover y<sup>e</sup>  
Fireship, & stop y<sup>e</sup> Sternmost Ships from getting ahead but fired at them at a great Distance.*
- e Marlborough.....*
- f Norfolk.....*


- g Constant y<sup>e</sup> Reals 2<sup>d</sup> a head y<sup>e</sup> run from y<sup>e</sup>*
- h { Roder y<sup>e</sup> had struck to y<sup>e</sup> Bernuck after bearing*
- i { Dragon Bedford Kingston Salisbury & Guernsey*
- j { Dragon Bedford Kingston Salisbury and y<sup>e</sup>*
- k { R A Rowley in y<sup>e</sup> Van making from y<sup>e</sup> French on*
- l { to y<sup>e</sup> Line of Battle w<sup>th</sup> y<sup>e</sup> Signal out for his Division to*
- l Foremost Ships in y<sup>e</sup> Van y<sup>e</sup> y<sup>e</sup> French came within*




in from y<sup>e</sup> Norfolk.  
after bearing y<sup>e</sup> Fire of y<sup>e</sup> Somerset Princessa  
bury & Guernsey at a great Distance.  
bury and Guernsey.  
y<sup>e</sup> French on y<sup>e</sup> Starboard Tack y<sup>e</sup> contrary Tack  
his Division to bear down into his Wake. . . .  
came within Pistol Shot & might have Raked fore

m French Squadron on y<sup>e</sup> Marbourn Jack bearing away to y<sup>e</sup> assistance of y<sup>e</sup> Spanish Squadron  
n { St. Mathew's in y<sup>e</sup> Namur with y<sup>e</sup> Signal out to leave off Chace after haling..  
down the Signal to Engage & y<sup>e</sup> Signal for y<sup>e</sup> Line of Battle.....  
o { Vice Admiral Lutwicks Squadron unable to Reach y<sup>e</sup> Hornmouth Ships of y<sup>e</sup>  
Enemy & obeying y<sup>e</sup> Signal to give over Chace.....











# BAY, and ROADS, of the ISLANDS of HIERES.

3 English Leagues.

- a. Winchelsea & Diamonds Station to watch the Enemy's Motion.  
 b. Essex, Dunkirk, Kingston, Chatham, Feversham, under Porquerolle, to repeat Signals to the Admiral.  
 c. Winchelsea made Signals to the Ships under Porquerolle, when the Enemy's were coming out.  
 d. Bombs & other small Craft.









of the Enemy's Line of Battle, were only six, the rest I dare say are both ready and willing to excuse themselves in much the same Manner Mr. *L---* *k* has done, that is to say, they either could not or would not engage the Enemy; were all ready to obey any Signal that kept them at a Distance; but none that commanded their Approach. To prove this, as to Mr. *L---* *k*'s Part, it need only be observed, how ready he was to obey the Chief Admiral's Signals, when he made one for the Fleet to bring to; but will Mr. *L---* *k* pretend to say, that that Signal directed him to lye to five Miles to Windward of the rest of the Fleet? Was it not his Business to have bore down to the Admiral first, to have clos'd the Line, and then to have brought to, pursuant to such Signal? Or has the Practice in great Fleets, where the Necessity of the Thing was so obvious, been ever otherwise, and the Officer escap'd Reproof? Was not that the plain Construction, the natural Intent and Meaning of such Signal, as the Signal for the Line preceded it? Or could Mr. *L---* *k* conceive because one was haul'd down, the other hoisted, supposing that had been the Case; as at best was only presum'd, therefore it meant that he should not come into the Line at all? This is indeed a Pretence well enough for a Man who chose to see his Country's Honour, and his Superior's Life sacrific'd, but would he have thought this right, had he and Mr. *M---* *ws* been on better Terms with one another? It's certainly true, he obey'd the Signal strictly enough, but if the three headmost Ships of the Van, as aforesaid, were, as he says, commended for disobeying the general Order to engage, because that the Van of the *French* might otherwise have tack- ed, weathered, and destroyed them; would he not have been at least as commendable to have

come first into his proper Station, and been in Condition to have aided his Superior, than instantly to have obey'd a Signal, which could in no Sense be construed to keep him out of it? How poor and pitiful then is this Part of his Defence, That he would rather take the Advantage of a Mistake, if it was one, to shelter himself under, than be of any Service to his Country, when it was so obviously in his Power. But to shew this still in a more intelligible Light, can that Officer pretend to say, that let Ships be at what Distance they may from one another in a Fleet, on a Signal made to bring to, is it usual to do it at such a Distance? Is it not the common Practice, if it can be done, first to fall into their assign'd Stations, and then to bring to? And does he not himself avow the acting contrary to this general Rule? And is he not herein palpably culpable? The youngest Officer in the Fleet, supposing him honest, would have been ashamed of such a Defence.

Mr. *L* — sets out very haughtily, triumphing in his Acquaintance with Discipline; and the Use he makes of his pretended Knowledge, is, only to see Errors in others, and to shelter himself from Justice, but not to serve his Country; I suppose he rather learn'd it to make him a penetrating Critick than an honest Man; to answer some idle Foible, or Resentment against his Superiors, than to be an Honour to his Country. This very evidently appears from every Step he took. He made it his Business to obey beyond Obedience, and because he would not be wanting in solid Remarks, he turn'd his Division into a Squadron of Observation, that he might be enabled, in case he was broke as an *A* — *I*, to come home and turn Author, and which he has performed with all the Artifice of a Bookseller;

writing,

writing, multiplying, and confounding, to the Tune of a pretty Penny; his Works plainly necessary, tho' comprizable in a Twelve-penny Pamphlet, are lengthen'd out to the Substance of a Volume in Folio. His learned Reflections and Digressions has spun out the Narrative only to one hundred and thirty-five Pages; yet if we shall follow him here in all that's material, it will appear how few Pages were requisite. I mention this only to shew the Genius and Temper of the Man in every Appearance, and how impossible it is to change Men's Natures, turn their Thoughts which Way you please,

*Naturam expellas furca licet usque recurret.*

He, after remarking that the Fleet could not be regularly formed into a Line of Battle, and the Admiral had made the Signal to bring to, begins his History thus, Page 59.

“ *Saturday, Feb. 11.* When Day appeared, instead of being form'd in tolerable Order, or any Thing like a Line of Battle; the Ships were scatter'd and extended wide of one another, rather more uneven than when we brought to at Night, which proceeded from a Line never as yet having been form'd, and the Current with the Wind being variable.” This Part of the Narrative is remarked upon by a Profusion of Notes, some to the Purpose, some out of Idleness; those to the Purpose are, “ That Mr. *L* — *k* brought to in the *Line of Battle*, within three Miles of the Enemy (how far from the sternmost Ship of Mr. *M* — *s*'s Division don't appear) but at Day-break found himself at a greater Distance from the Admiral than at Night when he brought to, occasioned by Indraughts, Eddies, &c. At half an Hour past



“ fix in the Morning, he was near being a-breast  
 “ of him (*here again it does not appear at*  
 “ *what Distance, whether seven Leagues, or se-*  
 “ *ven hundred Yards?*) though their Divisions  
 “ were far from being closed together : Time,  
 “ says he, will shew which of these Accounts are  
 “ right.” For my Part I see not any Difference  
 in the Account, unless it be in the different  
 Manner of Expression ; Mr. *Mathews* in his  
 second Query, asks, “ was it not your Duty to  
 “ have brought to in the Line of Battle ?”  
 whereby Mr. *M*——s plainly intends to ask  
 him ; Don’t you know that, pending the Line of  
 Battle Signal, all other Signals are to be construed  
 as co-operating therewith, and consequently al-  
 though you could not see the Line of Battle Sig-  
 nal after it was dark, yet as it never appeared to  
 you to be alter’d, you had no Pretence to presume  
 it was alter’d, and therefore should have closed  
 with the Center, before you had brought to ?  
 How is this acting contrary defended ? “ As a  
 “ Proof that we were in a Line with you, I  
 “ think we were within four Miles of the En-  
 “ my ; and all my Officers that took any Notice  
 “ affirm, that we were not above three Miles  
 “ from the Enemy when we brought to. Se-  
 “ veral of the *Spanish* Ships edged from us  
 “ soon after we brought to.” Can any Man  
 think this a proper Answer to the Query ? or  
 that it in any Sense shews that he ever intend-  
 ed to close with the Center ? His own Notes to the  
 Narrative plainly shew he did not, because there  
 he shews a proper Signal was wanting for that  
 Purpose. But this only makes bad worse, and is  
 only a wretched Resource from Quibble to Re-  
 flection on the general Want of proper established  
 Signals, which in the Case before us is absolutely  
 false. Mr. *Vernon*’s Signal for the Night-Line,  
 has

has nothing to do in this Case, that was presuming no previous Signal in the Day subsisting; for where that is the Case, there needs not any Night Signal; this is as obvious to common Sense as to Rule. Mr. *M*——s's third Query produces much the same Answer as before, with this Addition, that the Wind changing from E. S. E. to N. N. E. was the Reason of being to Windward; but was it not a Reason too for not being to Windward? Was it not a Reason for bearing down into the Line, without Breach of Discipline? Is not this Reason evident? Is not every Reason right, that brings you into your proper Station? Or would you have a distinct Signal for every Change of Wind? You know all this to be true, why then wilful Disobedience first, and senseless Evasion afterwards? Why truly because Mr. *M*——s should not, if you could help it, have the Honour of Serving his Country because his heroic Spirit shone too bright, for your dim Prospect; you could not bear the Splendor of the Sun in its full Lustre and Radiance, and therefore cursed its fiery Beams, and impotently aimed to stop its glorious Career, which never could have happen'd had you and your Division been the only Delinquents.

“ To return to the History. The combined  
 “ Fleets kept in an uniform Line, and had made  
 “ Sail in good Order, stretching to the Southward,  
 “ the Body of their Fleet, distant from ours, seven  
 “ or eight Miles. In this Disposition little Wind  
 “ at N. E. with a Swell, the Admiral made the  
 “ Signal for the Fleet to make sail, and kept edg-  
 “ ing down upon the Enemy, *the Wings* endea-  
 “ vouring their utmost by crowding Sail to get into  
 “ better Order and keep up with the Center. At  
 “ half an Hour past Seven, the Admiral made the  
 “ Signal for the Rear-Admiral and his Division  
 “ to make more Sail: And at Eight he also made  
 “ the

“ the same Signal for the Vice-Admiral and his  
 “ Division; then he made the Signal for the Line  
 “ of Battle a-breast of one another. At Nine the  
 “ Admiral made a Signal for the Fleet to draw  
 “ into a Line of Battle, one astern of another, with  
 “ a large Wind, and the Rear-Admiral to lead ;  
 “ and in half an Hour after he made the Signal  
 “ for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle one  
 “ Ship a-head of another.” And here the History  
 for a-while ceases; to enter into a Definition of a  
 Line of Battle, of which in its proper Place; at  
 present I shall only make such Remarks on this  
 Part of the Narrative as occurs to me.

The Narrative says above, that on the A——l's  
 making the last Signal for the Line of Battle a-  
 head of one another, *the Wings* endeavour'd, by  
 crouding Sail, to get into better Order, and keep  
 up with the Center; after this, a Signal was made  
 by the Ad——l, to the Rear-Ad——l, and soon  
 after to the Vice-Ad——l to make more Sail.  
 Now we are to suppose that the Divisions of the  
 Vice and Rear, were what the Narrative calls the  
 Wings, with Impropriety enough, and if they before  
 crouded all the Sail they could, it's inconceivable  
 how they were to make more; I therefore con-  
 clude that was not previously the Case, and on  
 this Point depends more than is at first easily seen.  
 The Van of the Fleet was little concern'd in this  
 Matter, for as Mr. M——s edg'd down they were  
 a-head of him, and being mostly in the right Line  
 edg'd down with him, except some of the Head-  
 most Ships as aforesaid; and the Signal for their  
 making Sail was to fall down on the Enemy, in  
 the same Manner the Ad——l did, but this  
 was not the Case with the Vice Ad——l's Di-  
 vision in the Rear who had not clos'd the Line,  
 nor from what appears never intended it, and  
 Mr. *Mathewes* made the last Signal, which would  
 have

have been ridiculous had he seen them crouding all the Sail they had. But another Circumstance a little after clears up this Matter, and proves they either did not, or the Ad——l thought they did not, even after the last Signal, make all the Sail they could, since he sent two Lieutenants one after the other to enforce Obedience to it; and although it may be very true, that when those Lieutenants came on Board the Vice Ad——l, the Sails were standing, as is said, it proves not that they were so before; the Wind was then dying away, and crouding Sail not so material as at first when the Wind was fresher, because of a Head-Sea; they then could not get up with the Admiral in any reasonable Time, and then if the Vice-Ad——l, when he saw the Boats a coming, did croud Sail, neither that nor the Narrative proves they were standing from the first; and indeed the Circumstances shew they were not, and the previous Matter relating to the bringing to, connected herewith, evidently evinces the Vice Ad——l's Intention was not to close the Line at all, if he could any Way avoid it with Safety to himself; and the Night at first, and the Winds at last, happily enough favour'd the wicked Result.

Mr. L——k would infer from all this, if he would infer any Thing, that the Ad——l is alone blameable, because the Ships either could not, or rather would not, fall into their proper Stations; he is by a Parity of Reasoning also blameable, because he suspended the Officer who was the chief Cause, as far as it regarded his own Division, of all this Disorder. There is a very extraordinary Circumstance comes at the Tail of all this, which is, that Mr. L——k blames the Ad——l's Conduct, when through Impatience he bore down to engage the *Spanish* Ad——l, which he says was the Station assign'd him; but he  
does



does not consider either that Mr. *M——ws* could not, if he engag'd at all, get into any other Station, nor that he himself ever intended, as plainly appear'd, ever to get into that, or any other fighting Station. However blameable Mr. *M——ws* may be in his Impatience to engage the Enemy, to vindicate his Country's Honour, to preserve the Dominions of an Ally, and to destroy the adverse Fleet; it is but too evident Mr. *L——k* had no Concern of the like Nature to incumber his Mind with; his was of a quite different Nature, and such as personal Resentment only could inspire; and to prevent this from being evidently perceiv'd, he has Recourse to every Artifice that may blind the People; the first indeed is a very bad one, the attempting by Scurrility and Abuse to scold the Nation into Sentiments in his Favour; the second by blaming his Superiors, and the last by shewing the Defects of the whole Oeconomy of the naval Conduct, which, supposing all, as some Parts are but too true, is at best but covering himself with a Cloud instead of clearing himself, by a fair and open Justification.

The Ad——l's Replies to the Vice Ad——l's Answers are clear, open and candid, while the Vice Ad——l's Rejoinders are wholly made up of Artifice and Evasion, talking of Discipline and Order, the Skin or Rind of the Argument, while the Soul or Essence is entirely forgot.

Mr. *M——ws* says, that ' By the *Namur's*  
 ' Logg-Book the Wind was at E. N. E. when we  
 ' brought to the 10th of *February*, and from ten  
 ' o'Clock that Night to six the next Morning,  
 ' from the N. E. by N. to N. E. Q. Whether  
 ' you ought not to have kept the Line, notwithstanding the Alteration of the Wind, since it  
 ' was in your Power to have done it, instead of being at Break of Day five Miles in the Wind's Eye  
 of

' of me, consequently 10 many Miles a-stern,  
 ' when I made Sail, which is notorious to the  
 ' whole Fleet?" Mr. *M*———*ws* might have  
 justly said, did not the Change of Wind mate-  
 rially contribute to bring you into your Station,  
 and will you therefore presume it to be a good  
 Reason for the keeping five Miles out of it? But  
 see the Answer, ' The *Namur's* and the *Nep-*  
 ' *tune's* Log-Books differ the 10th of *February*  
 ' when we brought to. The Ship came up S. by  
 ' W. till 10 o'Clock, when she came up S. E. off  
 ' S. S. E. at 12 she came up E. S. E. off S. E.  
 ' at 3 she came up E. off E. S. E. and continued  
 ' so until we made Sail at half past five o'Clock  
 ' in the Morning, before you made the Signal to  
 ' make Sail.' The Reader is to observe here,  
 that although it is differently expressed, that the  
 Winds by this Account, for the most part of the  
 Time in Question, were nearly the same as in  
 the Ad——l's Query, since Ships that lye up  
 from the E. S. E. to the E. upon one Tack, have  
 the Wind from the N. N. E. to the N. E. and  
 this Situation the Vice Ad——l admits from 12  
 to 5 o'Clock in the Morning, but takes care to  
 answer no farther, because that was more mate-  
 rial, and consequently necessary to be evaded:  
 Instead whereof he proceeds thus, ' In answer to  
 ' your Query in this Paragraph, which has been  
 ' already answer'd in my Answer to your Queries,  
 ' I should be glad to know, as you found it so  
 ' late in the Night as to be obliged to make the  
 ' Signal to bring to, whether it was possible for  
 ' the *Neptune* to see a Day Signal abroad for the  
 ' Line of Battle a-breast (as you have not thought  
 ' proper to appoint a Night Signal for that Pur-  
 ' pose) and whether the last Signal is not to be  
 ' comply'd with, even if it was in Contradiction  
 ' to the first?'

Now in turning back to the Queries, it appears not to be answer'd any otherwise than here; only there the Winds are stated, here the lying up of the Ship; which as I said before, is the same Thing differently express'd, and therefore to evade directly answering the most material Part of the Query, he falls into a String of Questions, which readily answer themselves, for the last Signal is certainly to be comply'd with, tho' in Contradiction to the first, but in this Case, the last Signal is not in Contradiction to the first, but concurs with it, and was the natural Result of approaching Night; the Line of Battle still depending, both by Reason of the previous Signal, and the very Nature and Reason of the Thing, as the Nearness of the Enemy presum'd it: And thus while the Vice Ad——l blames the Ships being out of their assign'd Stations, he himself, when he had Wind and Opportunity, would not with his Division fall into his assign'd Station, on Pretence that the Ad——l made no Night Signal for that present Purpose, when none such was in any Sense necessary.

The Ad——l proceeds with his natural Candor and Openness of Heart, 'It is true that the 13th Article of the fighting Instructions does not mention that the Signal for engaging shall be repeated by the other Flag-Officers; but I have Reason to believe, that every Captain in your Division, for want of your having repeated it, as Rear Ad——l *R——ly* did, judg'd he was to keep the Line, and not make Sail a-head of you in order to engage, which many of them could and would have done, had they not expected your repeating the Signal.' Mr. *L——k*'s Answer to this in Effect is; That such repeating the Signal being not directed by the standing Order, it matters not to him what the Rear-Ad——l did,  
or

or his own Captains thought, his Business being only to conform to exact Discipline; which in the main is very true. But as on this depends a very important Matter, it will not be amiss to examine this strict Disciplinarian's Views to the Bottom.

Mr. *M*——*ws* had been engag'd with the *Real*, and somewhat disabled; the Captain of the *Marlborough* had, on different Principles, from such as were so strictly pursued by our Hero, of Formality, and without regarding his very nice Punctilio's, push'd in between the Ad——l and the Enemy, and with a Bravery, most of the Fleet are Strangers to, took on himself the Enemy's whole Fire. The Ad——l was by this Means forc'd out of his proper Station, and had four of the Enemy, which Mr. Discipline had let pass by him, to engage with alone; but if this worthy Gentleman would not repeat the Signal, nor could come up himself, when he had clean Ships in his Squadron, and plainly saw that the Captains in the Rear of the Center would not assist their Ad——l, did it not plainly become him to have order'd his clean Ships to have advanc'd into their Stations? He says indeed he did fire at the *Dunkirk*, one of his head-moſt Ships for that Purpose, but that he would not obey him; but as to the *Cambridge*, *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham* and *Revenge*, it appears he never try'd. The Consequence was, as he plainly intended it should be, to throw his Ad——l between four Fires, by letting so many of the Enemy pass by for that special Purpose. Thus it seems that the great End of Discipline is to be made the Dupe of private Pique and Resentment, but unintended to answer any rational or honourable Purpose; and while the Basis of his Defence is founded on useless Exactitude, in attending to Trifles, the main End for which it was constituted, is buried in Oblivion, and forgot. Thus it will always be



with Men pick'd out of the Dregs of the People, who get Experience in their Heads, but have no Share of Honour or Generosity in their Hearts; who have more Subtilty than Honesty; and are absolute Strangers to those noble Sentiments that inspire the Heart with true Glory; and while that is pursuing, forget all private Resentment. The Want whereof, no Skill though ever so consummate, no Judgment though ever so well corrected, can make Amends for; and intimates how necessary some Sentiments of Honour are to the constituting of an Officer who is to be intrusted with the Guardianship of the *British* People.

But let us now see how Mr. Discipline defends himself; the Ad——l asks him in his Replies, ' Why did you not set your Studding-Sails, and ' order the sailing Ships of your Division to make ' Sail and engage the four stern-most Ships of the ' Enemy, particularly the *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham*, ' and *Revenge*? And why did you suffer any of ' your Division to shorten Sail? You say that ' the *Cambridge* and *Dunkirk* could have made ' more Sail, and engag'd the four stern-most Ships; ' and that you fired a Shot at the *Dunkirk*, and ' made her Commander's Signal, but all to no Purpose, for that he still kept to Windward of you, ' as did the *Cambridge* likewise: Query, why did ' you not make the *Cambridge*'s Signal also?

The Answer to this Part is, ' It did not appear ' to me that the Ships of my Division, a-stern of ' me, shorten'd Sail, and where I could not so ' well distinguish myself, my Officers on whom I ' could depend, frequently inform'd me of this ' Truth. And as to directing the clean Ships to go ' a head of me, particularly the *Elizabeth*, *Buckingham*, and *Revenge*, my Answer already to ' your fourth Query leaves no room to demand any other. But supposing, Sir, that these Ships,

' contrary

' contrary to my Observation, did shorten Sail at  
 ' Times to keep in order of Battle, according to  
 ' the Line, either before or after that you engag'd,  
 ' *yet nevertheless I had no Authority to alter your*  
 ' *Disposition.* The twenty-fourth Article of the  
 ' fighting Instructions enjoins every Ship to keep  
 ' her Station; and that, nor no other Article, im-  
 ' powers an inferior Flag-Officer to direct any  
 ' Breach of it, upon any Pretence whatsoever,  
 ' while the commanding Officer keeps abroad the  
 ' Signal for the Line, *and does not make the Signal*  
 ' *for that Flag-Officer and his Division to give*  
 ' *Chace to the Enemy.* Furthermore, had I taken  
 ' upon me what I could not answer, to direct  
 ' these Ships going a-head of me before you  
 ' engag'd the Enemy, I believe it was imprac-  
 ' ticable for them to execute it, considering  
 ' their Distance a-stern of me, the little Wind  
 ' and Swell.'

Order and Discipline is intended for the Pre-  
 servation, not for the Destruction of a Fleet; Dis-  
 cipline is establish'd by Rules founded on regular  
 Orders, which as they cannot foresee every Inci-  
 dent that may occur, so neither are they so strictly  
 to be pursu'd, as not on very obvious Emergencies  
 to be deviated from. The general Order is to  
 keep the Stations assign'd, but suppose Part of the  
 Van and Center had ran away, as they did little  
 better, and thereby the Residue been left as it  
 were a Sacrifice to the Enemy, and some Ships  
 of the Rear could have come up to their Assistance,  
 and some could not; will Mr. Discipline pretend  
 to say, he durst not have deviated from the stand-  
 ing Order, or rather that the plain obvious Ne-  
 cessity of the Thing did not require he should  
 have done it, in order to preserve the Fleet, which  
 must otherwise be inevitably lost? Is not the Ne-  
 cessity of Things arising from unforeseen Events,  
 a Di-

a Direction superior to all standing Rules? And will a Man presume to cover himself under such Rules, and be deem'd blameless? He presumes the Ad—I should have made a Signal for that Purpose; if he had, it's obvious how he would have answer'd it. He would then have said, that while the Signal for the Line was out, his Division were oblig'd to keep their assign'd Stations, and therefore pending that, a Signal to alter the Stations would have been contradictory, and consequently could not be answer'd; and if the Ad—I, to guard against this Evasion, had haul'd down the Signal for the Line, while he hoisted the Signal to chace, then had the Fleet been all thrown into Confusion. So that whether he made a Signal, or did not; whether there was absolute Necessity, or was not, Mr. Discipline had still a Subterfuge to fly to; and as he was resolv'd no Good should be done on his Part, so his only Business was to fit himself with suitable Resources against the Day of Judgment. And because he was not particularly empower'd to do Good by some standing Order, though the Honour of the Nation and the Preservation of the Fleet were both at Stake, he was determin'd that neither himself nor any of his Division should do any. This is the Conduct, this is the Honour of the Man who presumes to arraign his Superiors, and who happily enough shew'd what ought to have been done, by the Shot fir'd, and the Signal made to the *Dunkirk*, whose Commander perhaps had Orders from himself not to obey, for that is the most natural Way to construe his Disobedience. For my Part, I am amaz'd this thin Covering was not sooner seen through, and if it was, how it became possible that one Officer, who at most could be only mistaken, should be put on a Parity with another whose rotten

Heart

Heart ought to have render'd him a publick Abhorrence.

There are two Things to be considered in all Men, the Will and the Ability; where the last is wanting it is the Man's Misfortune, but the Fault only of those who employ him; but where the first is wanting, it's the Employer's Misfortune, but the Man's Fault. In publick Affairs, especially in the Royal Navy, Will and Ability should go hand in hand: It lies upon those at the Helm, to take care whom they employ, but they can't honestly punish them for want of Ability, tho' they are oblig'd to do it for want of Will; and when a Man pleads his Abilities, arraigns the Conduct of his Superiors, and is deficient at the same Time, both of Will and Ability, I think he may be justly punish'd for his Presumption, as well as for his Negligence.

The chief Part of Mr. *L—k*'s Defence, besides what has been previously said, depends on shewing that Mr. *M—s* had Ships enough in his own Division to have answered all the Purposes of the Center, and to have destroyed the *Spanish* Squadron, which is very true, but Mr. *L—k* could not help seeing that no more than three Ships of the Ad—l's Division did their Duty, and consequently were not enough to engage the Enemy; nor should this have been any Part of his Defence, unless he could at the same Time have shewn, that the Ships of that Division did their Duty, which he plainly saw they did not, and therefore could not honestly conclude, that because there were enough in Number, that therefore there were really enough. This only shews how ready he is to catch at any Thing that may give an unnatural Turn to the Argument, and by waving the only material Question, turn the Eyes of the People on what has nothing

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to do with it; it contributes indeed to persuade us into a Sense of his Abilities, but into none of his good Will, for the Honour of his Country and the Preservation of the Fleet; and Abilities ill placed, or mis-timed, are equal to no Abilities at all. The exerting himself here as a Writer is nothing, unless he could shew at the same Time, that he exerted himself as a Man of Honour when in his proper Station. He knows to a Certainty, that not one Man in a thousand either can or will enter with Care or Judgment into the Mystery of this Affair; and as the more he writes the more he perplexes it, so it is but too evident he writes only to perplex it, and to make use of his own unmannerly Expression, in his Answer to the Ad——l, *Throw out your Calumnies with Assurance, and some of them will find Credit*, is a Maxim it seems Mr. L——k is acquainted with, and has pursued with uncommon Spirit; and how far the same has been calculated to poison the Minds of those who take no Pains to judge accurately, or are Strangers to naval Science, is but too obvious, but how far it either has, or ought to have Effect, the Event of this Affair can only determine.

It is very strange to see the Nature and Genius of our Laws and Constitution thus trifled with, with Impunity, but much more to see such Proceedings patroniz'd by Men who ought at least to know better, as if an Affair of this Importance, whereon the Glory, Honour, and even Safety of the Nation depends, turn'd into a Party Affair, when the previous Point was only to enquire into the Conduct of the Vice A——l, to suffer him, instead of defending himself, to turn Accuser before he was cleared, is a kind of Proceeding quite new. It is most certainly true, that those who enquired into his Conduct had a very just  
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Right to enquire into the Ad——l's too, and, if they found it reasonable and right to have pass'd a suitable Censure; but it no way appears regular to suffer the first Delinquent to defend himself by accusing his Accuser. This was the way to perplex, not to clear up the Conduct of either to the Nation's Satisfaction, is wholly without Rule or Precedent, and cannot in any Power, though never so great, be justify'd; because it could in no Sense answer the main Intent of the Enquiry, which it is hop'd was first to bring an accused Delinquent to Justice, and after that as many more as should be found culpable. But here is a Precedent now set, that may mainly contribute to the acquitting of all though never so guilty, since they are not to shew how they themselves, but how their Superiors behav'd, which is waving the main Point in View, and turning it upon what is nothing to the Purpose. At this Rate, there is no bringing Delinquents to Justice, all Rule and Order is hereby confounded, and the Nature and Reason of Things turned into a Jest. I don't hereby presume that those who make Laws are bound down to the common Rules of established inferior Courts in every Case, but they are so in all Matters, where the Reason and common Sense of Things equally guide both; and Reason directs that a Delinquent should be himself first acquitted before he's suffered to turn Accuser. But here what is more strange, is, that even before any Enquiry was perhaps so much as thought of, the Person presumed Guilty breaks through all Rule, Order and Decency, and turns Accuser; he should at least have waited till he had been acquitted, and then he would have been fairly at Liberty to have pursued his Resentment; no, says he, but the Mob thought me in the Wrong, in which he includes the whole

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Nation,

Nation, I will therefore first treat them like a Pack of Scoundrels, next arraign the Conduct of my Superior, and at last say nothing to the Purpose for myself. This will take their Eyes off from the main Point, and turn them upon what has nothing to do with it. But hold, Sir! you have hitherto gone swimmingly on in this evasive Tract, but there remains another Court, another Enquiry, who are not to ask you what others did, but what you did not do, that you should have done; if you can clear yourself there, it's very well; if not, Justice may still have its due Course, without regarding your artificial Attempts to pre-judge them. They may perhaps plainly ask you, as you was in the Rear, and could see as far as the Head-most Ships of the Van, and what they did, whether you did not likewise see what was doing in the Center, which was nearer you? You admit you did, but then why, when you saw a Behaviour there unknown to former Ages, and the Ad——l left to engage almost alone, you did not contribute all in your Power to his Assistance? You say you did as far as Discipline would permit; but why so extremely scrupulous in Point of Discipline, when the Nature and Necessity of Things, to which all Discipline gives way, commanded a different Attention; is it not in publick Affairs as in private Life? It is a Rule in our religious Discipline, that People should attend divine Service, and are punishable if they don't do it; but will any Man pretend to say that if in Time of divine Service my Neighbour's House is on Fire, or broke into by Thieves, I shall not leave the Service I am bound to observe in general, to assist my Neighbour in particular; or if I am unable myself, that I ought not to send my Servant, let the Discipline of Church-Service in other Respects, be as severe as it will?

But to come nearer to the Point, in a Case  
more

more directly parallel. Suppose I was at the Head of a Troop or Regiment, at an assign'd Post, and my Orders were strictly not to stir therefrom until further Orders; his Majesty's Guards are cut off in my Sight, or won't defend him, and I am the nearest and alone able to do it; would I rather suffer him to be kill'd or taken Prisoner? Or would I break my Orders and fly to his Defence? Is the Choice to be hesitated upon a Moment, by any brave, honest, gallant Man? And is not this exactly your Case by your own shewing?

I presume, Sir, that you may in your Life-time have read a certain old fashion'd Book call'd the *New Testament*, and if you have, you can't well help remembring a Passage, whereon most of this Reasoning is grounded: The Place your Chaplain will point out to you, it is of *Christ* and his Disciples, passing through the Corn-Fields on the Sabbath Day, and being an hungred, pluck'd the Ears to eat, which was highly criminal by the *Jewish* Law; and when reprov'd by those who attended more to Discipline than to rational and necessary Acts, what was *Christ's* Answer? Good Sir, ask your Chaplain, I have really too much Tenderness for you to repeat it here.

Instances of this Nature are endless, and no Man can reflect a Moment and not see the Poor-ness of your Defence. You have said in another Part of your Libel, that Mr. *M*——*us* was too impatient, and by engaging the Enemy before you could come up, ruined the whole Affair. You in another Place say, that he had Ships enough, *viz.* 13 to 7, and therefore wanted not your Assistance; now why was he too impatient when he had so much the Superiority? Could a gallant Man, whose Soul was boiling with Ardor to revenge his Country's Cause, when he had sufficient Means, lye tamely by, and not engage them



tho' he was not properly seconded, neither by his own Captains, nor by you or any of yours? But could he divine before this fatal Experiment was made, such a Set of Wretches commanded under him? Could he conceive such a degenerate Crew were made Commanders, and that the very Nature of *Englishmen* was altered? Or could he have dreamt at least that his Vice Ad——I would have united in the common Garbage? How tenderly passionate does he speak when he says, that if you had sent your best sailing Ships to his Assistance *he would have heartily thank'd you for it.* And how like a Wretch do you answer it, when you say that you fir'd a Shot at the *Dunkirk*, and she would not obey?

I believe Mr. *M——ws's* Case is much the same with all Mankind; he judged by his own Heart, and thence concluded all others brave, open, generous, and gallant as himself, and has not been mistaken alone, in parallel Cases; he made one Exception indeed in some Particulars as to yourself, and therefore did not associate kindly with you, and has but too fatally found his Suspicions not ill grounded: You have not been content to deceive him in a Point he the least doubted; you have not been content under the Skreen of Discipline, to suffer as much as in your Power lay, him and your Country's Honour to be sacrific'd together, and yourself, like the profligate Fellow who burnt the Temple of *Diana* at *Ephesus*, glorying in being transmitted to Posterity, a Signature of Infamy; but you have likewise endeavour'd to render yourself doubly criminal, by attempting to throw the Oidium on a Man who merits eternal Honour, or at least to render him in the Eye of the Nation equally culpable with yourself. And thus in Imitation of the Idea we have of wicked Spirits, delighted,

delighted in adding one more to the Number of the Damned.

You lay some Stress upon the Fleet's having never been formed into a Line, and make it at the same Time evident, it never could have been formed and brought into that Figure near enough to engage the Enemy, since, as you admit, the Captains would not fight; does it not prove they would not form to any Purpose, for the same Reason that they would not fight, because one must necessarily have produc'd the other?

You likewise say Mr. *M*——*ws* would not wait for you. But if he had, could he have engag'd at all? Since you admit the Enemy sail'd three Foot to your one, and consequently could they not have kept you in the like Disposition as long as they pleas'd? Do you conceive that they would have lain by to let you have clos'd the Line, and the whole Fleet have been fairly abreast of them with superior Force; don't you, and did you not then conceive that to be plainly the Case? And will you therefore invidiously place that to the Ad——l's Impatience, which must either have been so done, or not at all? in either Case you would have had something equally material to say, though to much the same Purpose.

Mr. *L*——*k* has digress'd in his Narrative occasionally, in order to shew his Abilities as a Seaman, an Officer, and a Critic, but has therein forgot one of the main Articles essential to a good Officer, which is a thorough Knowledge of, and Acquaintance with, the customary Schemes and Artifices of the Enemy, and the Principles whereon they usually act. If he had made this Part of an Officer's Business, as most certainly it is, he would then have opened a Scene no Way to the Advantage of his Cause, as it would have unravelled the whole Mystery of his perplex'd Criticism.

cism. He could not help knowing that every Officer who commands, is oblig'd in a great Measure, to suit himself to the Disposition of the Enemy; he is not to engage in what Form he pleases, but as Circumstances will permit. It is agreed on all Sides, that the Enemy had formed themselves in due Order of Battle, but it is at the same time agreed, that they could sail three Foot to our one, and consequently could preserve that Disposition, when we could not, to any Purpose; for on our own being form'd, it was only their making more Sail, and then we must either have been thrown into Disorder, by our best sailing Ships leaving their assign'd Stations, to keep up with the Enemy; or if they kept their Stations, they could sail no faster than the foul Ships, and consequently could never have come up fairly to engage the Enemy; whose End would have been materially answer'd, in drawing them away far to the Westward, and thereby of leaving the Coast of *Italy* open for the transporting of their Troops and Stores thither. And no body in their Senies can presume, who ever studied *French* Politics, that they ever would be drawn in to engage on equal Terms. This accounts for Mr. *M——*'s Conduct in a Point wherein People generally think him the most blameable, *viz.* Because our Fleet was superior; but that was the very Reason why the *French* only had it in their Power, whether he should engage them or not, because it is agreed they sailed to much better, and this likewise plainly accounts for one of Mr. *L——*'s chief Objections to the Ad——l's Conduct, *viz.* That the *Van* was where the *Center* should have been, and the *Center* where the *Rear* should have been; but this was in the Breast of the Enemy, not of the Admiral, who could not make his Ships sail better, nor his Officers do their Duty.

ty. The Enemy were determin'd our Fleet should never be in a right Disposition fairly a-breast and up with them. The Ad——l therefore very judiciously conceived, that to engage the *Rear* and *Center*, which he could come up with, was the Way at once to bring the *Van* back into the Engagement, and to give his own *Rear* Time to get up. This, it seems by Mr. L——k's own Account, produced one Part of the desired Effect, but he was determin'd it should not the other. The *Van* of the Enemy thereupon tacked, but our *Rear* did not come up; Mr. L——k says he could not, but admits his best sailing Ships might; but that he could not permit, because it would have been a Breach of Discipline. But, as I have shewn before, it would have been such a Breach, as the Admiral would have heartily thanked him for, and I dare say the Nation would have been clearly of the same Opinion. Mr. L——k must have known before, and obviously have discovered now, that the Enemy never intended to engage on equal Terms, and he must as clearly perceive that an Engagement was no ways to be brought on, but by the Method that the Admiral pursued; and therefore what he either ignorantly or invidiously terms Impatience in the Admiral, was the only possible Means, as the Ships were station'd, and the *Rear*-Admiral led the *Van* upon that Tack, of engaging the Enemy at all; and if the Enemy had not been engag'd with at all, it certainly would have rais'd an universal Clamour here, not easily to have been allay'd; and Mr. L——k's fine-spun Schemes of Discipline construed into downright Cowardice; and it might then justly enough have been said, why did not the Admiral engage where he could, if not where he would? Since that must have certainly produced a general Engagement. And this must surely have been the Case if Mr. L——k's

Discipline



Discipline had been pursued, *viz.* to have all got up into their proper Stations before they had engaged the Enemy, which, as has been plainly shewn before, could never have been done, consequently Mr. *L——k*'s Views have been fully answered, the Admiral disgraced, and sacrificed to the just Resentment of a dishonoured Nation. But as Mr. *M——ws* could not bear the Thoughts of seeing the Enemy, and not engaging of them, so so neither could Mr. *L——k* bear to see his Admiral in the Way of gaining immortal Honour, where himself could only, had he done his Duty, been mentioned in common with those who behaved well. Fame would not, in this Situation, have trumpeted to the World his wondrous Gallantry, but all the Honour of the Action have rested on the Admiral, whom he heartily hated, and was determined, if possible, to ruin. His Subtlety and close Designs were not easily to be seen into, by a Mind, open, gallant, and undefining; which however may teach open-hearted gallant Men this useful Lesson, That they are not only to be upon their Guard against the more subtil and reserved, but likewise to be very cautious how they give them Offence, since nothing that is wicked will be wanting that is plausible, to contribute to their undoing. Such Men are, as it were, born with Machiavellian Principles, *viz.* to stick at no Means, though never so unjust, to attain their Ends, and their Ends will always be the raising of themselves, at the Expence of the Life or Honour of those whom they esteem their Enemies; whether the Cause arises from the Intervention of Power, or personal Prejudice, or both together, which was here but too unhappily the Case.

The putting of two such Men together, and as it were, chaining Antipathies, forcibly uniting, as it were, the Gentleman and the Brute, the Open  
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and the Sullen, the Companion of the Noble, and of the Sail-maker, the Frank and the Reserv'd, the Well-wisher to his Country, and the Lover of Himself, was a Solecism in Politicks, only to be cleared up by those in whose Breast it lay, to have both distinguished and acted better; as they could not help seeing that the latent Mischief must one Day operate to the Dishonour of the State and Nation; so they could not help seeing the natural Consequences big with innumerable Evils. Yet, as if they had been possessed with an evil Spirit, and determined to deal in Contradictions, they were resolved together they should be, in despite of the pathetic Representations of a gallant generous Man, who could ill bear being, as it were, chain'd to a mungrel Being, half Fox half Bear, and whom his open Soul most heartily detested.

I cannot help, as I draw towards the Conclusion, of indulging myself in a very few serious Reflections, which being properly attended to, may stand as Land-Marks to guide safely for the future into a secure Port, such careless, unthinking, wilful, or unskilful Mariners, who may attempt for the future, to take the Helm out of the Hands of judicious Pilots, and presume to steer the naval Power at Random. And first, is it not plainly as much the Business of those who direct the Ad—  
—ty, to consider what kind of Officers they send together on any Expedition, as how they may be deem'd individually proper? Since on their Agreement, or Disagreement, the Success, or Failure of every Expedition ultimately depends. For surely no Man of Common Sense needs be told, that Union is the Soul of Success, and consequently Disunion the Spirit of Disappointment; what Judgment then ought we to make of the Views of those, who wilfully hazard the wrecking of the Nation's Honour, because they have Power to do it?

Good Policy would plainly evince the Usefulness, and even the Necessity of placing Military Men in such a Situation, as may turn their Envy and Hatred of one another, into an Emulation of shewing their different Capacities, and exerting their different Abilities for the Service of the State. And as the putting them together only increases their Animosities, and ruins the Service, so the separating them into different active Stations, must necessarily produce the direct contrary Consequences, or leave the most meritorious to triumph as becomes him. By this Means they become eminently distinguished, and those in Power learn truly on whom they may most safely depend; the Dignity of the Nation rises in Proportion as such Measures are pursued, and the Business of the principal Direction becomes easy and pleasant: It is turning violent and unmanageable Spirits to the Emolument of the State, which otherwise act like Wildfire, disorder the OEconomy, and set the whole System in a Flame.

Previous to this unhappy Affair, neither of the Officers in Question were ever presum'd to want either Courage or Skill; and I doubt not in the least, that had they been separated into different Stations independent of each other, those who chain'd them together, as I have said before, would have had the Pleasure of seeing, that each of them would have been an Honour to his Country; from whence I shall take the Liberty to conclude, that although nothing will excuse either, if it appears they have not done their Duty to the utmost of their Power; yet as the putting them together is the Basis of the Evil, so I conceive ought the Conduct of those who did it to be enquired into; that Delinquents of every Kind may be punished according to their Demerits, and not the whole Fault thrown upon the Little, and the Great only escape due Censure. As

As I am myself above the Reach of the most haughty and supercilious of them all, so I both am and ever will be free occasionally to pass my Censure upon them, when either through Pride, Negligence, or Ignorance, the Royal Navy, that sole Resource of *British* Glory, and the Honour and Dignity of the State, suffers by their Mismanagement. When I see School-Boys made Captains, and gallant Officers superseded; when I see Officers misplaced, or Stations misjudged; Convoys neglected, or their Ships plundered by naval Commanders, and Officers who behave ill acquitted, either through Interest, or the Chicanery of Court Martials; then and upon all such Occasions, may those Gentlemen who direct superior, the Affairs of the Royal Navy, depend upon hearing further from me.

I hope the Reader will excuse this little Digression. There are but two more Points to settle, and those be what seem most to have taken with the Generality of the People in Prejudice of Mr. *M——ws*: But has this as been chiefly owing to the invidious and bad Insinuations of Mr. *L——k*, and never answered to any Purpose in favour of Mr. *M——ws*, so it is not at all to be admir'd at, that he who makes a specious Defence will be most regarded; and however Mr. *M——ws* may have behaved best abroad, Mr. *L——k* has plainly best understood our Constitution, and the Genius of the People his Heart is set to impose on.

The Points are, That previous to the Engagement, Mr. *M——ws* never pursued his Instructions in exercising the Fleet; an Error never committed by any commanding Officer before: And his Negligence in this Particular was the Cause of all the Disorder the Fleet was in during the Engagement.



While this first Article stands staring in the Face of the Nation undefended, it must certainly give the People a very indifferent Idea of Mr. *M——ws*'s Care and Conduct; because nothing is truer than the Necessity, as well as the Order of practising this Kind of Discipline. It is of Importance first to know who forms this Charge against Mr. *M——ws*? and why? It is the Man himself who had the Command of this Fleet absolutely, from *April* 1742 to the Time of Mr. *M——ws*'s Arrival, and from thence in Effect to the latter End of *December* 1743, when Mr. *M——ws* enter'd more particularly on his Charge at *Hieres*. Previous to Mr. *L——k*'s Command, the greater Part of the same Fleet had been a considerable Time under the Direction of Mr. *Haddock*, the whole together, as I can recollect, near about three Years. This Fleet under the Government of Mr. *Haddock* and Mr. *L——k* had been exercis'd thoroughly, or they had not: If they had, then the Reason as to one Part is very evident why they were not exercised during the six or seven Weeks Mr. *M——ws* was really on Duty, because there was neither Opportunity nor Necessity for doing it, And if these Officers aforesaid did not exercise the Fleet, especially Mr. *L——k*, with what Face can he charge Mr. *M——ws* of Negligence? The Truth of the Matter is, that Mr. *M——ws* was employed the greatest Part of the Time ashore, concerting Measures with the Court of *Turin*, and did not go aboard the Fleet till he was assured the *French* and *Spaniards* were preparing to put to Sea. He went on board the latter End of *December*, and on the 9th of *February* following both Fleets were in Motion: In the Interval, Part of the Fleet was employ'd in the best Kind of Exercise imaginable, *viz.* in cruizing and watching the Motion of the Enemy,  
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and the main Body ever ready to weigh at a Moment's Warning to attack the Enemy. What Exercise Mr. *L——k* means during this Space, is inconceivable. He can never mean that the Fleet should have been often under sail for that Purpose; because while they lay at Anchor in *Hieres*, they were always ready to attack the Enemy when they should come out of *Toulon* Harbour; but had they put to Sea for the Sake of Exercise, it is very uncertain where they might have been, since he well knows they could not command either the Winds or Currents, and consequently would have hazarded the letting the Enemy out, the greatest Error that could possibly have been committed; so that in the Whole Mr. *L——k* had much better have said, that the Fleet had been so well exercised under his Care, as that no Commander was well able to mistake his Duty, instead of saying they were not exercised under Mr. *M——ws*, which was impracticable, since Mr. *L——k* had the Direction of them, either absolutely or in Effect, above eighteen Months, and during that Time often at Sea; Mr. *M——ws* only in Effect about seven Weeks, and during that Time waiting the Motion of the Enemy at Anchor: For Mr. *L——k* will not presume to say, he had not Power to exercise the Fleet, while Mr. *M——ws* was absent, which every Navy Officer must know to be false. It is evident, therefore, that either Mr. *L——k* did not do his Duty, or that the Fleet was well exercised: And it is as evident that Mr. *M——s* could not, during the Time he was actually on Service aboard the Fleet, exercise them otherwise than he did, without being highly blameable. If any body should be weak enough to ask, Why Mr. *M——s* was no sooner aboard the Fleet, or what Business he had so long ashore? He is  
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only to be answered, that such was his Majesty's Pleasure; and when it pleases him to employ, or the Nature of the Affair requires it, it is as much the Business of the commanding Officer of the Fleet, at one Time to be ashore, as at another Time to be on board the Fleet; and this more especially, when it is presumed that he who has the second Command is both capable of, and willing to do his Duty. And here ends the wonderous Charge against Mr. *M——s*'s Conduct, I hope to the full Satisfaction of the Reader; altho' I can't help observing further, on a Matter consequent of this idle Charge, that on the Fleet's coming out of *Hieres Bay*, they were all in Confusion. This, if it relates to want of Experience in the Officers, lies like the other wholly on Mr. *L——k*; since it appears that he should have taught them better. But he himself shews, it was chiefly owing to such Incidents as naturally throw all Fleets into Confusion, *viz.* little Winds, Swells, and Currents. Can any Thing in Nature be more ridiculous than this Manner of accusing a Superior? First, to make him answerable for Mr. *L——k*'s own Misconduct; and next, for not being able to command the Winds, Seas and Currents. But what is it a wicked designing Man won't say? And what is it a credulous, unthinking People won't believe, that is told them with a good Assurance?

The last Point I shall meddle with, is the Affair of leaving off Chace when the Enemy had the crippled Ships in tow. This is a Charge on Mr. *M——s*, if possible, more wicked and ridiculous than the former; and shews to what wretched Resources that Man is driven, who dare first do every Thing to dishonour his Country, and then to cover himself under the Accusation of another.

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To give this all imaginable Force and Clearness, it's necessary to return back, and reconsider the Situation of the Fleet to the Instant of Time this silly Charge commences. It is there observed, that the Enemy sail'd three Foot to our one; that they would not therefore suffer our Fleet to come fairly up with them; and that consequently the attacking their Center, and Rear, was the only Means left of bringing on a general Battle. The A——l did so, and by a fatal Experiment found, he was neither to be seconded by his own Division, nor by the Vice A——l's. That there were not more than seven Ships would fight in the whole Fleet; that those that did fight disabled the Enemy; and that thereupon the Van of the Enemy's Fleet tacked, and stood to the Relief of their Friends; and, being much superior to the fighting Ships in our Fleet, took their own disabled Ships in tow, and made the best of their way off with them. After this, who can conceive either the Meaning or Use of chasing them? Will Mr. L——k presume to say, that the same Enemy, who in the Face of our whole Fleet could safely relieve their disabled Ships, and carry them off in Triumph, would suffer those same disabled Ships to have been taken from them by his Squadron, supposing they would have fought the Enemy, which is not quite so clear as one could wish? And suppose they would, considering the previous Facts, Who must have seconded them? Since three of the fighting Ships in the two other Divisions were disabled, consequently but four serviceable Ships were left out of both, for that Purpose; and does Mr. L——k presume that his Squadron with four more Ships could have beat the whole *French* Fleet, and retook their disabled Ships? If not, to what End was he to chase? Unless he intended to sacrifice those



those few Commanders who were willing to fight, to the superior Power of the Enemy, which must obviously have been the Case, had the Chate been continued.

*Thus have we fairly and impartially related the Transactions between the two Admirals, and have given each of them the Liberty of pleading his own Cause, and to say what he can for himself. But perhaps this Affair will appear still in a clearer Light, when we have read the Journal of the French Admiral M. De Court, which we shall next introduce. After which we shall give the private Sentiments of some English Officers, that were in the Engagement, and which they gave an Account of in Letters to their Friends.*

*A Journal of the Proceedings of Monsieur de Court from the Time of his Departure from Toulon, Feb. 10. to the Time of his anchoring in Alicant Bay, the 27th, ditto, N. S.*

*The 20th.*

**T**HE French and Spanish Squadrons being in Toulon Road, got under Sail fine Weather, moderate Gales, Wind at N. W. At 7 in the Evening all the Ships were under Sail, but the Admiral fearing their running aboard of one another, anchored with the Fleet under Saint Margaret's at 10 in the Evening.

*The*

*The 20th.*

In the Morning saw the *Leopard* with the Rail<sup>s</sup> of her Head, and gammoning of her Bow-sprit gone, &c. Her Soldiers were taken out and distributed amongst the other Ships; and she went in again to the Harbour to refit; the rest of the Fleet got under Sail, Wind at W. small Breezes: Employed all Day in forming a Line of Battle upon a Wind, without the *Spaniards* being able to get into it, either because their Ships went badly, or were badly managed.

*The 21st.*

At Sun-rising discover'd the *English* Fleet under Sail, with the Wind off Shoar about N. E. standing out of *Hiere's* Bay to the Number of 38 Sail. The Admiral made the Signal for the Line of Battle upon a Wind which was badly put in Execution; little Wind at N. N. W. with a great western Swell, steered to meet the *English*, who were standing towards us, with little Wind at E. N. E. the Winds variable from N. N. W. to E. N. E. but at last the Easterly Wind prevailed, unhappily for us.

In the Evening the *English* kept in Shore about the Distance of two Leagues off.

At eight in the Morning brought to under our Topsails with our Heads off.

*The 22d ditto.*

The Wind variable from the N. E. to the E. N. E. *Cape Siccie* bearing N. E. by N. Distance about eight Leagues, the *French* and *Spanish* Squadrons being about 2 or 3 Leagues to Lee-ward and a-stern of the *English*, *Monf. de Court* made the Signal for the Line of Battle upon a Wind, the *Spaniards* composing the Rear; upon

the Account of the Nearness of the *English*, who were bearing down; the Rear being very much extended, so that from the headmost Ship of their Van to the sternmost of their Rear the Distance was at least three Leagues; our Fleet was also too much extended, and might take up about two Leagues. We observed that the *English* had about 30 Ships of the Line, whereof three from 84 to 90 Guns were in the Center of the Rear, three of 90, and two of 70 in the Center, and three from 84 to 90 in the Center of the Van, the rest from 60 to 50.

At One in the Afternoon, the Fleets being in this Disposition, the *English* Rear a great way off, the *English* Admiral a-breast of the Royal *Philip*, Commandant of the *Spaniards* \* Vice Admiral *Lestock* a-breast of the *Terrible*, *Mons. de Court*, at the Distance of a large Gun Shot of 36 Pounds. Mr. *Mathews* the *English* Admiral, bore down short with the main Body of the Battle, within a small Gunshot of the Royal *Philip*, and begun the Engagement very briskly. In spite of all the Superiority of the *English* Ships, Don *Navarro* bravely bore the Fire for above three Hours, which was so terrible, that nothing was seen but Fire and Smoak. The Van of the *English* Fleet did not begin to Fire, till *Mons. de Sorgues* fired a 36 Pounder at † Vice Admiral *Lestock*, which reached him; then the *Terrible*, *Serieux*, *St. Esprit*, *Solide* and *Diamant* fired, but the latter left off the 18 Pounders, not being able to reach the *English*, who kept their Wind in such a Manner, that the three headmost Ships of their Van, never durst come within Gun-shot; for this Reason all the other *French* Ships had it not so much as in their Power to engage. At

\* Rear Admiral Rowley. † Rear Admiral Rowley.  
three

three the Admiral made the Signal for the Van to tack, to come to the Assistance of the *Spaniards*, and cut off Mr. *Mathews*, who by his bearing down, had exposed himself to be placed between two Fires: Unfortunately for us the Signal was not immediately perceived, and was not put in Execution till very late; we were even obliged to make the *French* tack altogether, to disengage Don *Navarro* and the *Spaniards*, which made Mr. *Mathews* continue to have the Wind of us, and the Engagement to cease with the Day; for the Night had as great a Share of that as the Approach of the *French*. Our Fleet being got together, lay to under our Topsails all Night: In this Engagement the *Spaniards* bore the Fire of the main Body and Rear of the *English* Fleet. The Royal *Philip* having with great Resolution and distinguished Bravery, made Mr. *Mathews* and his two Seconds abandon the Fight, caused a Fireship that was sent against him to blow up, out of which four Men only were saved; and shot away a 90 Gun Ships main and mizen Masts: Don *Navarro* had two slight Wounds, Mr. *de Girardin*, Captain of the Colours was mortally wounded, and 500 Men killed and wounded. The *Spanish* Ship the \* *Powerful* of 60 Guns, Don *Quiant* Captain, for two Hours, bore the Fire of five Ships of 60 Guns within Musket Shot; lost her main Mast, and fore and mizen Topmasts, and remained between both Fleets: The *English* sent to take out the Captain and the Boatwain, and left an Officer and twenty Men on Board of her, whom they durst not send to fetch away again, seeing the *French* rejoin this Ship.

The 23d.

At Sun rising the Wind at N. W. light Breezes

\* In Spanish called the El Poder.



saw the *English* Fleet about 4 Leagues to Windward, and made *Cape Sicie* N. N. E. about 13 Leagues. The *Hercules*, a *Spanish* Ship being within Gunshot of the *English*, engaged about an Hour, made up to her Assistance, and she rejoin'd us, but not without some Damage. The *English* Fleet bearing down upon ours, tack'd upon the *Powerful* to take Possession of her, and at Noon brought to, under our Topsails. Wind at N. E. light Breezes: The Admiral ordered the *Diamant* to take out as many of the *Powerfull's* Crew as she could, several other Ships also sent their Boats; at one o'Clock no Body being left on Board, the Admiral's Officer set her on Fire, and the *Diamant* made Sail to put the *Spaniards* on Board of *Don Navarro*. At two o'Clock the Fleet bore away before the Wind in the Line of Battle; in the Evening the *English* Fleet haled their Wind, at 9 ditto saw the *Powerful* blow up.

*The 24th.*

At Day break the Winds variable from N. N. W. to N. N. E. fresh Gales and a great Sea, the Fleet was obliged to bear away steering W. S. W. saw nothing of the *English*; a *Spanish* Ship having her Topmasts carried away, and several others damaged, steer'd S. W. with an easy Sail, because the Royal *Philip* being towed by the *Isabella*, was afraid of straining too much the Ship or Masts.

At 4 in the Afternoon made *Cape Creux*, distance about five Leagues brought to, Wind at E. N. E. strong Gales, all the *Spaniards* being damaged, continued their Rout to look for a Place of Shelter where they might refit.

*The*

*The 25th.*

At Day-break no *Spanish* Ship in Sight, Wind at N. E. fresh Gales, steer'd to reach the Coast of *Spain* to see for the *Spaniards*: Run under an easy Sail all Night.

*The 26th.*

At Sun rising saw the Island of *Majorca*, Wind from S. E. to E. S. E. fresh Gales; continued our Course at S. W. under an easy Sail all Night.

*The 27th.*

At Sun rising made the Island of *Belgran* East Distance six Leagues, crowded Sail, the Wind at North, a fine Gale, steering West and by South along the Coast; at five in the Evening anchored in *Alicant* Road.

N. B. *The above is a true Copy which came from Marfeilles, procured there, from the Secretary to the Marquis de Mirepoix, Commandant of Provence, to whom the Original was addressed, by Mons. de Court from Alicant.*

*A Journal from on Board of HIS MAJESTY'S Ship N——k, March 10th, 1743-4.*

*February 8.*

**T**HE *Winchelsea* having stood a-thwart the Petite Passe of the Bay of *Hieres*, hoisted a blue Ensign at the main Top-mast Head, and lower'd it a great many Times, as the Signal that the *French* and *Spanish* Squadrons were under Sail, coming out of *Toulon* Road; and the *Effex* under the Island of *Porquerole* repeating the same Signal, the Admiral answered both, by firing a  
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Gun; and made the Signal for the Fleet to un-moor. We hove short, the Enemy having stood in Shore again; we did not weigh, but continued to lie short all Night, clear for Action. At 8 His Majesty's Ships the *Oxford* and *Guernsey* got under Sail, and went out in the Grand Passe, to observe the Enemies Motions.

*February 9.*

At eight in the Morning, the *Dursey* and *Xebeck* sailed to the Southward. At Nine, the *Essex* made the Signal that the Enemy had got under Sail; and at Ten o'Clock the Admiral having made the Signal to weigh, the whole Fleet got under Sail with great Chearfulness and Expedition. Then the Signal was made for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle a-head, the Vice Admiral's Division leading on the Starboard Tack. At Eleven, the Signal for Lieutenants on Board of the Admiral; and half an Hour after, the Signal was made for the Van of the Fleet to tack. As the combined Fleets haled their Wind and kept to Windward, we continued under Sail till duskish, and anchored *per* Signal. The *Warwick* having stood in too nigh the Shore by the *Charter-House*, she was obliged to come to an Anchor, to strike her Yards and Topmasts, and to lighten, before she got off the Ground again, which she did without any Damage.

*February 10.*

At Six in the Morning, the Fleet weighed *per* Signal; and at Seven the Signal was made by the Admiral for the Ships that led on the Starboard Tack to head large: Accordingly the Fleet made Sail with little Wind off Shore. At ten o'Clock saw three Ships to the Eastward under *Levant* Island, which proved to be the *Boyne*,  
*Chichester*,

*Chichester*, and a Victualler from *Mahon*. They saluted the Admiral, and joined us very opportunely soon after.—Saw the Enemy, having very little Wind; standing towards us in a Line of Battle. At the same Time we had a little Air of Wind Easterly, with a very high Swell in the Southern Passage, the Ships being all in a Cluster together, employ'd our Boats to keep clear of one another, as did every other Ship; and at last, with some Difficulty, escaped Danger.—At One o'Clock, proving calm, the Fleet brought to by Signal. — At Two, we made Sail again, and the Admiral made the Signal for the Line of Battle a-breast; but the Sea and little Wind preventing us getting near enough the Enemy before Night, who had already brought to in a Line of Battle; the Admiral at six o'Clock made the Signal to bring to on the Larboard Tack, and we lay to all Night very nigh the Enemy, with Cruizers between us and them, to observe their Motions: Being little Wind, Cloudy, with an ugly Swell.

*February 11.*

In the Morning, the Enemy appeared to be further off than the Night before; and they had made Sail with little Wind Easterly, their Larboard Tacks on Board. The Vice Admiral's Division composing the Rear of our Fleet, with the Larboard Tacks on Board, was not closed with our Centers, but a great Distance off; neither was the Rear's Division, composing the Van of our Fleet, so close as they should have been.—Our Fleet made Sail, and the Admiral made the Signal for a Line of Battle a-breast. Soon afterwards the Signal for the Commander in the third Post to make more Sail; then the Signal for the Commander in the second Post to do the same.



At eight o'Clock, the Signal for the Van of the Fleet to lead large, in chace after the combined Fleets standing to the Southward ; but their Ships being all clean, they drew very fast a-head of us. At nine o'Clock, the *Royal Oak*, with two Victuallers from *Mahon*, having fallen in to the Eastward of us very luckily came into the Fleet, Half an Hour after, the Signal for a Line of Battle a-head. At Ten, the Signal to engage the Enemy, which Signal the Rear-Admiral repeated, tho' the Vice-Admiral did not ; which occasioned various Conjectures. — About One o'Clock, the *French Fleet* going very fast a-head, and leaving the Rear of their Fleet some Distance off a-stern, which was the *Spanish Squadron* ; the Admiral like himself, finding he could not come up with them, took this Opportunity, and bore down with the *Marlborough* upon the *Royal Philip*, on Board of which was Don Navarro, the *Spanish Admiral*, and began the Action with great Intrepidity. At the same Time we in the *Norfolk* bore down, and engaged the *Spanish Admiral's* Second a head, till we made her sick of it, and take to her Heels with all her Sails abroad ; not daring however to follow her, but compelled to keep in the Line of Battle. — A great Uneasiness to our brave Captain, all the Officers, and Men, to continue in this Manner idle Spectators. — Our Rigging, Masts, and Yards having been much maul'd and shatter'd, and tho' we had been at it above an Hour and a Quarter, yet we had only Twelve Men killed, and twenty-five wounded. The Ships a-head of us engaged the rest of the *Spanish Squadron* a-head of our Run-away ; and the Ships a-stern of the Admiral and *Marlborough*, engaged the Ships a stern of the *Spanish Admiral*. — The Vice, and his Division, having not come up. In the mean while Rear Ad——l

Ad—l R—w—y on Board of the *Barfleur*, with the *Princess Caroline* his Second, engaged the *French* Admiral with his Division; and continued the Fight with great Obstinacy and Judgment, assisted most courageously by the *Caroline*, till the *French* Admiral with his Seconds run from them, after a very warm Engagement near two Hours long.—The rest of our Van keeping their Wind with great Discretion, prevented the Enemy from Tacking and Weathering upon us, to the Applause and Reputation of the Officer who led? since, by bearing down upon the Enemy, the *French* must have got the better of us, being three Ships there to our one, including the Number of their Van and Center. The Admiral and *Marlborough* being just aboard of one another; to avoid which, the Admiral was obliged in the Heat of Action to make Sail a-head; his Masts, Yards, and Rigging being much damaged and shatter'd, so that it was with much ado he could work or manage his Ship. In this Condition, when the *Marlborough's* main and mizen Masts were shot by the Board, and still continued to fire upon the Enemy; the *Royal Philip* being altogether disabled, her Seconds gone, the Ships a stern not yet come up, the *Anne Galley* Fire-ship was ordered to prime with the utmost Dispatch, and go down upon the *Spanish* Admiral and burn him. But the Captain's want of Readiness, and great Delay, were the principal Cause of preventing the Execution of this Enterprize at the seasonable Time ordered and expected, and by some unlucky Accident or other she blew up along-side of the *Royal Philip*. All her way down, the Enemy kept constantly firing at her; nothing was left un-executed in the Power of the Admiral and *Marlborough* for her Protection; yet she unhappily miscarried, not with-

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out

out positive Assertions, that it was in some measure owing to the Misconduct or Neglect of some Officers, too great for me to name; but whether true or false, will, no doubt, hereafter appear. It is universally acknowledged, that the Admiral in the *Namur*, the Rear-Admiral in the *Barfleur*, Captain *Cornwall* (whose melancholy Fate will ever be lamented as a brave Officer, and his Judgment and Resolution will ever be pointed at, as an Example to all others) of the *Marlborough*, and the Officers on whom the Command devolved after his Death; Captain *Forbes* of the *Norfolk*, and Captain *Osburn* of the *Princess Caroline*, behaved like great Officers unacquainted with Fear, Patriots, and Seamen. — Who did not equally do their Duty to their King and Country, in serving them faithfully, in the Destruction of the combined Fleets, it is to be hoped Time will shew, it does not become me to utter my Thoughts; it is too delicate a Subject for me to touch upon. — In spite of the *Sterling-Castle's* Endeavours to the contrary, the Van of the *French* Squadron tack'd, which obliged the Rear-Admiral to tack also, in order to come and join our Center; while the *French* Fleet did not fire at our Van, but pursued their Course for the Protection and Relief of the *Spanish* Squadron. The *Powerful*, a *Spanish* Ship of 64 Guns, having been attacked by the *Somerfet*, *Princessa*, *Bedford*, *Kingston* and *Berwick*, after a resolute Defence, being dismasted, struck; whereupon several Boats boarded her, but the *French* Fleet coming upon them, retook her again, with the Lieutenant of the *Berwick* and twenty-five of her Men. — The Admiral had haled down the Signal for the Line of Battle; and at Five o'Clock wore with his Head in Shore, and made the Signal again for the Line of Battle a-head. The  
Ships

Ships of the Enemy that were a-stern of the *Royal Philip* all Day, now having come up to close with their Chief, kept firing at the Admiral; the *French* Fleet being also joined with the *Spaniards*, Night coming on, Firing ceased, and we stood with the Starboard Tacks in Shore—leaving the major Part of the *Spanish* Squadron almost destroyed and torn to Pieces. — At eight o’Clock the Signal to tack, little Wind variable, with a Swell all Night.

February 12.

The *Namur*’s Masts having been greatly wounded, the Admiral hoisted his Flag on board of the *Ruffel*. — At 6 o’Clock saw the Enemy to Leeward, bearing S. W. by W. of us, distant six Leagues — the Wind being about N. E. At the same Time observed the *Somerfet* to be engaged with one of the Enemy, at some Distance from their Fleets. They parted after several Discharges. At 9 o’Clock, the Vice Admiral made a Signal for his Division to chace to the S. W. At 11, the Admiral made the Signal for the Line of Battle a-breast, and the whole Fleet gave Chace in a good close Line. But the Enemy making what Sail they could from us with the crippled Ships, and there being little Wind all Day, at Duskish the Fleet brought to, in Expectation of renewing the Attack next Day. At nine o’Clock, the *Essex* set fire to the *Poder*, and she burned and blew up in half an Hour, being deserted by the Enemy.

February 13.

At 2 o’Clock in the Morning, the Signal was made to make Sail. Accordingly we did, blowing pretty fresh at N. E. At Day break saw the Enemy bearing down N. N. W. of us, just able



to stand with them. The Admiral made the Signal for the Vice-Admiral and his Division to give Chace; and the Fleet followed with all their Sail abroad that they could carry; but the Enemy's Ships being all clean, they went from us, the Wind increasing to put us by our Top-sails, many of our Ships being wounded in their Masts; and the Wind also favouring them, and shifting to the N. W. the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to leave off Chace, and for the weathermost Ships to bear down into his Wake. — The Wind continued to blow very hard all Night; and the Fleet lay by under a Main-sail.

In this Manner did Fate, Misconduct, and Backwardness, contribute to the easy Escape of the Enemy, which an Examination into will more amply discover. As to the principal Losses, I cannot be exact; therefore I shall only say, that, next to the *Marlborough*, the Rear-Admiral lost most Men. Next Day, after repairing our Losses, we made Sail in quest of the Enemy, but could not hear any Thing of them. On the 17th made Sail for *Minorca*, and dispatched the *Sutherland* Hospital ship into *Mahon* Harbour with our wounded Men. — Afterwards endeavoured all we could to get to Windward, lest in our Absence from *Hieres*, the Enemy should convoy to *Italy* any Reinforcements with the Men of War left in *Toulon* Harbour. — But after struggling in vain with hard Gales of Wind, and very bad Weather, many Ships being disabled thereby, we bore away the 28th, and next Day got into *Mahon* Harbour, to repair our Loss with great Expedition, to get out to Sea as soon as possible.

A Let-

*A Letter from the Rupert.*

Rupert, off Mahon, Feb. 22, 1743-4.

ON the Combined Fleet's haling out into the Great Road at *Toulon*, Captain *Norris*, in the *Essex*, was ordered to anchor under *Porquerole*, with the *Chatham* and *Fewerham*, where he could see the Motions of the Enemy's Fleet, to make Signals on their Motions of sailing. Accordingly on *Wednesday* the 8th of *February*, at half past 2 in the Afternoon, the *Essex* made the Signal of the Enemy's Fleet under Sail. Then Ad——l M——s made the Signal to unmoor. We hove short; and as he saw the Enemy standing in, and anchor again, we continued to lie short at an Anchor, on our Arms all Night; the Admiral having detach'd Frigates to lie without the Island of *Porquerole*, to observe their farther Motions.

On *Thursday* the 9th in the Morning at 6, we loosed our Sails; at 9, Capt. *Norris* made the Signal of the Combined Fleet's being under Sail; at 10, the Admiral made the Signal to weigh; accordingly the whole Fleet got under Sail. He then made the Signal for the Line of Battle a head with the Starboard Tack, the Wind then W. N. W. moderate Weather. At half past 11, the Signal was made for the Van of the Fleet to tack, on seeing the Enemy's Fleet stand in for the Land, We continued plying in the Bay of *Hieres* till Night; then the Signal to anchor.

On *Friday* the 10th, at 6 in the Morning, the Admiral made the Signal to weigh; we all got under Sail, and at 7, the Signal being made for the Ships that led on the Starboard Tack, to lead

lead large, by Noon, we all got out of the Bay; then saw the Enemy's Fleet to Leeward of us about 3 Leagues, endeavouring to get into *Toulon*, they having little Wind Westerly, and we a small Air of Wind at E. S. E. and variable, with a great western Swell, that it was with great Difficulty, by the help of our Boats, that we could keep some of our Ships from being foul of one another. We were then joined by the *Boyne* and *Chichester* from *England*. At half past 2, the Signal was made for the Rear-Admiral and his Division, to hawl by the Wind. We towed with all our Boats, in order to join the Enemy, (it being almost calm) till 5 o'Clock; at 6, we got within two Leagues of the Enemy's Fleet; and the Admiral made the Signal to bring to on the Larboard Tack. We accordingly lay to all Night; but did not lose Sight of the Enemy.

On *Saturday* the 11th, at Day-break, we found that the Currents had drove us between the Enemy and *Toulon*, Cape *Sicie* bearing N. N. W. four Leagues, and the Enemy about four Miles distance from us. At half past 6, the Admiral made the Signal for the Line of Battle a-breast. We continued edging down on the Enemy, who retreated; and our Ships being very foul, we could not get up with the *French* Fleet, who crouded all the Sail they could to get from us; nor could our Vice-Admiral or his Division come into the Line. The Admiral sent an Officer to those Ships a-stern of him, in his own Division, to desire they would keep the Line as close as they possibly could. At half past 8, the *Royal Oak* joined us from *Mahon*; and the Signal was made for the Rear-Admiral, and his Division, to lead large. At half past 9, the Signal was made for the Line of Battle a-head; and at 10, the Signal for all the Cruizers, and the  
Signal

Signal to engage. The Admiral then bore down on the Enemy's Fleet; and at 1, he was a-breast of the *Real*, which was the Centre of the *Spanish* Ships, brought to on the Larboard Tack, which formed our Line on that Tack, and, with the *Marlborough* his Second, began to engage the *Real* and her Second the *Isabella*; as did the Leaders of his Division, with the Leaders of the *Spanish* Line; and our Rear-Admiral with his Division those Ships of the *French* Fleet he could come up with, and continued a warm Engagement. The five Ships a-stern of the *Real*, not having come up to close their Line, had none to engage with till half past one; then they began to fire at me and the *Royal Oak*, which we returned, and began to engage, the Wind shifting to the N. E. shot us a-head of them; upon which I yawed to get my Ship farther a-stern, and brought Part of our Larboard Side to bear on them; but finding they raked us as they came up, I yawed again, brought our Starboard Side to bear on them, and continued our Fire. At 3, the *Marlborough's* main and mizen Masts were brought by the Board. At 4, the *Real* was greatly disabled; then the Admiral made a Signal for the *Anne Galley* Fireship to come down and burn her; but she blew up a-long Side, without doing Execution. The *Cambridge*, of the Vice-Admiral's Division, now came up, and began to fire on the five Ships, that we and the *Royal Oak* were engaged with; then the Admiral haled down the Signal for the Line. I bore down nearer the five *Spanish* Ships that were coming up to assist their Admiral, and continued the Engagement. At 5, the *Marlborough* was towed out of the Line; the Admiral then made the Signal for the Line a-head; we then immediately hauled our Wind, and formed our Line.

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The Admiral wore round, which we that were a-stern of his Division, only, did after him. These are the Ships, *viz.* the Admiral in the *Namur*, the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal-Oak*, that with the Admiral formed the Line; and with these we engaged the *Real*, her Second the *Isabella*, and the other five *Spanish* Ships, that by this Time were come up, and got into a close Line with their Admiral. The whole *French* Fleet being now got to Windward, and bearing down upon us, and Night coming on, Firing ceased on all Sides. We passed on, leaving the *Spanish* Ships greatly shatter'd, and almost quite disabled, the *French* Fleet having then joined the *Spaniards*. There was one of the *Spanish* Ships, called the *Powerful*, of 64 Guns, almost beat to Pieces, which struck to the *Berwick*; but he had only time to take the Captain and four of the principal Officers out, leaving a Lieutenant with twenty-three Men in her, which the *Spaniards* in the Night retook, and took all their Men out of her; but next Evening we came up with her, and Captain *Norris* was sent to burn her; which he did, and she blew up in a little less than half an Hour. Three Gentlemen lay claim to the Honour of her; but who did her the most Damage is quite uncertain. Upon the whole, it can only be said, that it was a running, harum-scarum Action. The *French* Ships sailed 5 Foot to our one; and the *Spanish* Ships out-sailed most of ours, which gave them great Advantages. I think, but sixteen Ships of ours did engage; we fairly beat them out of the Seas; but most of our Ships that engaged, had their Masts disabled, except myself. I came off without my Masts being hurt, having only four Men wounded; but my Sails and Rigging pretty much shattered. Tho' I was as much in the Heat of the Fire as any Ship that did engage, except the *Marlbo-*

*Marlborough*, and Adm—l *M*—ws himself in the *Namur*, who first began the Engagement; and you'll observe, as I said before, that I was an uneasy Spectator for above half an Hour, having no body to engage with, till those five *Spanish* Ships came up. Rear-Adm—l *R*—wl—y, and his Division, finding the *French* endeavouring to get the Wind of us, immediately hauled the Wind, and prevented them. The Vice-Admiral and his Division could not come in. At eight that Night, the Admiral made the Signal to tack. We had it almost quite calm, and little Wind quite round the Compass all Night.

On *Sunday* the 12th in the Morning, the Admiral's Ship having received some Damage in her Masts, he hoisted his Flag on Board the *Russel*. At Six, we saw the Enemy to Leeward, bearing about W. S. W. of us, distant 7 Leagues; we had then the Wind at E. N. E. upon which we bore away after them with all the Sail we could croud. At Seven we saw the *Somerset* engaged with one of the *Spanish* Ships that by Accident had fallen in with him, then four Miles distant from our Fleet; the *Spaniard* got away, after being engaged half an Hour. At Nine, the Signal was made for the Vice-Admiral and his Division, to chace to the S. W. At Eleven, the Signal for the Line a-breast. Accordingly we all bore down in a good Line, and the *French* stood away from us, with all the Sail they could make; we had but very little Wind all Day: But by Six we got within three Miles of them, and brought to with our Larboard Tacks, in hopes of attacking them in the Morning. The *Burford* this Night joined us from *England*, and fell into the Line.

On *Monday* the 13th at Two in the Morning, the Signal was made to make Sail, perceiving the Enemy's Fleet to make Sail from us. At Day-

light we saw them bearing about West of us, seven or eight Leagues, and the Wind flying about to the N. N. W. We could but just lay up with them. The Signal was then made for the Vice-Admiral to send Ships to chace, and we pursued with the whole Fleet after them with all the Sail we could croud; but they being all clean, we could not perceive that we came up with them. And at Nine the Wind coming to the Eastward, and blowing very hard, and several of our Ships having their Masts much wounded, the Admiral made the Signal to leave off chacing, and for the Weathermost Ships to bear down to him. It blew so hard that it put us by the Topfails; and at Noon we lay too under a Mizen, and at Night under a Main-Sail, the Wind still Eastwardly.

On *Tuesday* the 14th by Noon, being moderate, the Ships had then mostly repaired their Damages; we made Sail to the N. W. in hopes to meet them, and continued that Day and Night making Sail in for the Shore.

On *Wednesday* the 15th at Day-light, we saw Cape *Creaux* N. by W. 7 Leagues; and at Seven the Admiral made my Signal, and ordered me, with the *Winchelsea*, to go into the Bay of *Roses*, to see if I could discover any of the Enemies Ships there; which we accordingly did; but finding none there, joined the Fleet by Night. Then we all proceeded off of Cape *Bajolion*, on the Island of *Minorca*, where we got safe the 17th. I compute our Loss of Men killed and wounded to be near 400. This is the best Account I can give; but as far as I relate, you may depend upon it to be Fact.

Captain *Cornwall* was killed in the Action on Board the *Marlborough*; but to the eternal Honour of his Memory, he died like a Hero, worthy the greatest

greatest Praise of his King and Country. Captain *Russel* of the *Namur* had his Arm shot off. Lord *Forbes* wounded by a Splinter, but not so as to do him much hurt. Lieutenant *Frederick Cornwall* commanded the *Marlborough*, after his Kinsman, Captain *Cornwall*, was killed; he had his Arm shot off in the Action. Admiral *R——wl——y* was smartly engaged with the *French* Commodore; he has lost and his Ship much shatter'd.

JOHN A——

A COPY of a LETTER from on Board the *Namur*, dated at Sea 12th of February, 1743.

THE *French* and *Spanish* Fleets sailed out of *Toulon*, as did A——l M——s with his *Britannick* Majesty's Fleet from *Hieres-Bay*, standing towards the Enemy; but could not come up with them that Night. The 11th in the Morning, we made a Signal for the Line a-breast. A——l M——s and his Squadron stood for the Center of the *French* Fleet; but finding we could not come up with them to engage, the Admiral bore down to the *Spanish* Squadron, and at half past twelve the *Namur* was along-side the *Real* of 114 Guns, and 1300 Men. At this Time we were within Pistol-shot of him. Then the Admiral ordered us to begin, which was done accordingly by a Gun from our Quarter-Deck; the *Real* returned it with a whole Broad-side; so at it we went, with Courage and Resolution. The *Marlborough* was our Second, commanded by Captain *Cornwall*, who behaved like a great and good Man, till an unfortunate Shot took off both his Legs; soon after which the E-

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Enemy shot away his main and mizen Masts, and by the Fall of these, that unfortunate and brave Gentleman's Death was compleated. The Lieutenants fought as bravely afterwards, the first of which soon lost his Arm. The *Spanish* Admiral was seconded by the *Sr. Isabella*, a 64 Gun Ship, and supported by six more *Spanish* Ships, who kept all a continual Fire on the *Namur* and *Marlborough*, during most Part of the Engagement, which lasted near six Hours. We at this Time had our Squadron to the Windward of the Enemy, and about one Mile and half Distance. The Admiral seeing that His Majesty's Ships the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Royal Oak* and *Rupert*, did not bear down to his Assistance, sent his Boat on Board the *Dorsetshire*, to order them to bear down, and engage the Enemy; but her Captain did not think proper. The same Boat called on Board the *Essex*, and desired them likewise; but the C——n had lately married a handsome Wife at *Mahon*, and could not come; neither did any of the rest, but bravely stood the Battle at that Distance. Had they come down to our Assistance, we must unavoidably have destroy'd most of the *Spanish* Fleet, if not all; and should have been able to have given a good Account of the *French*. At three o'Clock the Admiral made a Signal for the *Anne Galley* Fireship to bear down to the *Real*, in order to board her, and burn her; but as she came near the *Real*, the Enemy turned her Guns at her; and when she was within a Cable's Length of the *Real*, Captain *Mackey* set fire. As soon as the *Real* saw her on fire, they poured into her Bows a Number of Shot, which immediately sunk her; when she sunk, she was not her Length from the *Real*, and went down all in a Blaze: There was lost in her Captain *Mackey*, his Lieutenant, and Gunner. We at  
this

this Time lay right a-head of the Enemy, with all our Rigging, Masts and Yards shot to Pieces, and could not get the Ship about to assist the *Marlborough*, excepting our Stern Chace-Guns, which we kept playing warmly on the *Real*; but all this Time we stood the Fire of six of our Enemies, raking us fore and aft, and those noble Captains of the Ships before mentioned never came to our Assistance; but I hope will meet with Justice.

The Honour of the *British* Nation suffered much this Day, by the Behaviour of the Commanders. I wont say it was Cowardice, or Treachery; but I leave that to the World to judge. Ad——l R——wl——ey in the *Barfleur*, engaged the *French* Admiral, and obliged him to run. The *Barfleur* was seconded by the *Princess Caroline*, which behaved very well; as did four or five more, which is the most I can say. We took one *Spanish* Ship of 64 Guns, and burnt her; her Masts were all shot away, and her Hull all to Pieces. We lost in the *Namur* about 25 Men, and near 50 wounded; among which is our Captain *Russel*, who lost his Arm close to his Body, but is likely to do well; the *Marlborough* had 40 killed and 100 wounded. What the rest lost, I cannot tell. The *French* and *Spaniards* consisted of 28 Sail of the Line, and 7 Frigates, Fireships, &c. Ours consisted of 28 Sail of the Line, 10 Frigates, and 2 Fireships.

Here you have a List of the Ships that engaged,  
\* *Namur*, *Norfolk*, (bravely); as did the *Marlborough*, *Somerset*, *Berwick*, and *Barfleur*, ;——

\* The Admiral's of the 29th February, printed in the *Gazette*, says, that the *Somerset*, *Princessa*, *Dragon*, *Bedford*, *Kingston* and *Berwick* engaged the *Spaniards* a-head.

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the *Princessa, Bedford, and Dorsetshire* (badly). It may be observed, I have said nothing of A—*L—k*, nor of his Division; and as I can't say any Thing in that Admiral's Favour, I chuse to be silent; but certain it is they did not engage. We saw the Enemy next Morning at a great Distance; they run away as fast as they could, and being all clean Ships had the Heels of us much. We are now in the Gulph of *Lyons* cruizing to get Intelligence of them. Nothing could behave finer than the Admiral, who exposed himself all the Time of Action, on the Arm-Chest, Quarter-Deck, and Round-House. Captain *P—s*, of the *Dunkirk*, is suspended; as I hope a great many more will soon be. The *Marlborough* is at *Makon* so bad, that she will not come out these four Months; the rest of the Fleet will be out in four Days.



A LETTER from a Marine Officer in  
the Fleet up the Mediterranean, to his  
Father in London.

*Makon, March 4, 1743-4.*

SIR,

**I**N Obedience to your Commands: After being so long in Expectation of an Engagement, I have for your Satisfaction and your Friends, sent you this particular Account, as I was an Eye-Witness to what passed; and where Distance or Smoak hindered me from making just Observations, or made me doubt what I saw, I have applied

plied to such of my Friends as had a better Opportunity of perceiving what passed, very well knowing, the real Matter of Fact would give you greater Pleasure than the magnifying Mole-Hills to Mountains; a Practice too frequent on both Sides, in giving an Account of any Action.

SIR,

*Your most Dutiful  
and Affectionate Son.*

*Feb. 8, 1743-4.*

**T**HE *Diamond* and *Winchelsea* being appointed to cruize off *Toulon* to observe the Motions of the *French* and *Spanish* Fleets, who lay with their Fore-topails loose, and were ready to put to Sea; likewise the *Essex*, *Chatham*, *Feverham*, *Dunkirk* and *Kingston* were stationed at an Anchor under the Island *Porquerole*, as a proper Channel to receive and communicate all Orders and Intelligence between the Admiral and these Cruizers. Pursuant to which, at three in the Afternoon, the *Winchelsea* stretched a-cross the Western Passage of the Bay, and made the Signal that the confederate Fleets were then coming out to Sea, which Signal was repeated by the *Essex*, and answered by the Admiral, who immediately made the publick Signal to unmoor, and soon after the private one; upon which the whole Fleet unmoored and hove short.

*Feb. 9.* As soon as a Breeze of Wind sprung up, which was about ten in the Morning, the whole Fleet weighed by Signal, and half an Hour after the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle a-head, but did



did not form it, the Wind blowing fresh Westerly: Continued all Day plying to the Windward between *Porquerole* and the Main in the Bay of *Hieres*, as did the Enemy on the West Side of the low Land, being resolved to keep the Advantage they had of the Wind of us; wherefore the Admiral at five in the Afternoon made the Signal, and anchored again with the Fleet in the Bay.

*Feb. 10.* At six o'Clock in the Morning the Fleet weighed again by Signal, and at seven the Wind being at N.N.W. the Admiral made the Signal for those who lead with the Starboard Tacks, to lead large; upon which the Vice-Admiral with his Division, made Sail a-head. — At ten o'Clock the Enemy appear'd in a Line of Battle a-head, bearing S.W. Distance about five Leagues. Before Noon we had the good Fortune to be joined by the *Boyne* and *Chichester*; but most Part of this Day being very little Wind, with a high Western Swell, greatly hinder'd our getting without the Island *Porquerole*, infomuch, that from thence, and the Ships crowding so fast out of the Grand Pass, there hardly seem'd a Probability, even with all the Boats towing a-head, the Swell being so excessive high, to prevent seven or eight of them falling on board of one another; yet, next to a Miracle, they all providentially escaped this Jeopardy. At half past Noon, a little Air of Wind coming from the Eastward, the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle a-head, but in an Hour after falling almost calm, he made the Signal, and the Fleet brought to with the Starboard Tacks on board. At three o'Clock the Admiral made the Signal to draw into a Line of Battle a-breast, at the same Time kept stretching to the S.W. with an easy Sail, in order to give Room for the Ships

to form between him and the Shore; the Vice-Admiral doing the same towards the N. W. and the Rear Admiral with his Division making Sail to get to the S. W. but at Duskish he appeared to be a great Way short of being a breast. The Enemy at this Juncture was not above two Leagues distant to Leeward, in all twenty-eight Sail of the Line, viz. sixteen *French* and twelve *Spanish* Ships, with eight Frigates and Fireships: A *Chef d'Escadre* in the Van of their Fleet, a Rear-Admiral in their Center, and the *Spanish* Admiral in the Rear with five of his Ships a-head of him, and the other six a-stern. At half an Hour past six the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to bring to with the Larboard Tacks on Board, the Enemy appearing very near our Center, and nearer our Rear.

*Feb. 11.* It was evident at Dawn of Day, that notwithstanding the many Signals that had been made for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle a-head and a-breast, yet hitherto it never appeared that either of them had been formed. The Wind shifting from E. S. E. after the Fleet brought to in the Night to N. E. and N. N. E. which brought the Vice Admiral and his Division so much the further to Windward of the Center, as it did on the contrary bring the Rear Admiral and his Division so much the further to Leeward, and nearer a-breast of the Center, as the Enemy too had made some Sail to the S. E. their Line being form'd with the utmost Exactness, Regularity and Closeness, in Course as this Shift of Wind brought the Van of both Fleets nearer together; it also brought the Rear of the Enemy more to the Southward of the Rear of our Fleet; however, the Rear Admiral's Division appear'd to be by much the Sternmost; therefore the Admiral, at seven o'Clock in the Morning, after making the Signal

to make Sail, with the Signal to draw into a Line of Battle a-head (the last Signal being a Line a-breast, having not been formed) made the Signal for he that commands in the third Post to make more Sail: And soon after he made the Signal for him that commands in the second Post to do the same. At half past eight the Admiral not waiting for the forming the Line of Battle a-head; now made the Signal for the Line of Battle a-breast; at nine made the Signal for those Ships that lead on the Larboard Tack to lead large: At half past nine made the Signal again for the Line of Battle a-head. About this Time we met with another Reinforcement, his Majesty's Ship *Royal Oak* from *Makon*. At eleven the Admiral made the Signal to engage the Enemy; and the *French* and *Spanish* Fleets hoisted their Colours, which they had not done before: So far we were greatly favoured by Fortune, three such Ships as the *Boyne*, *Chichester*, and *Royal Oak*, not only to escape the Enemy, but to join us at so critical and seasonable a Juncture, seemed to be a very happy Omen; Providence too gave us the Wind of the Enemy, which was so great an Advantage, that it secured us from any Apprehensions of their Fireships. Our Ships perfectly clear for Action, our Men full of Spirit and Resolution, perfect Strangers to Fear; and notwithstanding they had been fatigued for three Days and three Nights together, without their Hammocks or the least Rest, yet their Fortitude and Courage were not at all abated; a Virtue to be admired in them, and which proves their Value, and a Demonstration, that so often as we come to general Action, nothing can ever be wanting in our Men: Yet these auspicious Omens were not a little pall'd to find the Signal given for Battle, at the Time that the Enemy kept in so uniform a Line, their Ships all clean,

clean, and seemed to sail as well under their Top-sails as we did with every Thing set, while we were far from being formed in the Order of Battle. [Whether this proceeded from the Number of Signals repeated so fast upon one another; Lines of Battle a head, and Lines of Battle a-breast, without the Patience to allow such a Length of Time, as so great a Number of Ships must take with so little Wind to form either.] Whether the Center made too much Haste, and did not wait the necessary Time for the Wings to extend themselves, and close into a Line of Battle a-head or a-breast, or whether the Wings were any ways deficient in their Duty, neglecting their strict Observation of Signals, and could have made more Sail than they did? I will not pretend to determine: I can only relate Matters of Fact, leaving you to form a Judgment: But it is manifest there was no direct Line, the Ships very distant from one another, and wide of their Station according to the Order of Battle: The Van of the Enemy extending nine or ten Sail beyond the Van of our Fleet, which was very irregular, and to the Windward of one another, and almost all the *Spanish* Squadron were a-breast of our Center, while the Vice Admiral and his Division a-stern of him, excepting the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge* were not closed, tho' they had abroad all the Sail they could make.

Our Fleet being in this Situation about Noon there appeared an Opening between the united Fleets, which proceeded from the *French* making Sail to the Southward and the *Spaniards* were endeavouring to amend it, by making Sail in order to close their Line. At this very Juncture the *Marlborough*, the Admiral's Second, being very near the *Namure*, Captain *Cornwall* stept upon the Fore-Castle to pay his Compliments to



the Admiral, who was then walking in the Stern Gallery; the Admiral after having thanked him, expressed great Uneasiness and Impatience that the Fleet did not form faster, and that the Enemy should sail so exceedingly well, and we so bad. He then proposed to Captain *Cornwall* for the *Marlborough* to bear down upon the *Real*, and that he in the *Namure* would follow, which being with the greatest Alacrity submitted to, without any Expostulation, the Admiral made the Signal to leave off Chace, [but kept abroad the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head: Whether this last was meant to the Rear Admiral and his Division to haul upon the Wind, being as yet not formed, and by no Means able to cope with the *French* Squadron, whose Line, as has been observed, extended above nine Ships beyond our Van, I am not able to resolve, but it is certain, that Admiral did not apprehend it to mean so.]

At one o'Clock *Cape Siccie* bearing N. E. by N. about eight Leagues, the *Admiral* and *Marlborough* bore down upon the *Real*, and began the Engagement with great Warmth: The Ships a-head of the Admiral bore down also, as well as those a stern, but were not any thing so near the Enemy as the Admiral, both being extremely wide of him; [and the four Ships a-stern of the *Marlborough* throwing away their Powder and Shot in the most ridiculous Manner; and with the greatest Regard to Truth, I may venture to affirm, that not one of their Shot did Execution; and by all Accounts afterwards, I do not find that any of these Ships received the least Hurt from the Enemy, so great was their Distance off, so wary and cautious were they. Even the *R—t*, the Terror of the *Spanish* Privateers, the Destroyer of royal Fortifications, the Scourge of poor indigent Fishermen and Market Boats, and the  
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Scowerer of the Coast of *Catalonia*, who had done such mighty Feats there, kept at an awful Distance, where no random Shot could reach her.] Those Ships of the Admiral's Division that were a-head of him employed their Time better, but not so well as might have been expected. The *Namure* made good Fires, and the *Marlborough* made a great deal better, and covered the Admiral from the Fire of the *Real*: This floating Castle of the Enemy no sooner began to vomit her Fire, than she seem'd to be moor'd with one Second a little upon her Bow, and the other a little upon her Quarter, where they played their Parts so well, that they proved themselves to be Officers of great Knowledge and Intrepidity; their good Conduct and Gallantry cou'd no where be exceeded; and the Preservation of their Admiral may be said to be owing to so much excellent Judgment and inflexible Resolution. At two o' Clock the Rear Admiral came pretty near the *French* Admiral, and lay some Time without Action: At last, upon firing at the Van of the *Spanish* Squadron, the *French* Admiral pour'd in upon him a Broadside, and then the Action began in that Quarter, where only the *Princess Caroline* may be said to have assisted, [the other Ships keeping too far to Windward, and throwing away their Shot in the Manner that the Rear of the Admiral's Division were doing: Indeed the *St—ng C—st—e* and *W—w—ck*, the two foremost Ships in the Van, did not fire a Shot: Whether they wisely kept to Windward because they were not a Match for the *French*, or whether they concluded that the Signal to leave off Chace, considering their Situation, must relate to them, I am equally ignorant of, there being rather less Wind than more,] the Vice Admiral's Division could not get up, and the four Ships

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in the Rear of the *Spanish* Admiral, with great Discretion, and like Officers and Seamen, kept upon the Sheer from that Division: It was neither the Purpose nor the Duty of these four Ships of the Enemy to seek Battle with our Rear. They saw their Admiral and their Van engaged with our Center, which was eleven Ships, besides the *Berwick* and *Kingston* of the Rear Admiral's Division, which Admiral with the *Princess's Caroline* had at the Beginning a Touch with them: Likewise the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge* of the Vice Admiral's Division, who were all up, in all fifteen Sail, not including the *Barfleur* and *Caroline*, against eight. Undoubtedly then their Conduct was highly commendable, and cannot be enough admired, especially as they had the Advantage in their Heels to close up with their Center as near as possible, as the only Means they had left to protect their Chief in so great an Exigency from imminent Danger.

In less than an Hour after the Beginning of the Engagement, one of the *Spanish* Ships bore away out of the Line, supposed to be disabled, and the second a Stern of their *Real*, fired from her Fore-Chace many Shot at her, but she run to the Leeward of the Line, and never returned into it again. After two Hours warm firing, the *Marlborough's* main Mast and mizen Mast were shot away; the *Namure* became sick too, for she sprung her Luff probably to knot and splice: On the other Side the *Real's* Rigging appeared to be very much shatter'd, her Topail Yards hanging in their Slings, and her Main Yards shot down. Firing on both Sides ceas'd a great deal, particularly from the *Real*, but her Seconds continued their Fire with great Briskness, which the poor *Marlborough*, in so melancholy a Way, could not well sustain, being the only Ship near enough to  
bear

bear all the Shock, and yet not one Ship, tho' there were many near, was daring enough to endeavour to get between her and the Enemy; [an unpardonable Neglect, and deserving the greatest Penalty that martial Law can inflict.] At four o'Clock the Admiral made the Signal for the Pinaces and Barges mann'd and arm'd: Soon after the *Anne Galley* Fireship crowded all the Sail abroad she could, and steer'd right down upon the *Real* in order to burn her, who lay muzzled with her Stern to our Line; she went forward thro' the Fire of the six *Spanish* Ships a-stern of their Admiral, the four Sternmost of which were crowding a-head, and escaped surprisngly until she came, as it appeared to us, within her Length of the *Real*, and at five o'Clock unhappily blew up without doing Execution.

It was observed, that the *Real* when the Fireship came very near her, only fired a few Guns of her lower Deck, being unable in that Situation to bring any more to bear: It was likewise observed, that she had had the Precaution to man a Launch or Long boat with fifty or sixty Men, in order to save herself, take the Fireship, and in that Case would undoubtedly have retorted the Conflagration on the *Marlborough*, who continued alone so defenceless and unprotected; a well judged Undertaking, which at least preserved the *Real* from the Flames. The unfortunate Captain *Mackey* of the Fireship, who, it seems, was universally loved; and, upon all Occasions, acknowledged to be a good vigilant Officer, as he drew near kept what few Hands he had firing at this Launch; but, alas! whether a Shot from the Enemy did the Business, or whether when the Launch boarded her, he himself fired her, as the only Means left to keep the Evil from returning on ourselves, is very difficult to make any Judgment.



ment. This is certain, the Launch was likewise swallowed up in the Flames; and the Boat's Crew who escaped on Board the *Dorsetshire*, say, that they left their Captain with the Match in his Hand, and the Lieutenant at the Helm: However, tho' no better Success could have been well expected, considering the Condition, Vigilance and Caution of the Enemy, and the Fireship's having no Ships to cover and conduct her; it has been alledge'd, that had the Captain seen his Signal, primed his Ship sooner, and been ready to have gone down upon the first Notice he received, the Design might have been easily executed under Cover of the *Namure* and *Marlborough's* Guns: But that he was dilatory, contrary to his usual Practice and admired Diligence; a Reflection he no ways deserves. On the contrary, had every Officer from the Admiral down to the Captain of the pitiful *Barca Longa* executed their Duty with equal Ardour and Assiduity, from the best Accounts I have been able to gather, it is my humble Opinion the whole *Spanish* Squadron would have been sacrificed.

This Misfortune gave new Spirits to the Enemy: The *Real* recovered from a terrible Consternation, and employ'd her Boats a-head and a-stern to take up the Men who had jump't into the Water for fear of the Fire.

Soon after this Misfortune the Admiral haul'd down the Signal for Battle, also the Signal for the Line of Battle a-head, and made the Signal to leave off Chace, immediately hauling upon a Wind, having a little before the unhappy Catastrophe of the *Anne Galley*, bore down towards the Enemy and kept firing. At this Time too the Wind came more to the Southward, and it appeared that the Van of the *French* Fleet had tacked, and were endeavouring to hem in the  
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Rear-Admiral and his Division, who had made the Signal for the Ships to come down into his Wake, and was making all possible Expedition to join our Center. I have said already, that only the *Barfleur* and *Caroline* engaged the *French*, which continued pretty warm about an Hour and an Half: The Rear Admiral being hard put to it, in order to be enabled to fight his lower Tier of Guns, he judiciously caused to be cut away his Lee Anchors, which lightened the Ports better than a Pin's Head out of the Water: By which Means, in a great Measure, the *French* Chief became extremely sick of the Battle, let fall his Fore-top-sail, and sheer'd off: [But these are the Suggestions of Fools and Children; doubtless M. de Court, with his Experience and unquestionable Reputation for Gallantry and Circumspection, as an eminent Sea Officer, could not possibly, with such Seconds as he had, with thirteen fine Ships more for Battle, be intimidated to play thus the Fugitive: No, Sir, he could plainly distinguish, that the *Spanish* Admiral, with his Seconds, bore all the Brunt of the Battle; it appeared too, that two Thirds of our mighty Fleet lay hovering about him: Fearing, therefore his Overthrow and Destruction, likewise observing the Confusion we were in every where (so that a Stranger coming to look on at that Instant of Time, from the great Character we have acquired in maritime Affairs, and the contrary so much decry'd in the *Spaniards*, would have concluded the *Spanish* Ships by their Behaviour to be the *English*, and the *English*, from their Irresolution, want of Order, and bad Conduct, to be the *Spanish*) he well-judged it to be Time for the Van of his Fleet to tack, more especially as the Wind coming more to the Southward, favoured him, and tacked one after ano-

ther in the greatest Order and Discipline; so intent was he upon this Rescue, and the Advantage of doubling and gaining the Wind, that tho' two or three Ships ranged not above a Pistol Shot off from the *W—ck* and *S—r—ng C—st—e*, yet they did not fire one Shot, when they might infallibly have destroyed both Ships: The same Complaisance was shewn to the *Chichester*, who, as she would not stay, was obliged to wear, which brought her equally near three or four Sail more: An incontestable Proof that such Advantages could not tempt the *French* to break their Order of Battle, or divert them from pursuing Measures that appeared to them at that Time to be of much more Importance.]

About half an Hour past Five o' Clock so little Wind that the Ships had hardly Steerage-way; however the Admiral, even so late, made the Signal for a Line of Battle a head; after which he bore down again and kept firing with some of his Division, whether from Choice or Necessity does not appear; the *Dorsetshire* went a little nearer the *Real* than ever she had been before, but still at too great a Distance, as well as the three other Ships astern of her, who with the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge* [may have been said to continue (contrary to their Instructions) throwing their Shot away, and thereby disabling themselves in such a fruitless, unnecessary Expence, more than the Enemy.]

The *El Poder* a sixty Gun Ship, with 600 Men, in the Van of the *Spanish* Squadron, having for a considerable Time received the Fire of six different Ships, viz. the *Ca—l-ne*, *Som—set*, *B—f—d*, *K—g—st—n*, *Pr—ce—a* and *B—w—k*, after a very gallant Defence, wherein she lost her Main-mast, Foretop-mast, and other Damage done her, she struck to the *Berwick*, whose first and fourth Lieutenants, with ——— of his Men, took Possession of her,  
and

and sent the Captain and Officers on Board the *Berwick*. The first Lieutenant observing the Situation of both Fleets, wisely judged, that neither he nor his People could be much longer safe, finding the *French* double apace; therefore left the Prize with as many Men as one Boat could carry, and directed the fourth Lieutenant to follow him with the Remainder, leaving a Boat for that Purpose: But it seems this young Gentleman had not his Liberty so much at Heart; and he was not so expeditious as to get away before the *French* retook her with the Lieutenant and seventeen Men more.

[All Action ceased with the Day; and surely Heaven sent Darkness to prevent greater Confusion, if possible, amongst us, and to protect the *British* Fleet from an ignominious Defeat. At this Juncture I could not help calling to Mind the many different Histories I had read of Battles, &c. where a Handful of disciplined Troops, well headed and conducted, have defeated, and shamefully overthrown mighty Armies, who were without Order, or the Advantage of an old veteran Leader; and who, to a Degree of Temerity before Battle, held their Enemy in the greatest Contempt.

*Both did fight, both did beat, and both did run away.]*

In the Night our Fleet stood to the N. E. leaving the poor *Marlborough* destitute, or to be poorly protected by a forty Gun Ship; the Enemy's Fleet stood to the S. W. contrary Ways; but there was but light Airs all Night to keep us asunder.

Feb. 12. At Dawn of Day we were agreeably surprized to find the *Marlborough* not taken, and observed the Admiral's Flag to be flying on Board the *Russel*. At half an Hour past six in the



Morning saw the Enemy S. W. Distance about five Leagues, and at the same Time one of our Fleet engaged with one of the Enemy's, which seemed to be at some Distance from the Rear of their Fleet. This Ship prov'd to be the *Somerset*; [how she came there was no Instance of her good Look-out, nor of the Care and Vigilance of her Officers. As it would be endless and trifling to repeat the many different Accounts of her own People, and the *Terrible of Terribilities* (according to *Milton*) which she so luckily escaped, let it suffice for your Entertainment, that they say they were kept in a continual Jeopardy all the Night long, one Ship on her Bow, another upon her Quarter, and a third upon her Beam, all endeavouring to board her, but that every one had his Dose: After all, this Ship play'd her Part so well, that in this imminent Danger, and the preceding Battle, she only lost two Men, and about thirty wounded, including broken Skins, black Eyes, and scratch'd Faces.]

The Wind being about N. E. the Admiral with the Fleet bore down upon the Enemy, and the Vice Admiral's Division made Sail a-head; at 11 o' Clock the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to draw into a Line of Battle a-breast; when at two o' Clock he made the Signal to bring to, in order to wait for the Rear-Admiral's Division, who were a great Way a-stern; but as this Flag-Officer misapprehended the Signal, in repeating it, and bringing to, the Admiral corrected his Mistake, in making the Signal immediately for him that commands in the third Post to make more Sail. Fine Weather, the Wind at East, and the Body of the Enemy bearing S. W. about six or seven Miles; at half an Hour past five, the Admiral with the whole Fleet brought to with their Starboard Tacks aboard; the Vice with his Division

sion and the Admiral's being perfectly well for m<sup>d</sup> ed into a Line of Battle a-breast, and the *Rear's* Division pretty near it, then (and not before) the *British* Fleet appear'd in all their Strength and Glory, pleasant to the Eye of every *Englishman*, formidable and dreadful to the Enemy: We had embraced great Order and Discipline, and our former Confusion and Disorder seem'd to fly to the Leeward amongst the Enemy; our Line was close and appear'd impenetrable, and if the confederate Fleets had before flattered themselves with vain Hopes to make up in Policy and Address, what they were deficient in Strength, these Expectations proved only now to be mere Chimeras, and vanished like Smoak from before their Eyes. Heaven was yet on our Side, and continued to give us the Wind of the Enemy, we had no other Loss than the *Marlborough*, who was dismasted, and ordered to make the best of her Way for *Mahon*, under the Convoy of the *Oxford*: But then we had some Reparation in the *Burford*, who joined us this Morning from *Hieres*. On the contrary, among the *Spaniards* we had the Satisfaction to distinguish four Ships disabled and unfit for Battle, particularly the *Real* without a Top-mast on End or a Yard a-crofs, excepting her main-top Gallant, and sprit-sail Yards, under a sprit-sail and fore-stay Sail, in Tow of another Ship, who made all the Sail she could. The Flag at the mizen Top-mast Head appear'd, but surely one would think, had Don *Navarro* the Admiral been alive, he would not have continued on Board of such a Cripple. The *El Poder*, who had struck to the *Berwick*, and had been retaken by the Enemy the Night before, was in the Rear of the *French* Fleet, and upon our drawing near, every living Soul deserted her; the Admiral having ordered the *Essex* to burn her, the  
Boats

Boats Crew found her already on Fire ; and one of her Beams almost consumed, they added to this slow Fire and kindled more fore and aft, which soon made a pleasant Blaze, and attracted the Eyes of the whole Fleet. It was a fine Moon-light Night, and had the Seamen been jaded out of their Spirits by such constant Service Night and Day, yet such a delightful Prospect would have recovered the most drooping of them, after an Hour's Extacy of this Sort, the Ship blew up about Nine o'Clock, and a general Shout echoed thro' the whole Fleet, from the Van to the Rear.

The *French*, having been to the Windward of the *Spaniards*, in the Morning they bore down to join them ; and all the Afternoon, and under the Shew of shifting their Line, four or five Ships at a Time kept bearing away, the *Spaniards* were in the Van, and their Cripples to Leeward, and had all the Sail abroad they could make under Cover of their own Ships : Their Line was very irregular, all the Appearance of fine Officers, his great Order and Discipline which hitherto had been so very conspicuous in every Motion they made, now no longer subsisted. That Fleet who had shewed us that they could wheel and revolve about with so much Dexterity, in such a surprizing small Compass, now shewed a great deal of Confusion, and great Irresolution in forming: 'Tis true, indeed, they carried something like the Face of Battle, but nothing was ever farther from their Hearts, it was a meer Feint, and one without any great Gift of Penetration might have foreseen that their Hopes and only Resource lay in the ensuing Night, to steal away with their lame Ships, when probably they might either reach *Carthagena*, or be in the Way to meet with their expected Reinforcement from *Brest*:  
While

While we lay to, how vain were the Expectations of every one, nor was any Thing more talked of than the Advantage we seemed to have of keeping the Wind of the Enemy. It was often repeated, that should their Fleet run, tho' they had so much the Heels of us, yet surely the lame Ships must infallibly fall into our Hands, and it would be hard indeed, if some of our clean Ships did not come up also with some of their Rear, and either destroy them, or if they were protected, stop the whole, and by that Means bring on a general Engagement: Many such airy Castles were built; and every Bodies Expectation was raised to the highest Pitch, when the Admiral at two o'Clock in the Morning, made the Signal to make Sail, the Wind being northerly and a pleasant Gale, but it increased fresher and fresher with the Day; at Day-break instead of being within Gun-shot of the Enemy, alas, no body could discern them; Hands were thereupon dispatched to the Mast-head, Emissaries of every Sort, with the keenest and sharpest Eyes were kept upon the Stretch, all employed to look out for the Enemy; until the Vice Admiral and his Division who were a head, made the Signal of discovering twenty Sail of them: Upon which the Admiral made the Signal for that Gentleman and his Division, to draw into a Line of Battle a-head, who gave Chase, making Signals for his Division. The Wind increasing, the Admiral at nine o'Clock made the Signal to leave off Chase, which was obeyed, and then the Enemy unhappily escaped: Thus ended our Sea Fight; and to no better Purpose were the mighty Preparations for Battle on both Sides employed. The Wind being in the N.E. Quarter almost all the remaining Part of the Month, we could not get to the Windward to our old Rendezvous, *Hieres Bay*, where we judged we were bound; but



but meeting afterwards with a hard Gale of Wind, where many Ships were quite disabled, in loosing their Masts by distress of Weather, as well as falling on Board of one another, we were glad to get to *Makon*, in order to be fitted again for the Sea, which by all Accounts cannot be done, in less than a Month, considering the Damage done and the Number of Ships. (In the mean while the *Spaniards* and *French* have so far gained their Point, that they may now uninterruptedly carry on their Embarkations to *Italy*.)

As Experience teaches us that no sooner any Expedition or Undertaking proves unsuccessful, than the different Persons employed, vent their splenetick Reflections and Invectives on one another, every one making his own Story good, and bedaubing his Companions: So in like Manner every Ship that was concerned, railed, expatiated upon, and with great Art pointed out the Faults and bad Conduct of the others, not one Ship escaped Calumny unless it was the *Marlborough*, who was universally allow'd to behave well: It would be therefore ridiculous and an endless Task for me to enumerate all the Venom and bespattering Dirt, the many different Causes and Reasons given for our Miscarriages, I will only relate to you what I know to be Truth, (handed down to me from the best Authority.)

Those Ships of the Admiral's Division a-stern of him, had repeated Messages sent to them to bear down nearer the Enemy, that their Guns might have their proper Weight and Efficacy; (but it is said that they did not do it.)

The Vice Admiral fired a Shot at the *Dunkirk*, and the Rear Admiral called upon the *Somerset* three Times by firing three Shot at her: Officers who think themselves unjustly stigmatized, plead that when the Signal for the Line of Battle is flying,

flying, all Captains are bound strictly to observe the fighting Instructions, that their Laws, Rules and Customs can never be dispensed with, even if they could effectually destroy the Enemy, or fulfil the Intention of them, by more easy, safe and expeditious Ways: They are not to leave their Stations upon any Pretence whatsoever; they apprehended the Signal to be kept abroad to be observed, and according to these Instructions, they expected that the Van of our Fleet should have reached the Van of the Enemy; they did not dare to break the Line, or pursue, till the main Body of the Enemy was disabled or run. The Signal for the Line of Battle was not taken down, nor did the Admiral fire two Guns out of his Fore-chace.

It is certain that all this Reasoning is to be found in these Instructions; (but tho' I have been near six Years at Sea, yet I must refer you to some experienced Sea Officers, who can explain the Force and Validity of such Arguments.) By way of Recrimination, it has been likewise hinted, that had the Admiral been pleased to signify his Intention to each Captain, as Captain *Cornwal* had had the good Luck to know it from his own Mouth, the *Spaniards* must have been infallibly destroyed; or had the Rear Admiral, when the Resolution was taken to cut off the *Spaniards* from the *French*, been immediately directed, in a Manner that he could understand, to have kept his Wind with his Division, or tacked to come into our Rear; nothing then could have been apprehended from the *French*; and our Center with the Vice's Division would not have been taken off from endeavouring to destroy the *Spaniards* in the Evening, with such a Pannic when they saw that all the *French* Fleet were tacking to gain the Weather-gage.

Even here at *Minorca*, (my censorious Brethren,) who seem to understand every Body's Trade better than their own, and are very prone and explicit in exposing to ridicule the Conduct of all Sea Officers, interrogate me, why we did not pursue the Fugitives, after seeing the *Real* with three Ships more so disabled? Why, tho' we brought to so far to Windward of them, in so fine a Moon-light Night, when we might have so easily kept Sight of them all the Night long, by making more and more Sail as they appeared less and less perceptible, we did not follow them close in the Morning, and keep them in Sight, instead of calling the Vice-Admiral off from the Chace? In that Case you might have been sure of the Cripples, and that floating Battery the *Real*, which would have intitled you to something of a Triumph? Now you must begin again, and, probably, on far worse Terms than you set out; as they are in Expectation of the *Brest* Squadron to reinforce them.

Another Observation worthy of your Notice is, that among the Sea Officers, neither before attacking the Enemy, nor immediately after they lost sight of them, they never held one Council of War; this is indeed something very unaccountable, and the Murmurers of the Fleet are so audacious as to call it a surprising Instance of All-sufficiency; for it has been the constant Practice of the greatest Generals that ever lived, to esteem it of the highest Importance in Affairs of War, to deliberate with many, and to decide with few; to assemble their principal Officers, to hear all their Opinions, and from thence form a secret Resolution to be executed with all possible Speed.

I am tired of a Sea Life, and heartily sick of hearing such Reflections; for all the Experience that I have been able to learn from them, with my  
own

own Observation, is that there seems to be an absolute Necessity that an Admiral in Command at Sea, like a General posted on some Eminence, should not be taken up (so triflingly) in fighting so small a Share of the Fleet as that of his own Ship, where his Person is not only hazarded, in which all the Plan of Operation is centered; but in the Heat of Action and Smoak, being in the Line of Battle, he cannot possibly see or judge how to make proper Signals for the Destruction of the Enemy, and to teach all Inferiors where he would have them aid or repulse: Why was not therefore the Admiral placed in a Frigate, at some Distance off from the Center, where he can best distinguish with a Boat, and an Officer from each Ship to wait his immediate Commands, and to fly to put them in Execution? In this manner the great *Peter Czar of Muscovy* fought, who was as good an Admiral as he was allow'd to be a Soldier.

But as the present Practice has exploded such a Method, and placed the Admiral's Person so much on a Footing in Regard to the general Danger; the Fire of his Eyes in Time of Action ought to be such as to animate the Seamen, and the Serenity of his Countenance ought to banish all Fear. In the Heat of Battle he ought to be active and resolute, yet calm and present to himself, make his Signals distinct, not capable of the least Misapprehension, and keep every Ship to her destin'd Post: And if all the desired Success should not crown his Endeavours, should he therefore be inflamed with Rage, and all the Passions which possess a proud Spirit when fallen from its Hopes, he will then lose the Fruits of all his Talents, and precipitate himself into great Blunders, by giving Way to an headstrong Imagination, and an ungovernable Passion, which knows no Bounds [to its Velocity.]



The Losses sustained in this Fight are very inconsiderable, excepting the *Marlborough*, who had 52 Men kill'd, and 150 wounded; amongst the first was Captain *Cornwall*, who lost his Life, by keeping the Post allotted him with great Intrepidity, without having any Relief worth mentioning from the incessant Fire of the *Real*, and her two Seconds! He was a gallant Gentleman, affable, and of a fine Address, an Honour to the Service, the Darling of every Man that knew him; perfectly sweet-temper'd and well bred; in whose Death the King, our Country, and all Officers and Seamen have had a great Loss. Among the wounded was Lieutenant *Cornwall*, his Kinsman, who very gallantly lost his right Arm in this Action; an old Officer of great Merit, and yet unprovided for. The *Barfleur* had eighteen Men killed, and as many wounded; five of the kill'd were by an Accident of bursting one of her Quarter Deck Guns. The *Namure* had fifteen Men killed, and about thirty wounded; among the last was Capt. *Russel*, who lost his left Arm; a good Officer, and a stout Mariner, who always made his Master's Service his constant Study. The other Losses are not worth mentioning; neither is the Damage which was done the Shipping, unless it be that of the *Marlborough*.

The Captain of the *El Pader*, who was our Prisoner, informed us, that they always look'd upon the *Real* as one Third of their Strength, being so well fortified and garrisoned; and that her Sides being lined four or five Feet thick every where with Junk, he is sure that not one of our Shot pierced her Sides. Her Guns from the Poop and Patteraroes from the Tops, which Places were barricaded with Wool-Packs, did great Execution, and made great Havock amongst the Soldiers upon the *Marlborough's* Poop, where Captain *Godfrey*

*frey* was killed, and another marine Officer lost his Arm. This *Spanish* Officer told us likewise, that before they sailed from *Toulon*, the *French* took infinite Pains to make the *Spaniards* believe, that we had only a few capital Ships, and that the rest were all Frigates; that we were in great Want of Men, the *Namure* having the highest Complement, which was no more than 300 Men; that we had very little Powder; and that the Men that we had were sickly, and enfeebled with the Scurvy; tho' these Reports might serve to animate the private Men, yet they were not at all credited by the *Spanish* Officers; insomuch that in a Council of War, which was held the Day before their sailing, the *Spanish* Members argued vehemently against going to Sea until they were reinforced by the *Brest Squadron*; but to end all Disputes, *Monfieur de Court*, the *French* Admiral, producing the King's Order to proceed immediately to Sea, and to give us Battle; we had therefore no great Cause to be so impatient; for from thence it is evident that had we stayed till next Day, when we should have been in perfect Order of Battle, that, agreeable to their Orders before they retreated, they must have battled; and, indeed, from their Behaviour all along, and Method of acting, it seemed to be their real Intention. The *French*, who knew more of the Theory than the practical Part of an Officer, depending very much on their Numbers of Men, had provided Bridges to board us; some of which were taken up, which serve to prove their Stupidity, Ignorance and Folly.

To conclude; after the Enemy's Escape at so easy a Rate, when we had here so great a Strength, can Malice or Envy itself dare any longer [to arraign and] censure the Conduct of Admiral *Haddock*, who always possess'd [a great Delicacy of Soul,

Soul, great Abilities, [Sweetness of Temper, Affability,] and great Zeal for the Preservation and Honour of his Country: It was not sufficient for him to have done well, but even to have put it out of the Power of the unthinking Populace to blame his Conduct and censure his Actions; let us examine his unfortunate Situation, and look into his Line of Battle, since such Miracles were expected from him. It appears, that after a vigilant Cruize of above three Months off *Cadiz*, he was necessitated to put into *Gibraltar* for Water and Provision, to put his sick Men ashore, and to refit again for the Sea, when the *Spaniards* took that Opportunity with these very Ships, and six more of sixty and seventy Guns, in all eighteen Sail, to pass through the Gut for *Italy*. He lost not a Moment's Time, but followed them, having only the *Marlborough* of ninety Guns, the *Somerset* and *Lancaster* of eighty, the *Ipswich* of seventy, the *Warwick*, *Dragon*, *Plymouth* and *Pembroke* of sixty each, five Ships of fifty each, and two of forty, in all fifteen Sail, very indifferently mann'd. He got in Sight of the Enemy off *Carthagena*; and with this paltry Line was that brave Man determined to attack the Enemy, when the *French* Fleet, consisting of those very Ships, now joined to the *Spaniards*, appeared also, which forced the Admiral to stand off: And it was happy for us that the *French* came in Sight; for if we were to judge from the late Behaviour of the *Spanish* Officers, and the Strength of their Ships, that Admiral with all his Fleet would have been certainly destroyed. After this Experience, must they then not be Mad-men who blame this brave Gentleman's wise Conduct? For had he had a sufficient Force to cope with the Enemy, no Admiral that ever lived would have given a better Account of them.

The Lines of Battle shew the Force on both Sides;

Sides; but this may be said, that all their Ships were complete Ships of War; and their whole Study for Months before they sailed, was to fit them for Battle; and they were finished in a very extraordinary Manner. On the contrary, our Ships were not so well fitted for that Purpose, and some of them were not Ships of War. [Had a Builder, either in *France* or *Spain* built such Ships as the *Ch—ch—st—r*, *T—b—y*, *D—rs—sh—e* and *C—m—b—ge*, of eighty Guns, probably, instead of being knighted, he might have been hang'd.]

*From an Officer on Board the Namure.*

*Feb. 10, 1743 4.*

**T**HE *French* and *Spanish* Fleets sailed out of *Toulon*, as did A——l M——s with that of his *Britannick* Majesty's Fleet from *Hieres-Bay*, standing towards the Enemy; but could not come up with them that Night. The 11th in the Morning, we made a Signal for the Line a-breast. A——l M——s and his Squadron stood for the Center of the *French* Fleet; but finding we could not come up with them to engage, before Night, the *Namure* bore down to the *Spanish* Squadron, and at twenty Minutes past twelve we were along-side the *Real*, who had the *Spanish* Flag at the Mizen-top: She is a Ship of 114 Guns, and had then on Board 1400 Men. We were within Pistol-shot when Admiral M——s ordered us to begin, which was done by a Gun on our Quarter-Deck; the *Real* returned it with a whole Broadside: The *Marlborough* was our Second, commanded by Captain *Cornwall*, who soon came to our Assistance, and behaved very boldly, till an unfortunate Shot took off both his Legs, and Part of his Belly; after which the Enemies shot carried away his



his main and mizen Masts, by which Time Captain *Cornwall* was dead, when the Command fell to the first Lieutenant, who behaved as well, till another unlucky Ball took off his Arm; then the Command fell to the second Lieutenant, who behaved no way inferior to the First: The *Spanish* Admiral was seconded by *La Constantia*, and supported by six more *Spanish* Ships, who kept constant Fire on the *Marlborough* and *Namur*, and what happened bad in this Action, Captain *Cornwall's* Intention to save the Admiral from some of the Fire of the *Real*, run his Jib Boom over our Taffrail, which forced us so far a-head, that after two Hours Engagement, we could not bring a Gun to bear on any of the Enemies Ships, neither to assist the *Marlborough*, nor defend ourselves (our Stern-Chace excepted) which we played warmly on the *Real*, but were raked fore and aft by the Enemy a long Time, till we got our Rigging spliced.

This Engagement lasted six Hours, and we had at this Time of our own Division a Mile and half to Windward of the Enemy, the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal Oak*. Admiral *M——*s sent a Boat on Board the first, to order the Captain to bear down, and engage, but they never did, but fir'd at that Distance; when every Shot fell short into the Sea: By this Time the mighty *Real* begun to grow sick of the Battle, and did not fire more than two Shot in half an Hour, being full of Water, her Guns dismounted, and a great Number of her Men killed and wounded.

At three o'Clock the *Anne Galley* Fireship bore down to burn the *Real*, but for want of one of those Ships to Windward to cover her, the Enemies Shot played so warmly on her, that she was sinking within her own Length of the *Real*, when

Captain *Mackey* set fire to her, but she instantly went down all in a Blaze, without hurting the Enemy: The Captain, Lieutenant, Master and Gunner, all went down to the deep in her.

We at this Time lay right a-head of the Enemies Ships, with all our Masts and Yards cut to Pieces, and could not get the *Namur* to go about to bring any of our Guns to bear on the Enemy, (excepting our Stern Chace) which we played as before, and at the same Time stood the Fire of all of the *Spanish* Ships, who behaved very well, but our windward Ships did us no good at all, to the great Dishonour of the *English*, who had it then in their Power to have destroyed the whole *Spanish* Squadron, and some of the *French* with Pleasure.

Admiral *R—wl—ey* in the *Barfleur*, engaged the *French* Admiral, whom he forced to run, tho' he had three upon him at once. This Gentleman was seconded by Captain *Osborne* in the *Princess's Caroline*, who behaved extraordinary well, as did another Ship or two more, which is saying all I can indeed in their Favour. We took a *Spanish* Ship of 64 Guns, called *El Poder*, which was retaken again in the Night by the *French*, but finding she must endanger themselves to carry her off, they left her when we sent Hands on Board, and burnt her.

The *Namur* had killed and wounded in this Action 65, the *Marlborough* 160, and our Ships that did engage, lost in all, between four and five hundred Men.

The *French* and *Spanish* Squadrons consisted of 28 Sail of the Line, 7 Frigates and Fireships, His *Britannick* Majesty's Fleet of the same Number, with 10 Frigates, and 2 Fireships, but with more Guns than the Enemy.

The Ships that engaged, were the *Namur*,  
D d *Marl-*

*Marlborough, Norfolk, Princessa, Somerset, Bedford, Dorsetshire, Barfleur, Dragon and Berwick.*

It may be observed hitherto, I have not mentioned Admiral *L—k*, and his Division; as I can say so little in that great Officer's Favour, I chuse to be silent; but certain it is he did not engage, his Reasons may some Day be known to the World, Admiral *M——s* has sent him Home, where he must answer for himself.

Here was a Court-Martial held for Trial of two Captains and a Boatswain; the Captains after six Hours Argument were acquitted; but the poor Boatswain was render'd incapable in half quarter of the Time, though less in Fault than too many among us.

But to conclude, at Six o' Clock the *Namur* wore Ship, and run the Gantlet thro' six Sail of the Enemy, who were very complaisant with their Broadfides as we passed, which Favour we returned as fast as we could, when Night coming on, the combined Fleets made all the Sail they could, taking their disabled Ships in Tow.

We saw some Part of them next Morning, but never came up with them after.

*P. S.* Captain *Russell* lost his Arm in the Action, and is since dead.

Number of Men on our Side 15915.

Number of Guns 2150.

*Hitherto we have given the two Admirals fair Play, and they and their Friends have had the Liberty of saying all they can for themselves, and the Reader, by this Time, is capable*

capable of forming some Judgment upon the Whole. But as this Affair has been thought worthy of a Parliamentary Enquiry, and a strict Scrutiny made into it, by the Gentlemen of the House of Commons, we must not let the Cause rest in the Hands of the Pleaders without Doors. 'Tis true, we cannot give an exact Relation of all the Particulars that pass'd in the House on this memorable Occasion; yet, in general, it may be said, that on the Evidence of the numerous Witnesses that were produced on both Sides, it plainly appeared, that neither of the Admirals was free from Blame; and therefore the House thought proper to petition his Majesty, for a Court Martial to be held, where their Conduct may be enquired into by Persons who are competent Judges. At the Conclusion of the Enquiry, Mr. Lestock made the following Speech, which he calls a Recapitulation, which he spoke at the Bar of the House of Commons, on Tuesday, the 9th of April, 1745.

**I** Think it a Duty incumbent upon me to thank this Honourable Committee for their great Candour and Patience throughout this Enquiry; and also for the particular Indulgence in allowing me a Chair at the Bar. I shall always retain the most grateful Sense of the Favours and Honour I have received, such as will never be effaced out of my Memory.

I flatter myself I appear in a more favourable Light to this Honourable Committee than when



first this Enquiry was opened; but it has been my great Misfortune that my Evidences were not arrived, to remove every Doubt or Suspicion of my Conduct that may be yet remaining, tho' I applied for their being sent for Home so soon as I had procured his Majesty's Order for bringing me to a Trial, which was the 20th of last *August*, now almost eight Months ago. Those that have been examined are only such as Chance have sent in my Way: It is therefore a great Concern to me that all my Witnesses were not here to justify every Part of my Conduct, and render my Innocence more conspicuous, as my Reputation as an Officer, my All is at Stake, in the Applause or Censure of this Honourable House.

It is with humble Submission that I mention, notwithstanding the great Indulgence I have received from the Honourable Committee, that I have laboured under greater Disadvantages, in the Course of this Examination, than the Gentleman whose Authority laid the present Suspension on me. Had I been permitted to have cross-examined the Witnesses, I flatter myself that from their Evidence I should have gather'd sufficient Matter to invalidate their Testimony, and what would have made greatly for me.

I beg the Indulgence of the Honourable Committee to mention some Particulars.

Capt. *Marsh*, of the *Winchelsea*, gave it as his Opinion, that had I steer'd half a Point or a Point more to Leeward (as he said I kept the Admiral always upon my Lee-Bow,) I should have got up to engage the sternmost Ships. I appeal to every Seaman in this Honourable Committee, whether it is possible for a Man four or five Miles a-head, and wide of a Ship, to judge she steers within a Point, or half a Point of the Compass. I humbly apprehend as this was Capt. *Marsh*'s Situation  
with

with regard to me, it was impossible for him to have distinguish'd so nicely; and if it was scrupled at my seeing the *Poder* dismasted, as Capt. *Marsh* was very little short of that Distance from me, it may be wondered at his seeing a Ship steer within half a Point.

Capt. *Long* (who no doubt was a better Judge than Mr. *Marsh*, from his Situation right astern of me) does not alledge any thing against my Steerage, but, if I remember, he spoke in my Favour in that Point.

And as it has been declared by several Witnesses, that my studding Sails were frequently shifted from one Side to the other, I appeal to the Seamen in this Honourable Committee, whether this is not a Proof to invalidate Capt. *Marsh's* Evidence, as all the Ships a-head had the Wind on the Larboard Quarter.

Capt. *Long* also says, that he with all his Sail set could not get up with me, till I had hauled my Wind and shortned Sail, which he says I did at Three o'Clock; but upon being ask'd whether the *French* Squadron had then tack'd, he acknowledged they had.

If the Honourable Committee has not already observed in the Course of the Examination, that the *French* did not tack before the Fireship blew up, which was about Five o'Clock; upon Enquiry into this Particular, it will not be denied: It is a Truth universally known, for which Reason, I may well suppose Captain *Long* mistaken, and that it is evident I neither shortned Sail nor clapp'd upon a Wind, until the Signal was made to give over Chace, which was made on that Occasion.

Lieut. *Dorreil*, of the *Royal-Oak*, declared, that his Captain bore down, until he found that none of the Ships a-head of him would succour him,

him, and he was obliged to haul his Wind again from the Fire of three Ships of the Enemy, having received a Shot in the Head of his Main-Mast. As there were but six Ships a-stern of the *Real*, these three with her Second employ'd against the *Marlborough*, made four, so there were only two left at this Rate for my Division; and the Honourable Committee will be pleased to observe, there was a great Distance between our Divisions, and that the *Cambridge* and *Dunkirk* were posted in the Line of Battle ahead of me.

Mr. *Mathews*, eager as he may be to condemn me, will not I believe say that I could have taken upon me to have broke the Line of Battle, and bore down before the Time he bore down upon the *Real*, when I neither knew nor saw that he intended to attack the *Spanish* Squadron, which, according to the Line of Battle, and the Rules of War, should have fallen to my Share, as well as what Lieutenant *Knowles* had told me with regard to my engaging the *Spanish* Admiral.—But had he sent me a Message to have gone after these Ships, or made the Signal for me and my Division to give Chace in the Morning, before the sternmost Ships of the Enemy were so much a-head of me, though I could not have got up to engage, yet possibly I might have kept two or three of the sternmost afore the Wind, and I should have been justified for breaking the Line, and not endeavouring to engage according to the Order of the Battle, pursuing a small Number of the Enemies Ships before the main Body was disabled, or run, and leaving my Station on any Pretence, which Injunctions enforce Obedience, as the 1<sup>st</sup>, 13<sup>th</sup>, 21<sup>st</sup>, and 24<sup>th</sup> Articles of the Fighting Instructions sufficiently bear me Witness.

By bearing away more than I did, would have separated me to Leeward from the Center, and I  
should

should not have been in the Way at Eight at Night, when Admiral *Mathews* sent me Orders by the Lieutenant of the *Russel*, to keep near him; having shifted his Flag from the *Namur* on board of that Ship.

The Consequences of this Rashness without Authority, as Things afterwards fell out, would have brought the confederate Fleet between him and me, and it would have been impossible for me to have sustain'd so heavy a Charge against Discipline and Order, when it was so obvious and plain, that my Duty was to do my utmost to close with the Center, in Obedience to the Message sent to me, and the Signal for the Line which was kept abroad.

In the Forenoon we went at the Rate of three Miles an Hour; but when the Action began, the Wind had declin'd so much, and the Swell was so very high, that we had but just Steerage-way: And what serves to corroborate this Truth is, the little Distance we gain'd in the Afternoon's Sail upon the *Marlborough*; which Ship was all that Time in Action, lost her Masts, and could not be supposed to go any thing a-head. And as a farther Proof, the *Russel*, my Second a-stern, always esteem'd a good sailing Ship, not above eight Months from being clean'd, had every Sail set, but could not, according to her Captain's Declaration, get up to close with me before I shorten'd Sail, which was at Five o'Clock, instead of Three as he imagined, since he acknowledg'd that the *French* had then tackt.

Captain *Paulet* has said I reef'd my Top-sails, but one of his own People has contradicted him.

I have produced five Witnesses who heard the Messages from Mr. *Mathews* deliver'd by his Lieutenant to me on the *Neptune's* Quarter Deck; they are positive I never shorten'd Sail, nor did I reef  
that



that Day. They kept the Deck; one of them was quarter'd in the Main-Top, and it was impossible for me to have reef'd without their Knowledge. Besides, if the Honourable Committee will be pleas'd to consider the Improbability of my reefing between Nine and Ten o' Clock, having just before received Admiral *Mathews's* Order, to make more Sail, it is not likely that I should act in open Defiance of my commanding Officer's Order: To what Purpose should I do this? It could serve no other End than giving him an Opportunity to destroy me. There was no Wind to occasion this Caution, for we did not go more than three Miles an Hour with all the Appearance of fine Weather. Possibly, as Admiral *Mathews* himself, being in a good sailing Ship, did reef, as did the *Marlborough*, the Gentlemen a-stern have been thereby led into this Mistake.

I appeal to every Seaman, whether it was possible for me to reef Top-fails with Studding Sails and Top-gallant-fails abroad, and my Topsail-Yards slung. And if the Honourable Committee had not been perfectly satisfied with regard to my Innocence in this Point, I had more Witnesses in waiting last Examination Day, ready to declare that I never shorten'd Sail, nor reef'd my Top-fails. Besides, had I done this, surely Mr. *Mathews* would not have suffered so notorious a Breach of his Orders to escape him in his Charge against me.

I think it necessary more fully to explain my bringing to, the Night before the Action.

As soon as Mr. *Mathews* made the Night-Signal to bring to, the Line of Battle a-breast was destroy'd by that Order, and the Signal for that Line ceas'd to be an Order to all Intents and Purposes. If I had been wiser than Admiral *Mathews*, I could on no Pretence have refused my Obedience

to

to an Order that I did see, to comply with one that had been in Force, and could not be to the Moment the Night-Signal was made.

When the Signal was made for the Fleet to bring to, I happen'd to be far to the Westward, and in a Line abreast with the Admiral; but had not that been the Case, it would have been my Duty to have brought to immediately, without considering any former Order, since it was impossible that both Orders could be complied with, because two different Situations were required by these two Orders.

It is usual for Ships to set the Admiral when there is any Probability of losing Company; but in all my Practice I never knew it to be done every Hour when lying to; and for what I assert on this Subject, I appeal to all the Logg-Books and Journals in the Fleet; besides, a Ship may increase her Distance from another, yet not alter her Bearings. And farther, had my Sight been so nicely discerning as to have observed a gradual Drift of two or three Miles in eleven Hours in a dark Night, and I had taken upon me to have made more Sail, which was what I could not answer, as it was a Breach of the last Order receiv'd (the Night-Signal to bring to) yet I must have hoisted my Boat out, and search'd out every particular Ship of my Division, to have order'd them to make Sail, as there is no Signal in the Sailing or Fighting Instructions, for a particular Division to make Sail after lying by, nor for bringing to after making Sail.

It has been insinuated that I held a Correspondence with the Enemy, a Rumour that was never laid to my Charge by Admiral *Matthews*, however my Enemies may have propagated this Report for want of sufficient Matter against me. This is to

ridiculous in itself, that I shall only say I was never on Shore, but once, while the Fleet lay at *Hieres*, and that was with the Leave of Admiral *Mathews*, to meet a *French* Officer, who had taken me a Prisoner in the late War, and treated me nobly; when Mr. *Roxley* and Mr. *Martin*, now both Admirals, bore me Company all the Time we conversed together.

I humbly hope that the Honourable Committee has observ'd the great Difficulty and Struggles there were to get some of the Evidence to answer to the Questions that were put to them, relating to Admiral *Mathews's* Conduct, while at the same Time, they made no Hesitation, but were ready to answer to every thing that made against me: And this Method in giving their Evidence, was a Matter of so much Surprize to me, that I cannot help mentioning again, Captain *Marsh* seeing a Fault of mine, by judging within a Point of the Compass at four Miles Distance, better than he could see what Admiral *Mathews* was doing, tho' he was posted a breast of the Admiral in order to repeat his Signals. Neither can I let escape me, the indirect Practice of altering a Log-Book, on the false and frivolous Pretences that were urg'd; since by comparing the Captain's Journal, and Mate's, a Difference was prov'd.

Self preservation, and in Support of the Narrative I delivered the first Day of the Enquiry, make it necessary for me to trespass on the Time of this Honourable Committee, by pointing out the true Causes of this fatal Miscarriage, in which if I palliate, deceive, or misrepresent, may I suffer greater Evils than I have already, the Censure of this House, to confirm the popular Clamour and Fury against me.

It has not been said by any one Evidence that  
has

has been examined, that we were in Order of Battle, when Admiral *Mathews* bore down, and attack'd the *Spanish* Admiral. But it has been urged, in order to palliate so notorious a Breach of Discipline, that had not the Admiral engaged the *Spaniards* at the Time he did, the Enemy would have escaped, and we should not have come to an Action at all. Nothing can be more unjust than this pretended Plea; since the Behaviour of the Enemy, and Method of acting, from the Beginning of their Appearance to the Time the Admiral attack'd them, prove, that giving us Battle was their real Intention: For had it not been so, as the next Day, after the *Winchelsea* made the Signal for their coming out, they had a strong Westerly Wind, and at Night our Fleet anchored in *Hieres Bay*, there was nothing to hinder them from passing to *Italy*, had they been bound there; and had they been bound down the *Streights*, next Day when the Easterly Wind prevailed, they would have made Sail from us, and made the best Use of a fair Wind and clean Ships, instead of bringing to in Order of Battle.

The Substance of Admiral *Mathews's* Account, which was published by Authority, and now lying before this Honourable House, confirms what I advance, and to it I appeal; where it mentions, "our Fleet anchored in the Bay at Night; next Morning our getting under Sail, and the Enemy standing towards us with the Wind Westerly; and when it came to the Eastward, their bringing to in a Line of Battle."

Hence it is undeniable, that they came out on Purpose to give us Battle; for where else could they be bound stretching to the Southward, and making more Sail, while the Admiral made the Signal to engage, when our Fleet was in Disorder, but to gain the Weather-Gage? An Advantage which



every good Officer will endeavour to obtain, and be cautious of losing.

I have proved, by five Witnesses, that Mr. *Knowler* acknowledged all my Sail to be abroad, when he delivered Admiral *Mathews's* Message to me; and also, as I proved by the same Witnesses, that Lieutenant *Jasper* told me, by Order of the Admiral, that he would lie by for me, which he did not do, but, on the contrary, made more Sail from me. I am not any Ways answerable for the Distance between his Division and mine: For, had not he thought himself powerful enough with so great a Superiority as he had over the Enemy, he would have had the Prudence and Patience to have forbore engaging until I had got up, and been ready at Hand to succour and support him. As his Conduct alone made the Distance between the Center and Rear of our Fleet still greater and more dangerous, it is not reasonable I should answer for his Rashness; God forbid! Neither indeed could the Neglect he charges me with at Night, empower him in the Morning to act so opposite to Policy and the Art of War.

The Disorder of the Van of our Fleet, and the Danger it was in from its Weakness, only seven Ships against nineteen of the Enemy, have appear'd at this Bar. And Mr. *Mathews's* Account, published by Authority, confirms this, by saying, "that there were but three *French* Ships engaged, "the rest kept their Wind, in order to Tack and "Weather us; but that our Van keeping the "Wind of them, prevented their Design's taking "Place." And as it is notorious that Admiral *Mathews* did not direct the Van to keep the Wind, but keep the Signals for the Line, and engaging abroad, it appears that our Van was saved by Disobedience, and that no Measures were taken by Mr. *Mathews* to secure it against  
more

more than two Thirds of the Confederate Fleet. It cannot be denied that the *Berwick*, the next Ship to the *Princess Caroline* in the Line of Battle, engaged the *Poder*, as her Lieutenant and Men became Prisoners, and she is also said to have engaged that Ship by Mr. *Mathews's* Account; by which it is evident by this Circumstance alone, besides the Evidences that have been examined, that all the Ships between her and the *Norfolk* in the Line of Battle, no less than eight Ships, viz. the *Somerset*, *Princessa*, *Dragon*, *Bedford*, *Kingston*, *Salisbury*, and *Guernsey*, with the *Berwick*, were employ'd in firing at the *Poder*; that the *Norfolk* beat the *Constans* away out of the Enemies Line; and that the *Marlborough* was left in Distress against the *Real* and her Second astern by the *Namure*, has not only been proved by Evidence at the Bar, but I appeal to Admiral *Mathews's* Account, where he says, "that the *Marlborough's* driving a little too near him, obliged him to fill his Sails, to prevent her coming on board of him; and that having Occasion to reeve new Braces, with little Wind, and an ugly Swell, he could not give the *Marlborough* the Assistance Captain *Cornwall* wanted." And it cannot be doubted then, that had the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal Oak*, bore equally down with the *Marlborough*, at the Beginning of the Action, the *Real* must have fallen into her Hands; as the *Spanish* Admiral's Second, the Ship that distress'd the *Marlborough*, and clear'd her Decks, would have then been match'd, if not over-power'd; and consequently the Sternmost Ships, that were laid to my Charge, tho' they never got near enough to fire at the *Marlborough*, by this Means would have been stopt from getting a-head for me to have taken up.

Falshood

Falshood and Malice have aspers'd me without Controul; but I now, with such Evidence as have been examined, humbly submit to the Honourable Committee, whether if the *Dorsetshire*, *Effex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal Oak* had done their Duty, the *Marlborough* had been so hard press'd upon; and whether the Cause that the *Real* and her Second did not fall into our Hands, and indeed the sternmost Ships of the Enemy, was not owing to the Want of that Assistance which was so near at Hand, and not in any manner to my Conduct?

It has been pretended, that Fire and Smoke obstructed the Admiral's Sight; as if he had not left the *Marlborough*, or he had continued in Battle, and the Smoke had not gone to Leeward from him. On the contrary, his Stern lay towards the *Marlborough*, and it was impossible for him not to see how the Ships a-head and a-stern of him in the Line of Battle were employed. He had done with firing, his Person was not wounded, and what Smoke could there be to hinder him from distinguishing what was doing from the Van to the Rear of the Fleet; Neither can it be denied that the Situation of his Division, and Part of the Rear-Admiral's, was such, against so few Ships of the Enemy, that from the Beginning to the End of the Action they might have been shifted and disposed of according to the Condition and Disposition of both Fleets; and it is so well known that he sent Boats on board of the *Dorsetshire*, *Effex*, and Fireship, that it cannot be disputed. Nay, Capt. *Cole* of the Marines on board the *Dorsetshire*, declared at the Bar, that an Officer came on board from the Admiral with Orders, tho' he could not not say what they were; yet he said the Captain with his Officers held a Consultation upon receiving them, and their Result was not to go down nearer to the Enemy. Farther, I can prove that

Lieut.

Lieut. *Bentley*, now a Captain, when he was sent by Admiral *Mathews* to call me the third Day off Chace, told me he carried a Message from the Admiral on Board of the *Dorsetshire*, and at the same Time called on board the *Essex*. After such Proofs, I submit to this Honourable Committee, whether it can be said with the least Shew of Reason, that Admiral *Mathews* had it not in his Power to correct and reform these Ships, trifling and throwing away their Shot, and whether with any Degree of Justice Admiral *Mathews*, (as he does) can reckon the Conduct of these Ships part of his Charge against me.

It has appeared by the Boatswain of the Fireship's Evidence, that the Fireship's Distress was such, that her Captain, as he went under the *Dorsetshire's* Stern, hailed her, and desired Assistance; yet nevertheless no Ships cover'd or conducted him. At that Time there was neither Fire nor Smoke on either Side to hinder the Admiral from seeing that the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, and *Royal-Oak* kept to Windward, and looked on, where Duty and the Necessity of their Country's Cause call'd them; and yet after this notorious Neglect and Misconduct, Admiral *Mathews* has charg'd me with the Miscarriage of the Fireship. What is more, it is evident Mr. *Mathews* did not give Orders for the Fireship to prime before the Action, according to Practice, and the Nature of this Service, otherwise he would not have censur'd the deceas'd Captain, as he has done in his Account, by complaining of his Tedioufness in priming and coming down, but punish'd his Disobedience, since such Attempts entirely depend on Readiness and sudden Execution. For though a Ship may be so disabled as to give a fair Opportunity for burning her, yet if the Fireship is not prim'd ready to catch the Occasion when it offers, the  
Time



Time she will take to prime may very probably put the Enemy in such a Condition as to defeat the Enterprize; for which Reason I took upon me, early in the Morning, to order the Captain of the Fireship in my Division to prime before the Engagement.

It has been proved to the Honourable Committee, in the Course of the Examination, that our Van tack'd, and run from the *French* to join the Center, after the Fireship had miscarried; and what corroborates this, is Admiral *Mathews's* Account, where he says, "That notwithstanding the *French* tack'd upon Rear-Admiral *Rowley*, they did not think proper to engage him; they however retook the *Spanish* Ship, it being impossible to do any Thing with her, as she had not a Mast standing." And here I must beg Admiral *Mathews's* Pardon; for the *Poder* had her Fore-Mast, Bowsprit, and Mizen-mast standing; but that he having wore in little Wind and a Swell, and formed the Line of Battle on the Starboard-tack, on Purpose to get away from the *French*, who were just at Hand, bearing down to deliver the *Spanish* Squadron, else why was the *Poder* left with the *Berwick's* Lieutenant and People? In standing from the Enemy, and leaving the Place of Battle, some Shot were exchanged, as the Admiral with his Division pass'd by the four sternmost Ships of the Enemy, which Mr. *Mathews* in his Charge against me calls engaging within Musket-Shot; and also that this hinder'd the *Real* from falling into his Hands, and occasion'd him to be torn to Pieces, altho' it is evident he had left the *Real*, and he had, besides the Ships a-stern, six a-head, viz. the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, *Royal Oak*, *Dunkirk*, and *Cambridge*, that fi ed on this Occasion in passing, and only four Ships of the Enemy fir'd: And as an undoubted

undoubted Proof of what I affirm, it has been proved, and not controverted, that the Admiral fir'd his Larboard Guns the contrary Side that he attack'd the *Real* with, consequently that this was a forced Fire, in endeavouring to get away.

Next Day (after the Action) was spent in forming a Line of Battle, and going down upon the Enemy, who were going from us with their crippled Ships, and at Night we brought to in great Order, suffering the Enemy to escape: According to which Admiral *Mathews's* Account says, "That at Break of Day he saw the Enemy's Fleet to Leeward of them, and found they had tow'd all the crippled Ships before the Wind all Night. The Admiral chased them; the *French* lying in a Line of Battle to Windward of the *Spaniards*, most of them Hull to; but as he drew near them, they made Sail, and left the disabled sixty Gun Ship: That there was great Reason to believe, that if there had been any Wind, the *French* would have left the *Spanish* crippled Ships, as most of them had suffer'd greatly."

The Honourable Committee will be pleas'd to observe in this Account, all the Circumstances and Appearances of a fugitive Enemy, disabled, and encumber'd with crippled Ships, yet Admiral *Mathews*, brought to, a great Way to Windward of the Enemy, in a fine Moon-light Night. If he imagin'd the Enemy capable of running from him before the Action, as has been pretended, in order to excuse his engaging them contrary to the Line of Battle, he must be truly sensible that they would now more endeavour at it, as their only Resource lay in the ensuing Night to get away with their lame Ships.

In the Night before the Action, "he brought to, by his own Account, within a little more  
No. 8. F f "than

“ than three Guns shot of them, and order’d the  
 “ *Essex* to lie a Mile to Leeward of him, and  
 “ the *Winchelsea* a good Musket-shot to Leeward  
 “ of the *Essex*, to watch their Motions, and to  
 “ make their proper Signals, and stand after  
 “ them, in case they should make Sail; and that  
 “ he was so near, that he could count the En-  
 “ my’s Ships, after the Moon was down.” Here  
 the Honourable Committee will be pleas’d to ob-  
 serve, that all the necessary Precautions were taken,  
 lest the Enemy should endeavour to escape us  
 when we were not so much as form’d in Order of  
 Battle, and they were lying by for us in good  
 Order; but when we had gain’d the Advantage,  
 of disabling four of their Ships, and burning ano-  
 ther, he became more cautious, and brought to,  
 at a much greater Distance, in Order of Battle,  
 without sending Cruizers to observe their Motions.  
 What could occasion two such extraordinary Ex-  
 tremes, as the least Danger could not arise by go-  
 ing nearer at this Juncture, is impossible to say;  
 but it is certain, they are opposite to the Rules of  
 War and Prudence, especially as it would have  
 been easy for us to have kept Sight of them all  
 Night, by making more and more Sail, as they  
 appear’d less and less perceptible.

It has been proved that we saw the Enemy  
 next Morning, and that I made a Signal for see-  
 ing twenty Sail of them. Mr. *Mathews*’s Account  
 also says, “ that he saw the Enemy next Morn-  
 “ ing, but at a great Distance. And further it  
 “ says; that after the Admiral lost Sight of the  
 “ Enemy’s Fleet, he found all his Endeavours to  
 “ rejoin them, or procure Intelligence of them,  
 “ ineffectual, they being gone, as he supposed,  
 “ down the *Streights*.”

Here he acknowledges that he saw the Enemy  
 (notwithstanding his Captain at that Time, Cap-  
 tain

tain *Long*, declared at the Bar, that they could not see them from the Mast-head;) but Mr. *Mathews* does not say one Word in his Account, of calling me off Chace; having gained so much on the Enemy, as to make them from a Deck, with a Separation between the *Spanish* and *French* Squadrons. Not satisfied with the Signal for that Purpose, the *Winchelsea* was sent with Orders for me to come into the Fleet; and if it was Weather for her Boat to come on Board of me, surely it was such as might have been employed in going after a fugitive disabled Enemy, without injuring our Ships Masts that were wounded.

Admiral *Mathews* says in his Account, "that the Day before there was great Reason to believe, that if there had been any Wind, the *French* would have left the *Spanish* crippled Ships, as most of them suffered greatly." And now that there was Wind sufficient to bring him up with the Enemy to gain these Ships, or force a general Engagement, he gives over Chace, passing over this Particular in his Account, or giving any Reason for such extraordinary Conduct; at the same Time pretending, that he us'd all his Endeavours to rejoin the Enemy, or procure Intelligence of them, when it is notorious that he lay by all Day and next Night with an Easterly Wind.

Every Consideration seem'd to enforce our Fleet pursuing the Enemy down the *Streights*, especially as it was reported they expected Reinforcements from *Brest*, and not one against it, even if it could have been possible to have strain'd our wounded Masts by sailing large: So great an Advantage and such sure Omens of Victory, were worth running some Risk; and as the Enemy escaped by my being call'd off Chace, Mr. *Mathews*, who gave the Order, is alone answerable.



After that Queries, Answers, and Replies had past between us, on the 16th of *March*, above five Weeks after the Action, having sent Mr. *Mathews* what is intituled my Rejoinder, a Paper of some Length and Reasoning, without any farther Consideration he sent me the Letter of Suspension. I struck my Flag the same Night, and the next Morning many Boats came on Board of the Ship, enquiring whether I was not dead; and even some Captains ask'd me the Cause of my being suspended, so little did I appear to the Fleet that I had misbehaved or deserved this severe Censure.

However, notwithstanding this publick Censure, his Majesty's Governor of *Minorca* seem'd to esteem me an injur'd Man, by saluting me with fifteen Guns, when I sailed out of the Harbour, on board the *Salisbury* for *England*; and this is what he never would have done, had he imagined I had sacrificed his Majesty's Service, and the Honour and Interest of my Country.

When Admiral *Mathews* arrived from *England*, I not only saluted him myself, but I ordered all the Ships in the Fleet to do it, and went in my Boat, out of the Port of *Villa Franca*, to meet him before he got in. Had he been of the Royal Blood, I could not have paid him more Respect, or Submission; in return to which, immediately on seeing me, before Mons. *Corbeau*, the Commandant of the County of *Nice*, and some Field-Officers in the King of *Sardinia*'s Service, as well as a great many Captains of the Fleet, who were then on board of him, without any Regard to Decency or good Manners, my Rank, and Reputation as an Officer, he began with reprimanding me, telling me he was surprized, that as I had been so long in his Majesty's Service, I had not yet learn'd to comply with his Instructions in writing to him,  
and

and sending a Frigate down to *Gibraltar* to him. I answered, that I had done both, and if he had not received my Letters, nor met with the Frigate, it was not my Fault.

I had the Satisfaction and Pleasure to receive the King of *Sardinia's* Thanks, as also his Majesty's entire Approbation of my Conduct by a Letter from the Duke of *Newcastle*, yet it was too difficult a Task for me to please Mr. *Mathews*.

He began his Command over me in this Manner, and superseded all the Officers that I had made, even my own Secretary, and those that had been appointed before he sail'd from *England*, and had come within the Jurisdiction of his Command.

This, I humbly apprehend, he had no more Power to do, than to supersede the Officers that Mr. *Haddock* had appointed; since I had the King's Authority to command the Fleet.

Not to trespass any longer on the Time of the Honourable Committee, having been thus arraign'd and condemn'd by Admiral *Mathews*, deprived of Commanding in Chief the Fleet, and my Share of the Prize-Money, I was sent Home, as a Delinquent, in a fifty Gun Ship, charged with a Convoy, full in the Sight of the Nation, to take all the Blame and Odium of the Failure of His Majesty's Fleet; as in the Shame and open Disgrace thus put upon me, was involved the Misconduct of every Person in the Fleet, as it has has appear'd that no other has been accused by Admiral *Mathews*.

But with what Equity and Impartiality, I submit to the Honourable Committee.

Here I have been near a Twelve-month; seen Junior Flag Officers promoted to the Rank above me; left to struggle, without any Friend, with the greatest Misfortunes and Difficulties to come  
at

at my Trial, the indubitable Right of every *Eng-lishman*: And had Mr. *Mathews* labour'd and endeavour'd as much to obtain an Enquiry, as I have done, the necessary Evidences would have been arrived to have perfected it before this Time, and entirely confuted the many scandalous Reports spread to blemish my Reputation.

I have nothing more to add, than that I hope, tho' I have not been arm'd for this Enquiry with my Evidence, yet I have given no Proof of conscious Guilt, or a defective Cause.

The Persecution of a popular Clamour, and the Tortures of Misrepresentations and Calumny, have had their Days against me; but now the Time is at hand when they must yield to Truth and Demonstration.

*Thus have we given an impartial Account, as far as it came to our Knowledge, of the Conduct of the two Admirals in the late memorable Engagement in the Mediterranean; we have likewise seen Mr. Lestock's Defence in the Speech which he made at the Bar of the House of Commons at the Close of the Enquiry: What is farther to be added, shall be only by way of Review upon what has been advanced; from whence it will appear, that this ever-infamous Miscarriage proceeded either from Malice or Treachery.*

**I**T is universally allowed, that the late unhappy Miscarriage of our Fleet in the *Mediterranean*, is entirely owing to some private Piques, Grudges, and Animosities of those Gentlemen that had the chief Command: But certainly

tainly the suffering of any such to interfere with his Majesty's Service, and the Good of the Nation, ought to be as severely punished, as the most enormous Degree either of *Cowardice* or *Treachery*. The more especially as it has been often seen, that Men, of the greatest Reputation for their Bravery, have been so far misled by their Passions, as not only to be ready to sacrifice themselves, but even their Country, and all that was dear to them in their Gratification. Whatever Evils may arise from our Indulgence of Passions in private Life, is no way comparable with such as may accrue from the same Weakness in those that are concerned in Publick; as in the one Case, the Good or Welfare of a few Individuals only can be annoyed; in the other, the Interest of a whole Nation: The *Law*, as in the Case of *Murder*, has happily made a Distinction between such Actions as are accidental, and those that are done with Malice afore-thought; which Difference, must be determined by the Conduct or Behaviour of the Party, both before, and at the Time of the Action: So that by tracing of the Effects up to their Cause, it is thereby discovered, and the Jury are to give their Verdict accordingly.

From the Scrutiny that has lately been made into the Engagement off *Toulon*, there appears strong and violent Presumptions of Cowardice or Treachery; and an entire Neglect or Disregard of the Good of his Majesty's Service; which both the Accuser and the Accused endeavour alternately to fix on each other. In order to which, the A ———— 1, or Commander in Chief, has published his Account of the Engagement, printed by Authority, together with his Queries, and Reply to the Vice A ———— 1, which are  
the



the whole of his Charge. — The Vice-Ad — l, in Return, has published his Answer to the Queries of the A — l; his Rejoinder to the A — l's Reply; his Account of the Engagement near *Toulon*; Situations, Views, and Positions in that Engagement, with Historical and Critical Remarks and References; together with his Recapitulation. To these, if we may judge by the Stile, may be added, that incomparable, modest and impartial Account, entitled, *The Narrative of the Proceedings of his Majesty's Fleet in the Mediterranean*; which having been published a long Time before Ad — l L — k's Account appeared; and agreeing so entirely with his Journal therein, except the Omission of some remarkable Censures, Exaggerations and Invectives, which, perhaps, it was thought might not have such Influence with a *British* Senate, as it was intended they should have on the Populace. And here I cannot forbear taking Notice of that gross Affront, which was put on Admiral M — s, in the Person of the Bookseller; who was directed by the candid and sincere Author, to write the following Letter, as it appears in his Dedication.

S I R,

*I Am preparing to print a third Edition of the Narrative of the late Action in the Mediterranean; with Notes: If there is any Thing in the former Editions not strictly true, if you will be pleased to signify your Objections by the Hand of your Secretary, I will take upon me to print them at the End of this Edition of the*  
*said*

*said Pamphlet. I would not give Offence, being  
with the greatest Respect,*

SIR,

Your most Obedient

Humble Servant,

J. MILLAN.

To the Honourable A — I M — s.

‘ Mr. *Millan*, after waiting some Time at Mr. *M—h—ws’s* House, was told there was no ‘ Answer to the above Letter.” ——— *Pity he did not receive such as his Attendance and Assurance merited!* which by the by I take to be a greater Instance of Moderation in the A — I, than any that has yet appeared in Mr. *L—st—k’s* Favour, either in Publick or Private.

What Appearance can it have to any one that is Impartial, to view a Bookseller, that has been employed in publishing a long, insincere, Detail of Actions, misrepresented and exaggerated with the most unjust Censures and Reflections by an Anonymous Author, waiting on a Gentleman that had been honour’d with the chief Command of his Majesty’s Fleet, and Title of his Majesty’s Ambassador and Plenipotentiary, desiring him to correct that his third Edition of personal Reflections upon himself; and promising to print them at the End of his Edition; no doubt with a pompous Puff in his Title-Page. — The Insolence of both Author and Bookseller, is manifestly apparent, and the Design of this Letter could be no other, than either to shew a Contempt of the Ad — I’s Abilities, by endeavour-

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ing to induce him to enter the Lists with an anonymous, contemptible Antagonist, that had not Courage enough to sign his Name to his sincere Narrative; or by making use of his Silence, in the Manner they have done, by publishing the audacious Letter, as a tacit *Imprimatur* to their Scandal. And whoever shall be at the Trouble of comparing this modest Letter, with some others that passed from the Gentleman that so loudly complains of Injustice and Oppression to the Admiral, will not be long at a Loss for the Author.

But what Usage less gross can be expected to a Person, in whatever Rank or Station, whom this unknown Author has endeavoured to traduce, by branding him with Pride, Ambition, Vanity, Malice and Weakness, Cowardice, Imprudence and Ignorance? with what Degree of Truth these Imputations might be retorted, will in some Measure appear on the Perusal of these Sheets.

Clamour and Noise ever bear great Sway with Mankind, as they are apt to agitate those Passions, by which the greater Part are ruled; and to be silent, is, by the Populace, construed as an evident Sign of Guilt. How often has the Appearance of an innocent Behaviour by not flying, but casting himself on his Trial by his Country, so far influenced a Jury, as to save the Felon, that by other Circumstances would have suffered for those Facts, of which afterwards he hath acknowledged himself to have been guilty? There seems at least (however conscious of Guilt) to be this Satisfaction in pretending and maintaining Innocence, that tho' condemned, it may be in the Power of some to arraign the Sentence of Judges as impartial. This, with the Chance of being cleared by their obstinate Adherence to  
their

their Innocency, induces many a one to call loudly for his Trial, that inwardly dreads the taking of it. I do not — I would not pretend to insinuate, that the late Vice-Admiral, by a long, clamorous, and vigorous Application of so many Months for his Trial, endeavoured to terrify the Friends of the distant Admiral, by his Unconsciousness of Guilt, into such Measures as might prevent its ever taking Place, even were their Power and Influence such as he acknowledges — Neither would I urge, that his Endeavours were grounded on a Consciousness of having more Interest in the Navy, or elsewhere, than his Commander. Tho' the latter might, perhaps, account for some particular Encroachments on the Authority of his Superior; it nevertheless cannot be brought in as the Cause of his long Intercession to bring his Affair to a Determination. — Every innocent Man, is certainly at all times ready and desirous to clear himself to his Country; and in this Light we must view Mr. *L—k*, *contending with insurmountable Difficulties, and no Opportunity to accumulate Wealth, or make Friends, but from the Justice of his Cause; an inconsiderable Advocate in this Age!* — while Mr. *M—s*, on the contrary, has all the Benefit that Power and Interest can give him, together with that immense Wealth acquired in the short Time he has been Admiral; during which the other bore the Command for no less than six Months at a Time — and consequently could have no Opportunity of benefiting himself.

The Design of these Sheets, not being to enter upon a formal Justification of the Conduct of Mr. *M—ws*, but only to review that of Mr. *L—k*, it would be needless to insert any Commendations of him, as an Officer or a Sea-



man; more especially as they would stand but in an indifferent Light, when compared with those of the latter, whom we find (tho' now friendless and moneyless) introduced to the King by the late Lord *Torrington*, who was pleased to say, ' That he took the Liberty to recommend to ' his Majesty one of the ablest and best Quarter-deck Officers that had ever been bred at Sea.' This has been always the Judgment of every Sea-Officer; even his Enemies cannot help acknowledging his great Capacity and Understanding: That he is indefatigable in his Duty, knowing, well qualified, and so perfectly acquainted with every Branch of the Navy, that the Difficulties of the greatest Command cannot exceed the Bounds and Extent of his Genius; he having been constantly employed in his Majesty's Service from his Infancy; never any Length of Time on Half-Pay? Consequently with no more than equal Talents, he must excel in Knowledge and Experience, those who have lived ashore any Number of Years, and are but newly returned to retrieve what they have lost by a long Absence from their Trade. — *Ergo*, our Author might have urged the only consummate compleat Officer in the Navy. — How glorious a Character to uphold! how inestimable to lose!

But the Character of Mr. *M——ws*, as given by the same Author (after omitting his Behaviour when he commanded the *Kent*, in the Engagement under Sir *George Bing*, in the *Mediterranean*, as too valorous to suit his Narrative) is so low and trifling, as not to come into any Competition with the Former's.

No wonder at the Miscarriage of a Fleet under so insufficient a Commander, that crippled the Genius of the *most consummate of Seamen*! How his Majesty, or the Ministry, came to entrust him

him with the same Power and Authority as the late Sir *George Bing*, is altogether unaccountable.

It must certainly have been very vexatious for an experienced Officer, that had been so many Years constantly employed, and had arrived at the Honour of commanding his Majesty's Fleet, to see himself dispossessed of that Command by any other; but more especially by a Gentleman, who, tho' a much elder Officer, had lived eighteen Years on Shore; and to be sure in that Time, had so far forgotten all maritime Affairs, as to be necessitated to re-learn the Trade under his Intuition.

Who is it that can blame Mr. *L* ——— *k* for any Miscarriage? is not Mr. *Ma* ——— *ws* entirely culpable, in not submitting to go as a subordinate Officer, to a Man of such experienced Command? and are not our Misfortunes entirely owing to Mr. *M* ——— *ws* taking on him the Command in Chief in the *Mediterranean*? ——— Though *Treachery* or *Cowardice* may be found to have been the mediate Cause of our Miscarriage, yet I very much fear that *Envy* may have been the Incitement.

This is, I think, so apparent from the Behaviour of the two Admirals, from the Time of their meeting, to that of Mr. *L* ——— *k*'s Suspension, as to need no Exaggeration: ——— But must leave it to any one to judge of the horrid Situation of a *Commander*, whose next Officer is endued with that detestable Passion ——— His Commands are obey'd with Reluctance, and his most sanguine Designs either arraign'd, if successful, or defeated in the Performance.

And indeed we find by the Letters which passed between them, that Mr. *M* ——— *ws* was as weary of his Command, as the other was impatient

tient to succeed him, inasmuch that he daily expected one of them would be recalled.

The Misunderstanding continued to increase, even to the Day of Battle; a Day that every Commander would dread, had he the Misfortune of an obstinate envious Man for his Second; and we find by Mr. *L——k*'s Journal, that on the 9th of *February*, 1743-4, when the Combined Fleets were coming out to Sea, Mr. *L——k* went on board the Admiral, and desired to know (as he had the Honour to command next to him, and the Enemy in Sight) if he had any particular Commands or Instructions for him? The Admiral answered No, saying it was very cold, and bid him go on board. — This Coldness in the Admiral, whether it might proceed from some Suspicion he had of Mr. *L——k*'s not seconding him, or his waiting some Opportunity to do him harm, or some secret Mistrust of his holding \* \* \* \* \* I shall not set about to determine; but think the Admiral's Coldness might have obliged a Man of less boasted Prudence and Conduct than Mr. *L——k*, to look well to his Behaviour in the Engagement. — And should he (as I heartily wish he may not) incur the *Censure* of a *Court Martial*, it must be either for *Cowardice* or *Treachery*: New Instructions in the former *Case* would have been unnecessary, as he did not perform such as he had already received — In the latter, they might have been detrimental to the whole Fleet: And tho' Mr. *L——k* may endeavour to make a Handle of the Admiral's Coldness to him; yet I cannot but think, by his Behaviour during the Engagement, that it was a great Act of Prudence of Mr. *M——res* in not giving him any particular Instructions, from his forced or feigned *Complaisance*; however, he or  
his

his Partizans may deny the Admiral's having either *Prudence* or *Conduct*.

On *Feb. 10.* At seven o'Clock the Admiral made a Signal for the Line of Battle a-stern; but the little Wind, a high Western Swell, and the Ships crowding and pressing on one another, hindered the Fleet from getting out of the Bay, in the Disposition of Battle, according to the Signal abroad. — Thus Mr. *L—k* very impartially — But observe the candid, veracious *Eye-witness*, the Author of the *Narrative*. — The little Wind, with an high Eastern Swell, and the *unaccountable* Impatience of many of the Ships in crowding and pressing on one another; whose unseasonable *Eagerness* was not to be held in, even by Order and Discipline, hindered the Fleet from getting out of the Bay, in the Disposition of Battle, according to the Signal abroad. — However disagreeable such *Eagerness* and *Impatience* of our Ships to form the Line might be to Mr. *L—k*, or his Friend, the Writer of the *Narrative*; I should be glad to know, whether he thought the Admiral's Order or Discipline, or that of the Sailors, could overcome the Western Wind, or Swelling of the Seas, which drove them confusedly together?

*Saturday, Feb. 11.* Soon after it was dark, the Admiral put abroad four Lights in his Fore-shrouds, and fired eight Guns, which is the Night Signal for the Fleet to bring to, and the Windward Ships to do it first, by the 9th Article of the fighting Instructions: And Admiral *M——* says, in his Account published by Authority, *That he brought too so very near the Enemy, that he could count the Enemy's Ships after the Moon was down, but could not at the same Time see Vice-Admiral L——k and his Squadron, he having brought too so far to Windward,*



*ward, that when it was dawning, and the Admiral had made Sail, and the Signal for the Line of Battle a-breast, the Vice-Admiral was full five Miles a-stern of him.*

Mr. *L——k*, in his Account, says, That he brought too, being in a Line of Battle with the Admiral, within three Miles of the Enemy, two of whose Ships bore away from him: But at Day-break, finding himself at a greater Distance from the Admiral than at Night when he brought too, occasioned by a Shift of Wind, Eddy, or Indraught of the Islands, while Mr. *M——ws* was in the Offing in the Power of the Current, he made Sail; and by that Time the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to make Sail, which he repeated. At half an Hour after Six in the Morning, he was near being a-breast of him, though their Divisions were far from being closed together. And the Rear-Admiral's a great Way to Windward of the Line of Battle.

Thus these contradictory Accounts, which, as the *Narrative* says, Time must rectify. — But I cannot forbear his observing, that the Fleet were not in the Line of Battle when the Signal was made to bring to: For he says, Page 57, 'In the Evening we were not at all regular, the Rear-Admiral's Division was straggled and a great Way a-stern of the Center; neither was the Center, nor the Vice-Admiral's Division form'd in Order of Battle.' How then could Mr. *L——k*, as above, affirm his bringing too in the Line of Battle with the Enemy? — I must beg Leave also to observe, that at Day-break Mr. *L——k* perceiving his great Distance from the Admiral, ventur'd (tho' so great a Disciplinarian) to make Sail towards him, even before he gave the Signal for the Fleet's Sailing. Had the prudent Mr. *L——k*, who, by his own Account, must needs perceive his Distance from the Admiral at bringing too over  
Night

Night (more especially as he affirms he was then in Line of Battle with him) had but the Caution to have continued Sail a little longer, 'tis probable he might in the Morning have found himself at a less Distance than five Miles, and have been able to come up so as to engage the Rear of the Enemy, in Spite of the *Eddies* or *Indraught* of the Islands, of which, doubtless, he made no Advantage, he being so near to the Enemy as to disturb two of their Ships; and though their Divisions were perceptible to the Admiral, and the rest of the Fleet, his was not.

Mr. *L——k*, and his Second seem to lay great Stress on the Admiral's Signal to bring too, being for those that were to Windward to do it first, which he being to Windward performed accordingly. ——— And, says the *Narrative*, 'There is no Signal in the Sailing or fighting Instructions for a particular Division to make Sail after lying by, nor for their bringing too after making Sail.' ——— I must remind this Author of these remarkable Words in Mr. *L——k*'s Journal. 'At Day-break finding myself at a greater Distance from the Admiral than at Night, when I brought too, &c. I made Sail, and, by that Time the Admiral made the Signal for the Fleet to make Sail;' and should be glad that in his next Edition he will be pleased to inform the Publick, as there is no Signal for a particular Division's making Sail after lying by, what Signal Mr. *L——k* made use of for that Purpose to set them a Sailing in the Morning just at Break of Day? and if the Admiral had not given the Signal for making Sail till after he had come up, what Signal he would have thrown out to have stop'd his particular Division by bringing too? especially as there is no Signal for particular Divisions bringing too

H h after

after making Sail. However happily before the latter was necessary, the Admiral made a Signal for the whole Fleet's sailing; and soon after another to quicken our prudent Vice-Admiral's Division, what Regard he paid thereto we shall observe in its proper Place: However, it must be acknowledged, that had he not fortunately, by some Means or other, got his Ships under Sail before the Admiral's Signal was abroad, or he could well perceive it had been so, his Division would probably have been so far to Windward, as not perhaps to have had so much as a Sight of the Engagement, which would have given the malicious World too flagrant a Proof of Timidity, or somewhat worse.

The Combined Fleet, says Mr. *L——k*, made Sail, and stretch'd in good Order of Battle the Southward. At half an Hour past seven o' Clock the Ad——l made the Signal for the Rear Ad——l and his Division to make more Sail (whom Mr. *L——k* as before observes was a great Way to the Windward of the Line of Battle) and soon after he made Signal for my doing the same \*, having at that Time all my Sail abroad. Before Eight Lieutenant *Jasper*,

\* I leave any one to judge of the Anxiety of the Admiral that was thus obliged to be continually quickning the Motions of his Brother Admirals, to bring them and their Divisions into a Line of Battle. May it not reasonably be supposed, that perceiving their Dilatoriness in forming the Line to the Windward, that he was glad of the Opportunity of attacking the combin'd Fleet, as soon as he got his Van near to him (when he found that neither his Signal, nor two Messages, could hasten his Rear) lest the Enemy with their clean Ships might either escape him or tack upon him, one of which they would infallibly have done, had he waited any longer Mr. *L——k*'s prudent Motions.

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the Ad——l's Lieutenant, came on Board me, with the Ad——l's Directions to me, that he would lay by until I could get up with my Division to close the Line of Battle with him: But instead thereof, I having observed to Mr. *Jasper* that the Ad——l had rather made more Sail, and went faster from me, he replied, that soon after he put off from his Ship that she had made more Sail; nevertheless, he thought it his Duty not to return before he had deliver'd to me the Ad——l's Message. Soon after Lieutenant *Knowler* of the *Namur*, came on board me from the Ad——l, with Orders for me to make more Sail; upon which I bid him look aloft and see whether I could make any more Sail: Every Sail which could draw being then set. Lieutenant *Knowler* acknowledged the Truth of what I said, and added, that the Ad——l was very uneasy, that the Rear Ad——l and his Division, did not make more Sail to get into the Line of Battle: And upon my saying to him, that according to the Line, the *Real*, the *Spanish* Admiral, must be my Adversary; he reply'd, that Ad——l *M——ws* had told him so: And after giving my Compliments to the Ad——l, with Assurances, that nothing should be left undone that I had Power to do, to get along-side of the *Real* with all possible Expedition, Lieutenant *Knowler* return'd to the Ad——l.

In this Place, the Author of the *Narrative* has a long Dissertation on Order, Discipline, &c. much to the same Purport of what Mr. *L——k* says in his Defence in the *Recapitulation* spoke by him at the Bar of the House. — But I must beg leave to mention a Word or two in Turn: The Ad——l first made a Signal for Mr. *L——k*'s making more Sail — which he not doing, the Ad——l dispatches his Lieutenant Mr.



*Jasper* to him — Mr. *L——k* not yet answering; the Ad——l order'd Mr. *Knowler*, another Lieutenant of his to go on Board Mr. *L——k*, and desire him to make more Sail: — On his coming, Mr. *L——k*, in a surly Manner, bids him look up and see whether he could make any more Sail; the Lieutenant, I suppose, somewhat intimidated at the Vice Admiral's Cruelty, seem'd to acknowledge his Assertion, and immediately is induced to enter into a Conference with him; and upon the Vice Ad——l's saying, that according to the Line, the *Real*, the *Spanish* Admiral must be his Adversary — the Lieutenant, Mr. *Knowler*, reply'd, that Admiral *M——ws* had told him so — From this Account, as published by Mr. *L——k*, I leave any candid and impartial Reader to judge, whether Mr. *M——ws* had not at that Time, when Mr. *Knowler*'s Boat came off, a View of attacking the Combin'd Fleet in Form? so that the Van of the *French*, would then have fallen to Mr. *Rowley*'s Share, the Center to the Admiral's, and the *Spaniards* in the Rear, to Mr. *L——k*'s, could he but have perswaded his Brother Admirals to make more haste; but their Delay in not hastening to form the Line, occasion'd Things to take such a Turn, that by the Time Rear-Admiral *Rowley* got up, the *French* were stretch'd so far to the Southward, that our Van was with their Center, and our Center with their Rear.

Had the Ad——l therefore waited for Mr. *L——k*, the Enemy would either have run off, or obtain'd the \* Weather-Gage — but more of

\* An Advantage, says Mr. *L——k*, in his *Recapitulation*, " which every good Officer will endeavour to obtain, and be cautious of losing " — Who then can blame

of this when we come to take Notice of Mr. *L——k's Recapitulation.*

*February* the 11th, at half an Hour past ten o'Clock, the Ad——l made the Signal to engage the Enemy, which the Rear-Admiral repeated, but Mr. *L——k* did not—— How the Rear-Admiral came to return the Signal, being, according to Mr. *L——k*, four or five Miles to Windward of the Line, and Mr. *L——k* not to do it, seems a proper Subject of Enquiry; unless he was angry at the Ad——l for not lying by for him according to his Pleasure.—— But we find that in about three Hours, *viz.* at half an Hour past one, the Center of our Fleet being a-breast with the Enemy's Rear, the *Spanish* Squadron; and our Van, near a-breast with their Center; the Ad——l, willing to miss no Opportunity, as equally dreading the Tardiness of our Divisions, and the Nimbleness of the Combin'd Fleets, valiantly bore down with the *Marlborough*, and began the Engagement with the *Spanish* Admiral.—— And happily he did so; for we find the Combin'd Fleets were so eager to gain the Wind-Gage of us, that according to Mr. *L——k*, the three headmost Ships of the *Spanish* Squadron, did only exchange a Broadside with the headmost Ships of the Admiral's Division in passing; but continued their Course to the

blame Mr. *M——us's* engaging while he had that Advantage, which probably, an Hour's Delay would infallibly have lost. And notwithstanding the Sneers of the late Vice-Admiral, or the Author of the *Narrative*, he seems to be such a good Judge of this Advantage, as to rely more thereupon than on his Brother Admiral's Assistance.

Southward

Southward with the *French* Squadron, in all nineteen Ships. — And had the Admiral waited for Mr. *L — k*, God knows how far to the Southward, or elsewhere, those nimble *Dons* and *Monseurs* would have gotten, far enough certainly out of our Reach; unless they could have taken some signal Advantage of us.

That some of our Ships engaged too far off \*, is allowed; and others, like Mr. *L — k*, not at all, is lamented. — But, however, I think 'tis some Proof of the *French's* Activity, that Mr. *R — y* did not get up with M. de Court, the *French* Admiral, till † two o' Clock — But, however, our vigilant Vice-Ad — l, tho' he did not like being hurried himself, perceiving that the *Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*, two Ships whose Stations were ahead of him, were to Windward, he fir'd a Shot, and made the *Dunkirk's* Signal. — And in half an Hour after, he fired a Shot, to endeavour to stop the Sternmost Ship of the Enemy, but, in vain; and she being a large ‡

\* Mr. *L — k* seems mightily to bemoan their trifling their Shot away at that Distance, while he kept his in Reserve for another Day. — But had they follow'd his Example, and not fir'd at all, our Enemies might, perhaps have thought that our Fleet were unprovided with Ball.

† Three Hours, says the Author of the *Narrative*, after the Signal for Battle was made; and even how two of his Ships, the *Boyne* and *Chichester*, kept to Windward. How bravely was Mr. *M — w*s assisted by his whole Fleet from Van to Rear?

‡ The *Isabella*.

Eighty.

Eighty-Gun Ship, we suppose the Gentleman did not chuse following her. — But had he given a Signal to quicken the *Dunkirk's* Motion somewhat sooner, 'tis very probable, that she being a Sixty-Gun Ship, (and consequently lighter than his, the *Neptune*) might have come up with the *Spaniard*.

Mr. *L* ——— *k* continues, " When the Fire-ship had miscarried, and our Van were making what haste they could to join our Center, with the *French* close after them in good Order of Battle, Ad ——— *l* *M* ——— *ws* hal'd down the Signal to engage the Enemy, and the Signal for the Line of Battle, and hoisted the Signal to give over Chace; upon which *I* hal'd down the Signal for the Line of Battle, repeated the Signal to give over Chace, and shortened Sail."

What Idea can any intelligent Reader conceive from this very Paragraph of Mr. *L* ——— *k's* Journal? would he not really think that the *French* were pursuing our Van; our Rear, with Mr. *L* ——— *k*, pursuing the *Spaniards*; and the Ad ——— *l* endeavouring, by giving his Signal to leave of Chace, to stop Mr. *L* ——— *k's* Impetuosity? ——— Who can help remarking how *assiduously* he repeats the Signal to give over Chace, and shortened Sail, and how *sullenly*, when the Ad ——— *l's* Signal was abroad to engage, he refus'd to answer it, as before? ——— What could any Ad ——— *l* have done in this State, but endeavoured to get his scatter'd Fleet into some Order, especially when he found some of those that were nearest to him would not engage? what then could he think of those who took care to keep at a Distance?

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As the *French* were intent upon assisting \* the *Spanish* Squadron, (by Mr. L——k's Account) they did not tack, but bore away. — Mr. M——ws made Signal for the Line of Battle a-head; and he, together with the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*, *Royal Oak*, (*Dunkirk* and *Cambridge*, two of Mr. L——k's Division) fired at the Enemy, which Firing was the last of the Action. — As Mr. L——k could not have the Honour of a first Stroke at the *Spaniards*, his destined Enemy, it seems, he scorn'd to come in for the last. — But Heaven happily sent Darkness, to veil the ignominious Behaviour of some of the *British* Fleet. —

At Eight o'Clock the same Night, the Ad——l sent the Lieutenant of the *Russel* on board Mr. L——k, to acquaint him, that he had shifted his Flag on board that Ship; and to direct him to keep near to the Ad——l all Night. — And indeed very necessary, to prevent his misunderstanding the Ad——l's Signals, which he much affected; and to keep him near, when it was so difficult to get him, if once asunder.

I cannot proceed without observing, that notwithstanding the many Flings and Scoffs of the Author of the *Narrative*, and Mr. L——k at

\* How much soever Mr. L——k may strain upon some of our Ships mispending their Shot, yet we find that others had the good Fortune to annoy their Enemies with it; otherwise the *French* would not have miss'd the Opportunity they had of tacking on our Van, to come to the Relief of the *Spaniards*. And indeed, we find by the *French's* Journal, that the *Spanish* Squadron was pretty much shatter'd.

Mr.

Mr. *M*——*ws*, as though he had left the *Marlborough* too soon; or even as if he had quitted the Engagement: Yet, as it is apparent that his Ship the *Namure* had suffer'd so much, that he was obliged to quit her immediately after the Battle. — But, drowning Men will catch at a Straw.

Notwithstanding Mr. *L*——*k*'s Behaviour in not returning the Admiral's Signals, &c. we find that Mr. *M*——*ws* was so unaffected with it, that he complaisantly wrote him a Letter, which he received about Eight o'Clock in the Morning, to desire him, when he (the Admiral) made Signal for the Line of Battle ahead, that Mr. *L*——*k* would lead with his Division, whether with Starboard or Larboard Tacks on board. At the same Time the Vice-Admiral returned his Compliments to the Admiral by Captain *Long*, with his Opinion, that they should do nothing unless they engaged the Enemy in a proper Disposition. — Who can forbear observing the presumptuous Overbearing, I might say, insolent Return to the Admiral's Letter? And whatever Objections have been made to the Admiral's Order at this Time, as *Loss of Time, and running the Gauntlet of the whole Fleet, &c.* Yet it was absolutely necessary, both to prevent his Divisions lagging behind as they did the Day before; and also that he might chace the Enemy, his Ships being in a better Condition to do it, as they were undamaged in the preceding Day's Action. — The Admiral seeming by this Order to try *whether Mr. L*——*k* *would lead, as he had found the Day before that he would not drive.*

Accordingly at nine o'Clock, we find (by Mr.

*I i*

*L*——*k*)

*L——k*) that he made Signal for his Divisions giving Chace to the S. W. and crowded Sail a-head very alert to come up with the Enemy, when he was almost certain of not overtaking them. But the Admiral, I suppose, not liking this over and above Alertness, no more than he did the Inactivity of the preceding Day; after suffering him to give Chace from Nine till Two (five Hours) brought to, and was obliged to give the Signal about Three, for his making more Sail, which he repeated and obey'd. — I might here, after the Manner of the Author of the Narrative, enter upon a pompous Dissertation on the Difference of Men's Courage, Vigour, and Alertness in the Time of Action and Danger; and that of Pursuit. How quickly can they summon all their locomotive Faculties to pursue a flying Enemy? But, Matter of Fact being my present Business, I shall decline Eloquence or Exaggerations, though I have more just Occasion, than any that our renowned Author had, in all his long-winded, sincere, candid Narrative, which is half full of unjust Reflections.

At Six o'Clock our Fleet brought to, with their Starboard Tacks, being perfectly well formed in a Line of Battle. — *This is the only Time Mr. L——k allows them to have been perfectly well form'd.*

At Ten o'Clock, Mr. *L——k* says he lost Sight of the Enemy.

At half an Hour past Two, the Admiral made Signal for the Fleet to make Sail; and at Day-break Mr. *L——k* made Signal, for seeing above twenty Sail of the Enemy, then bearing W. S. W.

At Seven, the Admiral accordingly made Signal for the Fleet's drawing into a Line of Battle a-head.

At Nine o'Clock, he made Signal for the Fleet to give over Chace; and sent the *Winchelsea* to order Mr. *L——k* to give over Chace.

At Ten o'Clock, the Admiral continuing the Signal abroad for the Ships to Windward to bear down into his Wake, fired another Gun. Fresh Gales; the Wind came more to Eastward. Lost Sight of the Enemy.

And here I intend to lose Sight of these Articles of our Vice Admiral's Journal, till such Time as we come to the Mention of them in the Observations on his *Recapitulation*; to which I shall immediately proceed.

In what is stiled the *Recapitulation* of Mr. *L——k*, spoken by him, at the Bar of the House of Commons, on *Tuesday* the 9th of *April* 1745, he thanks that Honourable Committee, for the Indulgence of having a Chair allow'd him at the Bar; and then proceeds to inform them, that in eight Months after he had procured his Majesty's Order for bringing him to a Trial, he could not obtain to have his Witnesses called home; having only such as Chance had sent in his Way. — What an invidious Insinuation on his Majesty and his Ministry! — Were not the numerous Witnesses he sent for order'd Home by one of his Majesty's Messengers, dispatch'd expressly for that Purpose to Admiral *Rowley*? As he had requested to be tried by a Court-Martial, could the Admiralty be ascertain'd, even before the Meeting of Parliament, of the House of Commons taking this Affair into Consideration? Did they not proceed regularly in sum-

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moning the Witnesses as soon as they had received Mr. *M———*'s Charge? — Would he bring Witnesses before any Charge is laid against him? — But to proceed, he complains of lying under greater Disadvantages, than the Gentleman that laid the Suspension on him, by not being permitted to cross-examine the Witnesses. — Had this been allowed, the Evidence would have stood a fine Chance, by his tormentous inconsistent Enquiry, in order to pick a Hole in his Commander's Coat, to mend his own with. — However, though the Honourable House did not think proper to give him this Liberty, he ventures to take it in his Speech, by traversing their Evidence; and makes great Objections to Capt. *Marsh's*, of the *Winchelsea*, saying, that had he steer'd a Point, or half a Point more to the Leeward, he might have got up to engage the sternmost Ships; and brings Capt. *Long's* Evidence to invalidate Capt. *Marsh's* in this Affair. — I shall leave Capt. *Marsh* to clear himself from our Vice Admiral's Quibbles, (about judging to a Point at five Miles Distance) at the Court Martial; and only observe, that the said Gentleman is positive Mr. *L——k* had his Wind, and shorten'd Sail at Three o'Clock.

Our Vice Admiral urges strongly, that no one can charge him with having broke the Line of Battle; neither could he think the Admiral would have attack'd the *Spanish* Squadron, which ought to have fallen to his Share.

He might as well, were it possible, have form'd into a Line of Battle, at the Distance of a hundred Miles from the Center as where he did; and I durst swear, done as effectual Service: But for his expecting the Admiral to suffer the *Spanish* Squadron to escape, or the Combin'd Fleet

Fleet to get the Wind-Gage of him, which seems to have been their Intention; is it not ridiculous that two Divisions of a Fleet should suffer for the Obstinacy of one? — But, says he, had he sent me a Message to have gone after these Ships, or made a Signal for me and my Division to give Chace in the Morning, before the sternmost Ships were so much a-head, though I could not get up to engage, yet possibly I might have kept two or three of them before the Wind. Here he desires the Admiral (who could not see him Over-night) to send him a Message to pursue with his whole Division, two or three Ships, even at a Time when the Admiral thought to have reach'd the Combin'd Fleet, so as to have been a-breast of their Center; and Mr. *L——k* to have the Rear to engage; both which, our Enemies Nimbleness, and his Dilatoriness, prevented. — But why, when he found the Admiral engaged with the *Spanish* Squadron, did he not attempt the sternmost of their Ships? Because, truly, he was afraid of going so far to Leeward of the Center, as not to be back again at Night.

As I have already, in observing this Journal, taken Notice, that had the Admiral waited much longer for his coming up, the Enemy would either have escap'd or gain'd the Wind. — I shall say nothing more of his accusing Mr. *M——ws* with Rashness, in hurrying on without him, only observing that Piece of Inconsistency, in endeavouring to clear himself, he acknowledges †, That both the Admiral and the *Marlborough*, being good sailing Ships, did reef, which might induce the Gentlemen a-

† See *Recapitulation*.

stern to think he had done the same. — Were the Gentlemen a-stern so dim-sighted, that they could not distinguish his Ship from the Admiral's and *Marlborough* so much a-head? And if these two did reef, what was it for? Surely to wait his coming up, not to hasten from him.

As for what he mentions concerning the Rumour of his holding a Correspondence with the Enemy, and the Ridiculousness thereof. — I shall only observe, that the Seamen in general are so honest-hearted, as never to tax any Man of Misbehaviour, unless there is some Occasion: Here was apparent Misbehaviour, but to what Cause could they assign it? not to Cowardice surely in a Man that had been so many Years in the Navy, and had always behaved so well before! As for *Treachery*, whatever they might judge, our Vice-Ad — I seems to be safe enough at present, if he and his supposed *Confederates* can but keep their own Counsel.

As to what he says of our Van's being saved by keeping the Wind, and not obeying the Signal for the Line of Battle, and engaging abroad: 'Tis unnecessary to reply any farther than by asking, if the Admiral saw their Actions, and did not disapprove of them at that Juncture, was there any Necessity of recalling them by Signals? or would he have their Officers punish'd for preventing the *French* from tacking on us? — I believe it is demonstrable, that their Disobedience, as he unjustly calls it, did more Good than his strictest Observance of Order and Discipline.

It is worthy Observation to perceive how readily he can censure the *Dorsetshire*, *Essex*, *Rupert*,

*pert*, and *Royal Oak*, for not bearing down with the *Marlborough*, which, says he, “ would have stopt the Sternmost from getting a-head “ for me to have taken up.” — But why did he not endeavour to get up with them when he fir’d a Shot at the Sternmost? And as for his Remarks on the Admiral’s not continuing in Battle, ’tis, as I have shewn already, a palpable Falsity; when as his Ship the *Namure* had suffered so much that he was obliged to quit her.

This *Account* of the unhappy *Affair* of the Fireship’s blowing up too soon, and the *Berwick’s* Men being left on Board the *Poder*, demonstrates, that he was more mindful of the Admiral’s, and other’s Conduct, than of his own; and neglected his own Business, by troubling himself about other’s. — That the Admiral brought too so far to Windward in a fine Moonlight Night, might, perhaps, be to keep to Mr. *L* — — — k’s fresh Division near to him; and the more probable, as he sent him such a Message about eight o’Clock, which might be the Cause of the Admiral’s not pursuing the Enemy by Night. Mr. *L* — — — k’s Eagerness to pursue the Enemy next Morning; his getting a full View of them when No-body else could perceive them, is astonishing: But how could the Admiral’s Account for such sudden Alacrity, so as to be able to trust to it, whether he was blameable or not, must be referred to a *Court Martial*. — If Mr. *L* — — — k has been wrongfully suspended, they must make him Satisfaction; if Mr. *M* — — — — — ’s Conduct has been wrong arraigned more from Malice than Truth, they will make him Recompence. — The Captains of the Fleet sending  
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ing their Boats on Board the next Morning after Mr. *L*———*k* had struck his Flag, to enquire whether he was not dead, appears to me in another Light than he intended it should. \*——— The Governor of *Minorca*'s saluting him with fifteen Guns on his Departure, shews if he was not one of Mr. *L*———*k*'s Creatures, that he thought him innocent: And I shall conclude with wishing him to appear so on his Trial.

\* *Query*, Did they suspect him suspended by any but his own Hands?



*F I N I S.*



